Panel Title
Perspectivism in Plato’s Views of the Gods
Location
Thomas 224
Start Date
10-12-2013 10:15 AM
End Date
10-12-2013 11:00 AM
Abstract
In the Sophist (235 c - 237 a), Plato presents a distinction between two kinds of mimetic art: “the art of likeness-making” (eikastikè technè), over against “the art of appearance-making” (fantastikè technè). The first consists in the accurate reproduction of the proportions of the model, while the second applies a number of tricks to remedy the optical effects brought about by the spectator’s perspective. Plato clearly prefers the image that accurately reproduces the proportions of the model, over the “perspectival” image, which –though more artistic – falls short in truth-value.
This rejection of perspectivism is a major point in Plato’s aesthetics, ethics, and epistemology. But it also underlies Plato’s theology. Contrary to what recent interpreters have held, Plato’s theology is not about introducing a monistic system headed by a thinking (and hence, comprehensible) Nous. Rather, Plato’s view of the gods is based on accepting human beings’ incapacity to grasp the nature of the gods. Ultimately, “god is pre-eminently the ‘measure of all things’.” (Laws IV, 716 c-d). That leaves us again with the problem of “perspectivism”. Starting from Plato’s hesitation in speaking about the gods (e.g., Crat. 400 d - 401 a, and Phdr. 246 b-d), and on his rejection of the Homeric description of the gods (Rep. II), we shall discuss this rejection of perspectivism in the context of theology. This will also involve a discussion of “speaking about the gods” in the context of cosmology (e.g. the Demiurge in the Timaeus), and, in general, of Plato’s innovation (or lack of it) in theology.
Perspectivism in Plato’s Views of the Gods
Thomas 224
In the Sophist (235 c - 237 a), Plato presents a distinction between two kinds of mimetic art: “the art of likeness-making” (eikastikè technè), over against “the art of appearance-making” (fantastikè technè). The first consists in the accurate reproduction of the proportions of the model, while the second applies a number of tricks to remedy the optical effects brought about by the spectator’s perspective. Plato clearly prefers the image that accurately reproduces the proportions of the model, over the “perspectival” image, which –though more artistic – falls short in truth-value.
This rejection of perspectivism is a major point in Plato’s aesthetics, ethics, and epistemology. But it also underlies Plato’s theology. Contrary to what recent interpreters have held, Plato’s theology is not about introducing a monistic system headed by a thinking (and hence, comprehensible) Nous. Rather, Plato’s view of the gods is based on accepting human beings’ incapacity to grasp the nature of the gods. Ultimately, “god is pre-eminently the ‘measure of all things’.” (Laws IV, 716 c-d). That leaves us again with the problem of “perspectivism”. Starting from Plato’s hesitation in speaking about the gods (e.g., Crat. 400 d - 401 a, and Phdr. 246 b-d), and on his rejection of the Homeric description of the gods (Rep. II), we shall discuss this rejection of perspectivism in the context of theology. This will also involve a discussion of “speaking about the gods” in the context of cosmology (e.g. the Demiurge in the Timaeus), and, in general, of Plato’s innovation (or lack of it) in theology.