Panel Title
Two images of the Soul in the Republic: The three-headed Beast (Book IX) and the Sea Creature Glaucus (Book X)
Location
Thomas 224
Start Date
10-12-2013 9:30 AM
End Date
10-12-2013 10:15 AM
Abstract
The moral psychology of the Republic is based on the conception of a tripartite soul, which is put into visual form in Book IX and, if Socrates is to be believed, Book X. It is interesting to compare the images of the three-headed beast and the sea creature Glaucus for two reasons: first, because they are both associated with strange beings, making the soul respectively into a sort of three-headed monster and a being with a deformed body; and second, because they are linked by Socrates, who makes them both images of the tripartite soul. Therefore they are not, according to him, fundamentally different: “we have seen the soul in a condition that is like that of the sea Glaucus” (611c8). Despite the fact that the idea of the composite soul, although not cast into doubt, seems somewhat undermined by the image of Glaucus, which suggests the idea of a simple soul, these two images are in reality complementary. The image of the three-headed beast enriches our understanding of the nature of the soul in relation to the arguments in Books IV and IX, while the image of Glaucus illustrates in a specific way the limits of the psychology of the Republic.
Two images of the Soul in the Republic: The three-headed Beast (Book IX) and the Sea Creature Glaucus (Book X)
Thomas 224
The moral psychology of the Republic is based on the conception of a tripartite soul, which is put into visual form in Book IX and, if Socrates is to be believed, Book X. It is interesting to compare the images of the three-headed beast and the sea creature Glaucus for two reasons: first, because they are both associated with strange beings, making the soul respectively into a sort of three-headed monster and a being with a deformed body; and second, because they are linked by Socrates, who makes them both images of the tripartite soul. Therefore they are not, according to him, fundamentally different: “we have seen the soul in a condition that is like that of the sea Glaucus” (611c8). Despite the fact that the idea of the composite soul, although not cast into doubt, seems somewhat undermined by the image of Glaucus, which suggests the idea of a simple soul, these two images are in reality complementary. The image of the three-headed beast enriches our understanding of the nature of the soul in relation to the arguments in Books IV and IX, while the image of Glaucus illustrates in a specific way the limits of the psychology of the Republic.