

2019

Misleading and Unclear to the Many: Allegory in the Derveni Papyrus and the Orphic Theogony of Hieronymus

Radcliffe G. Edmonds III
Bryn Mawr College, redmonds@brynmawr.edu

[Let us know how access to this document benefits you.](#)

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.brynmawr.edu/classics_pubs

 Part of the [Classics Commons](#)

Custom Citation

Edmonds, Radcliffe G., III. 2019. "The Derveni Papyrus: Unearthing Ancient Mysteries." In *The Derveni Papyrus: Unearthing Ancient Mysteries*, edited by Marco Antonio Santamaria, 77-99. Leiden: Brill.

This paper is posted at Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr College. https://repository.brynmawr.edu/classics_pubs/122

For more information, please contact repository@brynmawr.edu.

Misleading and Unclear to the Many: Allegory in the Derveni Papyrus and the Orphic *Theogony of Hieronymus*

Radcliffe G. Edmonds III

1 Introduction

This verse has been made misleading and it is unclear to the many, but to those who understand correctly it is clear that Oceanus is the air and air is Zeus.¹

This rather surprising claim is only one of the many allegorical interpretations made by the unknown author of the Derveni Papyrus in his explanation of a poem of Orpheus. The discovery and publication of the Derveni Papyrus has, among other things, fuelled a new interest in the history of allegorical interpretation in the Greek philosophical and religious traditions. When the papyrus was first uncovered, scholars often sneered at the peculiar interpretations provided by the Derveni Author (henceforth DA), but recent studies have taken the DA more seriously as a thinker, trying to understand the context in which these interpretations could be offered. The problem of context is, of course, endemic to the study of the Orphica, since the fragments of poetry attributed to Orpheus are inevitably out of context. Such absence of context is particularly the case for the references in the Neoplatonic philosophers, such as Damascius' references to earlier Orphic theogonies, the *Rhapsodies* and the ones in the accounts of Eudemus and Hieronymus, which provide only tantalising hints at several removes from the actual poems. It is even true, however, for the most complete Orphic text that survives, the remains of the papyrus burned on a funeral pyre of an aristocratic warrior near Derveni in Thessaly sometime in the late fourth century. The archaeological context provides only a rough date for the tomb; it remains unclear when the text of the papyrus

was composed, by whom, for whom, or even why it was included on the pyre.²

Scholars have, for the most part, focused upon the content of the treatise in the Derveni Papyrus, trying to reconstruct the underlying cosmology of the DA, who shows no sign of Platonic influence but a great deal of influence from Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, and other so-called pre-Socratic philosophers.³ Some of the ideas and exegetical techniques have, however, recently prompted some scholars to consider a Stoic context for the treatise. I suggest that an examination of the use of allegory in the Derveni Papyrus can help fill in the missing context for the treatise, showing that the DA is a ritual practitioner in the age of Euripides, rather than a scholar of the Stoic school. By contrast, an examination of the presence of allegory in the Orphic theogony associated with Hieronymus and Hellanicus can contextualise the source of that account, showing it to be a product of Peripatetic systematising of sophistic allegoresis, rather than a much later account deriving from a Stoic allegorical reworking of an earlier Orphic poem. Attention to the ways in which allegory is used in these two texts illuminates the two differing contexts, neither Stoic, that give rise to these accounts. The scholastic way in which allegory is treated in the Peripatetic accounts highlights, through the contrast, the agonistic way in which the DA employs his allegories, and a better understanding of these two contexts sophistic contestation and Peripatetic systematisation—provides a better grasp of the ways allegory was used before the Stoics, as well as a clearer understanding of the way in which Orphic poems were received in the Classical period.

1 *PDerv.* col. XXIII 1–3: τὸ ἔπος πα[ρα]γωγὸν πεπὸνται καὶ το[ῖς] μ[ὲν] | πολλοῖς ἀδηλὸν ἐστὶ τοῖς δὲ ὀρθῶς γινώσκουσιν | εὐδηλον ὅτι Ὠκεανὸς ἐστὶν ὁ ἀήρ, ἀήρ δὲ Ζεὺς.

2 Cf. the overview of the archaeological context in Kouremenos' introduction of the KPT edition, 1–19.

3 Starting with Burkert 1967, many scholars have tackled the issue; note especially Burkert 1970 and 1997, Bernabé 2002, 2004, 2008, and most importantly, Betegh 2004.

2 Why Use Allegory?

Scholars have explained the DA's striking use of allegory in radically different ways, providing widely varying pictures of the DA and his religious and philosophical background. At one extreme are those who argue that the DA's explanations of the traditional gods in terms of physical theories mark him as what the ancients labelled an "atheist," someone who attacks the traditional religious beliefs. According to Janko, the DA is a product of post-Anaxagorean rationalism, using allegory to polemicise against the irrationality of traditional beliefs.⁴ The DA's allegoresis strips away the obfuscating trappings of myth to show that the hidden meaning of the poem is the movements of particles amidst the air and fire, since "he is whole-heartedly committed to what can be called a 'protoscientific' / naturalistic worldview and has no use for mystery cults with their obscurantist conception of the world."⁵

Other scholars see the DA's allegorising as a defense of traditional religion, rather than an attack upon it. Jourdan suggests that the DA is responding to the attack by suggesting that the rationalists' literal reading of the texts misses the profound meaning hidden within it.⁶ This "defensive" allegory draws upon the rationalist philosophers to correct the problems that the traditional myths present with their unclear and even scandalous stories, but with the aim of restoring faith in the tradition, rather than destroying it. As Laks suggests, "The overall intellectual horizon that is at work in the Derveni Papyrus could well be that of a rational Enlightenment turned against the two main forms of religious obscurantism: ethics is to ritual what physics is to myth."⁷

4 For his contemporaries, "the ultimate outrage would have been the allegory itself—the interpretation of the holy poem as a coded version of the latest physics, and the equation of God with the most basic element, Air." Janko 2002–3: 13. Cf. Janko 2001: 2: "It is my contention that he sets out to criticize most of his contemporaries on the ground that they believed too literally in the rites and holy texts of traditional religion."

5 Kouremenos in KPT: 52.

6 Jourdan 2003: xiv: "L'auteur reproche à ses contemporains une compréhension trop littérale des rites et textes sacrés. Cette incapacité à pénétrer leur sens profond les conduits inéluctablement à un défaut de croyance. Pour pallier ce danger, il en propose une exégèse." Cf. Brisson 2010: 29: "Les hommes qui sont incapables d'une véritable exégèse ne peuvent comprendre le message que transmet le poème orphique et donc y croire. Cela les amène à ne pas prendre en compte les châtements qui les attendent dans l'Hadès; et ils se privent ainsi de toute possibilité de salut."

7 Laks 1997: 126. Cf. Laks 1997: 138: "He is, in the first place, an up to date believer in divine providence and omnipotence, and an interesting representative of a trend that could be dubbed *religious secularization*."

While some scholars thus see the DA as defending the authority of the traditional texts through allegoresis, others suggest that he is borrowing the authority of Orpheus' poem to support his own ideas, since he could never engage in such outrageous interpretations if Orpheus' ideas were his primary concern.⁸ West imagines the DA as a speculative theologian providing avant-garde theology for a group of Orphic faithful, while Most and Casadio suggest that his views are so divergent from those generally associated with Orphism by modern scholars that he must be some sort of heretical Orphic, preaching his own doctrine.⁹ Allegory becomes the tool for this thinker to introduce his own innovative ideas while retaining the sanction of the traditional authorities.

Such a tactic of appropriating through allegoresis the authority of traditional myths for the development of new philosophical ideas prompts other scholars to link the DA with the Stoics, who are notorious from Cicero's critique for precisely such activities. Plato and Aristotle certainly introduce their own philosophical and cosmological notions, but they both explicitly reject allegoresis as a legitimate means of contesting their predecessors.¹⁰ The Stoics,

8 *Contra* Laks 1997: 134–5: "We can probably forget about 'legitimation': it would seem somewhat perverse to picture the author of the Derveni papyrus as a natural philosopher looking for warrants in an Orphic theogony, because one would expect such warrants to be universally recognized texts (as Homer is), not marginal productions such as an Orphic theogonical poem. But 'defence,' although it is more relevant to what the allegorist is doing, is not quite enough, if we assume, as there is every reason to believe, that the author of the Derveni papyrus was committed to the Orphic tradition in a way that one can hardly claim of Homer—unless Homer is the Neoplatonic Theologian. Does not reading Presocratic physics into an Orphic text destroy its Orphic character, which is precisely what it is supposed to defend? It would seem that we are in a quandary." However, cf. Struck 2004: 12–4 on the problems with the dichotomy of 'defensive' and 'positive' allegory.

9 West 1997: 84: "The initiates he mentions are those of an Orphic-Bacchic cult society; the theogony is their holy book, perhaps recited in conjunction with their sacrifices. He is their learned exegete ... these cults will always have had a place for the speculative theologian who was ready to explain to the participants that their rites held mystic meanings which only the instructed could grasp (and they only for a fee)." Contrast Most 1997: 121: "He is, or would like to be, the leader of a particular grouping or sect within Orphism which considers itself Orphic and stands in opposition to non-Orphics, but at the same time distinguishes itself by its doctrine from other Orphic groups." Casadio 1986: 299 comments: "ma un iniziato orfico ben strano e un interprete inetto o eretico doveva essere il nostro commentatore."

10 As Brisson 2010: 23 notes of the DA's allegoresis: "Il ne peut avoir subi ni l'influence platonicienne, car Platon est hostile à l'allégorie, ni l'influence aristotélicienne, puisque l'allégorie était peu pratiquée dans cette École. Il reste alors le stoïcisme."

by contrast, seem to have embraced allegoresis as a way of introducing ideas about the nature of the cosmos, some of which, such as the central role of fire and the providence of a single, supreme deity, resemble those put forward by the DA.

All of these scholars start with the assumption that the primary purpose of the allegoresis is to propound a religious doctrine that corresponds with a physical theory of the cosmos, even if the reconstruction of that physical theory depends on the assumptions about the religious doctrine (and vice versa).¹¹ I argue to the contrary that, while the DA certainly has both religious and physical ideas, the exposition of a systematic doctrine is not the aim of the DA in the text of the papyrus. Rather, the DA is a religious practitioner trying to win clientele, and his practice of allegorical interpretation is a tactic to establish his expertise within the competitive marketplace of his times.

3 The DA as Ritual Practitioner

Since the revelation of the ritual focus in the first few columns of the Derveni Papyrus, the identity of the DA as a ritual practitioner has seemed to many scholars to be of paramount importance in explaining his use of allegorical interpretations, but most have still assumed that his physical ideas must somehow systematically provide the support for his religious practices. Obbink sees the cosmogony in the Orphic poem as part of an initiatory ritual re-establishment of cosmic order, while the DA's allegorical interpretations become an explanation of that cosmic order that provides the initiates with understanding of their ritual transformation and renewal.¹² Betegh, on the other hand, sees the very process of exegesis as crucial to the salvation offered by the DA in his expertise.

If we find the right way to make the connection between the text and the cosmos, then the two will mirror and interpret each other. The text will help us in understanding the constitution of the world,

¹¹ As Laks 1997: 127 argues, "Obviously, trying to make out how the Derveni allegory can perform a religious function presupposes that we reconstruct the physics of the Derveni author."

¹² Obbink 1997: 40: "I am concerned first to show how the Derveni author might have seen his elucidation of cosmology as possible instruction for mystic initiates, in which an eschatological myth associated with the mysteries is combined with a dominant concern about relations between elements." I have argued elsewhere (Edmonds 2013: 105–11) about the problems with this pernicious Eliadean model of cosmogony undergirding initiatory ritual misapplied to elements of Greek religion.

while our knowledge of the world will further our understanding of Orpheus' text.¹³

On this view, the DA is concerned to explain the nature of the cosmos to his clients, for only in this way can they live appropriately, but, as Detienne argues, it is the very act of hermeneutical engagement with the text of Orpheus that provides the way to salvation.¹⁴

I argue that the DA's allegoresis is not a *recherché* mode of hermeneutical salvation that depends upon a systematic correspondence between his physical system and his sacred text, but rather a technique that he shows off in his treatise to demonstrate his expertise in his craft as a ritual expert; it is his ability to give a *logos*, rather than the content of that account, that is his primary focus in the text. Like the wise priests Socrates mentions in the *Meno*, the DA provides many complex explanations of both myths and rituals in his treatise.¹⁵ When he expresses his scorn and pity for those who go to other practitioners who fail to explain the rites, he emphasizes the distinction between those who do not provide an explanation and his own practices.

But all those who (hope to acquire knowledge?) from someone who makes a craft of the holy rites deserve to be wondered at and pitied. Wondered at because, thinking that they will know before they perform the rites, they go away after having performed them before they have attained knowledge.¹⁶

¹³ Betegh 2004: 365; in p. 355 he stresses the DA's systematic approach, like that of the Hippocratic doctors: "The Derveni text can be seen as an attempt to implement for the *orpheotelestes*' craft a certain type of professional attitude, methodology and argumentative strategy which we can see most notably in the sphere of the medical art."

¹⁴ Detienne 2003: 135: "The papyrus found at Derveni is a text of philosophical hermeneutics, which refers to the system of Anaxagoras and its ideas of separation and differentiation. Its spirited exegesis sets out to show that what Orpheus thinks and says is always correct and that the meaning of words that Orpheus deliberately uses to express the world has existed ever since the time when things were separated out, giving birth to the world and all its parts. The song of Orpheus generates interpretations, gives rise to exegetic constructions that become or are an integral part of the Orphic discourse."

¹⁵ Pl. *Men.* 81a 10-b 2: "The speakers were certain priests and priestesses who have made it a practice to be able to give an account of the things they have in hand." οἱ μὲν λέγοντές εἰσι τῶν ἱερέων τε καὶ τῶν ἱερειῶν ὅσοις μεμέληκε περὶ ὧν μεταχειρίζονται λόγον οἷος τ' εἶναι διδόναι.

¹⁶ Col. xx 3–7: ὅσοι δὲ παρὰ τοῦ | τέχνην ποιουμένου τὰ ἱερά, οὗτοι ἀξιοθαυμάζεσθαι | καὶ οἰκτε[ί]ρεσθαι· θαυμάζεσθαι μὲν ὅτι θεοκούντες | πρότερον ἢ ἐπιτελέσαι εἰδήσειν, ἀπέρχονται ἐπι-|τελέσαντες πρὶν εἰδέναι.

The DA is not here condemning all ritual practices, merely denigrating the inferior practices of his rivals. Understanding the DA's use of allegory, I argue, requires placing him within the proper context of this competition for authority, the marketplace in which different thinkers advertise their expertise, not so much by a systematic exposition of their theological and philosophical doctrines as by an *epideixis* of their professional abilities as interpreters of rituals and texts. The Derveni Papyrus, with its demonstration of complex allegorical interpretations, is an epideictic advertisement within this competitive marketplace, like the showpieces of Gorgias on Helen or some of the early Hippocratic treatises, rather than the scholastic arguments of the Stoics and Peripatetics that catalogue earlier interpretations in their systematic exposition of alternative theses.

4 The Contest Context

Begging priests and prophets frequent the doors of the rich and persuade them that they possess a god-given power founded on sacrifices and incantations And they present a hubbub of books by Musaeus and Orpheus, offspring as they say of Selene and the Muses, in accordance with which they perform their rituals. And they persuade not only individuals but whole cities that the unjust deeds can be absolved or purified through ritual sacrifices and pleasant games, whether for them still living or when they have died. These initiations, as they call them, free people from punishment hereafter, while a terrible fate awaits those who have not performed the rituals.¹⁷

Plato's famous lines in the *Republic* provide the best illustration of this marketplace, and the DA is doubtless one of those specialists unfairly characterised as immoral charlatans, who try to persuade their clients of their expertise in relations with the gods. The hubbub of books by Orpheus and Musaeus described by Plato is importantly

17 Pl. *R.* 364b–365a: ἀγύρται δὲ καὶ μάντιες ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας ἰόντες πείθουσιν ὡς ἔστι παρὰ σφίσι δύναμις ἐκ θεῶν ποριζομένη θυσιαῖς τε καὶ ἐπωιδαῖς ... βιβλίων δὲ ἄμαθρον παρέχονται Μουσαίου καὶ Ὀρφέως, Σελήνης τε καὶ Μουσῶν ἐργόνων, ὡς φασί, καθ' ἃς θυηπολοῦσιν, πείθοντες οὐ μόνον ἰδιώτας ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεις, ὡς ἄρα λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικημάτων διὰ θυσιῶν καὶ παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν εἰσι μὲν ἔτι ζῶσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ἃς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν, αἱ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν ἀπολύουσιν ἡμᾶς, μὴ θύσαντας δὲ δεῖν ἀπεριμένει. Portions of the following argument are adapted from Edmonds 2013: 124–35. They are used with permission of Cambridge University Press.

an essentially agonistic discourse; the books are deployed in struggles for discursive authority, in contests where the prize is the reputation for wisdom and all of the influence that comes with it. Plato himself, in his attacks on the sophists, provides the most vivid pictures of such clamour, the disputes back and forth between rival experts professing special knowledge. Aristophanes' contest between the weaker and stronger argument in the *Clouds* takes such contests to an absurd extreme, but it is worth noting that the function of the contest is to convince the onlookers that Socrates has wisdom worth acquiring. These sophistic contests are the direct descendants of the wisdom contests that provide the performance contexts for most of the poetry and prose in the Greek tradition, a competitive tradition that continues in the poetic competitions (of tragedy, comedy, and other forms) of the religious festivals.¹⁸ Thus, Plato's *Ion* boasts that he can outdo his rivals—Metrodorus of Lampsacus, Stesimbrotus of Thasos, or Glaucon—in his skill at the exegesis of Homer.¹⁹

An early Hippocratic treatise describes this agonistic milieu, in which various pretenders to medical knowledge dispute with one another over the superiority of their ideas. He draws a vivid picture of the public arena, in which such disputations, like wrestling matches, might be won by whoever knocked down his opponent three times in a row:

One could understand this best, if he were present when they were debating. For when the same speakers dispute with one another in front of the same audience, the same man never wins in the discussion three times in a row, but sometimes this one wins, sometimes that one, and sometimes whoever happens to have the most fluent tongue in addressing the mob.²⁰

18 Gagarin 2002: 18–22. For this tradition of contest, see Griffith 1990. This impulse to competition is fundamental to Greek culture, as Hesiod notes in *Op.* 20–6: φθονέει καὶ αἰδοῦς αἰδοῦμαι.

19 Pl. *Ion* 530cd: “And I consider I speak about Homer better than anybody, for neither Metrodorus of Lampsacus, nor Stesimbrotus of Thasos, nor Glaucon, nor any one that the world has ever seen, had so many and such fine comments to offer on Homer as I have.” καὶ οἶμαι κάλλιστα ἀνθρώπων λέγειν περὶ Ὀμήρου, ὡς οὔτε Μητρόδωρος ὁ Λαμψακηνὸς οὔτε Στησίμβροτος ὁ Θάσιος οὔτε Γλαύκων οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τῶν πάποτε γενομένων ἔσχεν εἰπεῖν οὔτω πολλὰς καὶ καλὰς διανοίας περὶ Ὀμήρου ὅσας ἐγώ.

20 *Hr. Nat. Hom.* 1.15–20: Γνοίη δ' ἂν τις τότε μάλιστα παραγενόμενος αὐτέοισιν ἀντιλέγουσιν· πρὸς γὰρ ἀλλήλους ἀντιλέγοντες οἱ αὐτοὶ ἄνδρες τῶν αὐτέων ἐναντίον ἀκροατέων οὐδέποτε τρις ἐφεξῆς ὁ αὐτὸς περιγίνεται ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ μὲν οὗτος ἐπικρατεῖ, ποτὲ δὲ οὗτος, ποτὲ δὲ ὧν ἂν τύχηι μάλιστα ἢ γλώσσα ἐπιβρυεῖσα πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον. Jouanna 1975: 55–60 attributes this text to Polybus, the son-in-law of Hippocrates, and conjectures that it was written

Many of the Hippocratic treatises begin with such polemical sections, rhetorically denouncing rival practitioners and explaining why the speaker's own method is the best.²¹ For every type of expertise, then, there was a whole spectrum of experts seeking authority and public recognition of their wisdom, from the marginal lunatic fringe to the civically respected and authorised specialists.

An Athenian decree regulating the offering of first fruits at Eleusis provides a case in which a panel of experts, including the famous *mantis* Lampon, were selected to provide recommendations on how the city should act.²² Lampon was notorious for his political involvement, but others must have been constantly vying for influence in the Assembly on the basis of their religious expertise. Hierocles, who appears as the prominent expert in another decree, was at some point, like Lampon, granted the great civic privilege of dining in the Prytaneum for his services to Athens.²³ The Platonic Euthyphro, however, complains that he is often mocked when he speaks in the Assembly, urging various causes on the basis of his expertise in religious matters. We need not imagine Euthyphro a farcical crank, however, who was just a joke in the Assembly; he was influential enough to become a target of Plato's critiques in two dialogues, even if his assertions of special wisdom were not always accepted in public debates.²⁴ Even the successful were not immune from mockery. Lampon and Hierocles, for example, despite the official recognition by the Assembly of their expertise, are portrayed as money-grubbing charlatans in Aristophanes.²⁵ Just as

tendentiously, Plato lumps together the beggar-priests (ἀγύρται) and diviners who not only come to the doors of the rich, but convince whole cities of their special power and expertise. For every type of expertise, there was a whole spectrum of experts seeking authority and public recognition of their wisdom, and to collapse the distinctions between the widely respected and the lunatic fringe is in itself a polemical move, rejecting all rival claims to wisdom. The DA makes a similar move, dismissing the value of the ritual experience both in the city festivals and in the rituals of other private practitioners and claiming that only his own reasoned discourse provides something worthwhile.

Those men who, while performing the rites in the cities, have seen the holy things, I wonder less that they do not have knowledge. For it is not possible to hear and at the same time to understand what is being said. But all those who (hope to acquire knowledge?) from someone who makes craft of the holy rites deserve to be wondered at and pitied.²⁶

The DA indeed engages in many of the same strategies found in other polemical texts designed to showcase the expertise of the author, denigrating the understanding of the non-specialists and disparaging potential rivals. Not only do the two Arguments in Aristophanes' *Clouds* never cease to abuse each other, but the Hippocratic author sneers at his rivals in the treatise *On the Sacred Disease*, calling them mountebanks and charlatans who puff themselves up with ridiculous claims to special knowledge (unlike the author, who, of course, really has special knowledge).²⁷ The DA frequently draws the

some time in the last decade of the fifth century. Cf. Thomas 2003: 176–80 on the context of such displays.

21 Hp. *Art. 1*, e.g., consists largely of such polemics. Cf. Jouanna 1999: 80–5. See Gagarin 2002: 18–22 for the context of contest among the early medical authors and other sophists.

22 IG I³ 78 = ML 73: περί δὲ τὸ ἐλαίῳ ἀπαρχῆς χτυγγράφ|σας Λάμπων ἐπιδειχσάτο τῆι βολῆι ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνάτης πρυτανείας. | ἡ δὲ βολὴ ἐς τὸν δῆμον ἐχσενενκέτο ἐπάναγκες. Cf. Oliver 1950: 8: "During the fifth century boards of experts were customarily set up to study special problems for which special knowledge was required and to make recommendations in the form of *xyngraphai*." Lampon is undoubtedly the Thuriomantis to whom Aristophanes refers in *Nu.* 332, and he was a prominent figure in Athens at the time, an associate of Pericles (cf. Plu. *Per.* 6.2) who was one of the founders of the colony of Thurii (D. S. 12.10.3–4, cf. Sch. Ar. *Nu.* 332). Cf. Dillery 2005: 196–7.

23 IG 12 39 (IG 13 40) lines 65–69 mentions Hierocles as an expert; in Ar. *Pax* 1084, Trygaeus threatens Hierocles with the loss of his privilege of dining in the Prytaneum.

24 *Euthphr.* 3c. In addition to the *Euthyphro*, much of the *Cratylus* concerns Euthyphro's expertise. Cf. Kahn 1997 for the suggestion that the DA was Euthyphro or someone much like him.

25 E.g., *Nu.* 332, *Av.* 987–8, and *Pax* 1043–7. The fact that Hierocles, who seems to have been consulted as an *exegetes* and perhaps even acted as a *mantis*, could be called a *chresmologos* and

alazon, shows that the terminology was not precise, but depended, as so often, on the speaker's point of view or axe to grind. *Exegetes* was a term implying public acceptance, whereas *mantis* and *chresmologos* could have less positive connotations. Cf. Dillery 2005: 194–7.

26 Col. xx 1–5: ἀνθρώπων ἐν πόλεσιν ἐπιτελέσαντες [τὰ] ἱερά εἶδον, | ἔλασσόν σφας θαυμάζω μὴ γινώσκειν. οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε | ἀκούσαι ὁμοῦ καὶ μαθεῖν τὰ λεγόμενα. ὅσοι δὲ παρά του | τέχνην ποιουμένου τὰ ἱερά, οὗτοι ἄξιοι θαυμάζεσθαι | καὶ οἰκτε[ί]ρεσθαι. I take του in παρά του not as the article, but as the genitive of the indefinite pronoun τις.

27 Hp. *Morb. Sacr.* 1.22–28: "They who first referred this malady to the gods appear to me to have been just such persons as the conjurers, purificators, mountebanks, and charlatans now are, who give themselves out for being excessively religious, and as knowing more than other people. Such persons, then, using the divinity as a pretext and screen of their own inability to afford any assistance, have given out that the disease is sacred." Ἔμοι δὲ δοκέουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι τοῦτο τὸ νόσημα ἀφιερῶσαντες τοιοῦτοι εἶναι ἄνθρωποι οἱ καὶ νῦν εἰσι μάγοι τε καὶ καθάρται καὶ ἀγύρται

distinction between the many, who do not understand (οὐ γινώσκοντες), and those who understand correctly, specifically himself.

This verse has been made misleading and it is unclear to the many, but to those who understand correctly it is clear that Oceanus is the air and air is Zeus.... But those who do not understand think that Oceanus is a river.²⁸

The reason for this widespread ignorance is that Orpheus did not want just anyone to understand; he uses allegory intentionally to cloak his meanings, although he also carefully and systematically chooses his words so that someone as wise as the DA can uncover the important meanings hidden in the poem.²⁹ The DA proves his own understanding and expertise through the *epideixis* of his exegesis, by explaining confusing passages and revealing the hidden meanings, just as Ion shows off his own prowess through exegesis, or the sophists display their expertise in their handling of the poets.

Indeed, the competition described in Plato's *Protagoras* over the interpretation of a poem by Simonides provides the most detailed account of such a wisdom contest in 5th century Athens, showing how the exegesis of an authoritative text could provide the opportunity for someone claiming extra-ordinary wisdom to demonstrate the validity of his claim, and his superiority over his rivals. Plato's scene is set with an all-star cast of sophists, the better to

display the prowess of his champion, Socrates. Not only does Protagoras, the man famous for introducing the teaching of disputation for profit in Athens, take the role as Socrates' chief adversary, but many of the other leading intellectuals of the day (especially Hippias and Prodicus) just happen to be present to pitch in and be defeated in their turn.³⁰ Of course, in his typical fashion, Plato has Socrates eventually change the rules of the game and invent his own kind of contest, more suited to Platonic philosophical inquiry, but, before the Socratic shift, he makes it clear that Socrates can compete in the traditional kind of wisdom contest, and win against the greatest possible opponents.³¹

Protagoras sets up the contest by claiming that "The most important part of education is being clever concerning poetry (περὶ ἐπῶν δεινόν); that is, to understand what is said by the poets, both rightly and not, and to be able to tell the difference and to give an account when challenged."³² Like the contests of oracle explanations or the DA's interpretations, the Simonides contest involves the exegesis of an existing text, rather than the creation of a new one, as in the case of the sophistic long speeches or the medical treatises.³³ At stake in each contest is the reputation of the participants as wise men in the face of the audience that observes them, a reputation that not only determines who and how many will choose to employ their services (as healers, teachers, or advisors), but also how those who take their wisdom seriously will choose to live. Plato's Socrates may belittle the whole contest as the sort of thing that boorish folk do at the symposium when they have drunk too much, but the choice of a Protagorean or Socratic view of the world could have a substantial impact on an Athenian's way of life, just as the choice

καὶ ἀλαζόνες, ὁκόσοι δὴ προσποιέονται σφόδρα θεοσεβέες εἶναι καὶ πλέον τι εἰδέναι. Οὗτοι τοίνυν παραμπεχόμενοι καὶ προβαλλόμενοι τὸ θεῖον τῆς ἀμυχανῆς τοῦ μὴ ἴσχειν ὃ τι προσενέγκαντες ὠφελήσουσιν, ὡς μὴ κατάδηλοι ἔωσιν οὐδὲν ἐπιστάμενοι, ἱερὸν ἐνόμισαν τοῦτο τὸ πάθος εἶναι.

28 Col. xxiii 1–3, 5–6: τοῦτο τὸ ἔπος πα[ρα]γωγὸν πεπότηται καὶ το[ῖς] μὲν | πολλοῖς ἀδηλὸν ἔστιν, τοῖς δὲ ὀρθῶς γινώσκουσιν | εὐδηλον ὅτι "Ὀκεανός" ἔστιν ὁ ἀήρ, ἀήρ δὲ Ζεὺς. | ... οἱ δ' οὐ γινώσκοντες τῶν | Ὀκεανὸν ποταμὸν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. Cf. references to οὐ γινώσκοντες in cols. v, ix, xii, xviii (οὐκ εἰδότες) and xxvi. The ignorant also fail to notice (λανθάνει) that Orpheus uses hyperbaton, col. viii 6: [τ]αῦτα τὰ ἔπη ὑπερβατὰ ἐό[ν]τα λανθάν[ει].

29 Col. xxv 12–3: "Those (words) which come after these he puts before (as a screen) not wishing all men to understand." τὰ δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐπίπροσθε π[ο]ιεῖται | [οὐ β]ου[λό]μενο[ς] πάντας γιν[ώ]σκε[ι]; col. vii 4–7: "His poetry is something strange and riddling for people. But Orpheus did not intend to tell them captious riddles, but momentous things in riddles." ἔστι δὲ ξ[έ]νη τις ἢ | πόησις | [κ]αὶ ἀνθρώ[ποις] αἰν[ι]γμ[α]τῶδης, [κ]ε[ῖ]ν [Ὀρφεὺ]ς αὐτ[ὸ]ς | [ἐ]ρίστ' αἰν[ι]γμ[α]τα οὐκ ἤθελε λέγειν, [ἐν αἰν[ι]γμ[α]σ[ι]ν ὅ]ν δὲ | [μ]εγ[α]λά; col. xxii 1–2: "So he named all things in the same way as finely as he could, knowing the nature of men." πάν[τ] οὐ]ν ὁμοίω[ς] ὠ]νόμασεν ὡς κάλλιστα ἢ[δύ]γατο, | γινώσκων τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὴν φύσιν. Cf. Rangos 2007 for another interpretation of the role of obfuscation.

30 As Ford 2014: 19, puts it: "If Plato were writing the *Protagoras* for our time, he might set it in the 1970's, with young Hippocrates thinking about graduate study at the School of Criticism & Theory at Irvine, where Derrida, de Man and Jameson all happened to be passing through."

31 Cf. the analysis of Ledbetter 2003: 99–118, for some indications of the way Plato uses the debate over the ode to set up his more complex points later in the dialogue. Socrates or Protagoras or a Hippocratic doctor any other wise man may have a coherent view of the cosmos that underlies their ideas, but the contest itself does not involve the systematic exposition of that view but a demonstration of their wisdom and expertise.

32 Pl. *Prt.* 339a: ἡγοῦμαι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι· ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα οἷον τ' εἶναι συνιέναι ἅ τε ὀρθῶς πεποιήται καὶ ἅ μὴ, καὶ ἐπίστασθαι διελεῖν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενον λόγον δοῦναι.

33 Hippias' offer (347b) to perform a long speech on the same subject shows, however, that these two modes were seen as comparable games, even if Plato's Socrates repeatedly rejects the legitimacy of the long speech as a mode of philosophical activity.

between following the medical regime of a Hippocratic doctor or some other, not to mention the choice between Themistocles' (or Cleon's) interpretation of an oracle or someone else's.³⁴ Neither Socrates' nor the sophists' interpretations nor even the chresmologues' oracle readings should be taken as a meaningless joke, since each interpreter sees an important meaning in the text he is explaining, however bizarre the twists of reasoning may seem to other observers.

Indeed, the similarity of his interpretive strategies to those of the oracle-mongers mocked by Aristophanes or of the sophists criticised by Plato have led some modern scholars to doubt either the intelligence or the sincerity of the DA. "Our preposterous commentator," as West refers to him, seems to go out of his way to avoid the obvious meaning of the text, with the result that "his interpretations are uniformly false. Not once does he come near to giving a correct explanation of anything in his text."³⁵ However, giving an explanation finely and correctly (*καλῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς*) is the aim in the Simonides contest too, and we should assess the DA's expertise in the context of this sort of contest, rather than by the standards of nineteenth and twentieth century philology. The DA, like the contestants in the *Protagoras*, seeks to make an explanation that demonstrates his own *sophia*, his acuity and cleverness in explicating the details as well as his understanding of the significance of the text as a whole.

The DA insists, in one of the most controversial passages, that every word of Orpheus must be treated carefully. "Since in his whole work he speaks about matters enigmatically, one has to speak about each word in turn."³⁶ In this case, the DA is speaking about the word *αἰδοῖον*, and he takes the word not as an epithet meaning 'venerable', but rather as a substantive meaning 'phallus'. Uranos the venerable first-born god, he explains, must be understood as the sun, since both the phallus and the sun are generative of new life.³⁷ The DA shows how an event within the

Orphic poem enigmatically signifies the role of the sun and its fire in the generation of life in the cosmos, and he calls attention to his own act of exegesis, displaying his own skill at revealing the obscure significance of a line in a provocatively scandalous way.

Some of his techniques are fairly sophisticated, displaying his ability to situate the Orphic poem within a wider poetic context. Following his policy of word by word exegesis, he tackles the potentially problematic line in which Zeus desires to sleep with his own mother (*μητρὸς ἑᾶς*). 'Mother' he explains as Mind, but he makes a more complex argument about *ἑᾶς*. Just as Socrates makes a point about the Lesbian dialect of Simonides' address to Pittacus, so too the DA points out that in epic language the word *ἑᾶς* can mean 'good,' rather than 'his own.'³⁸ He cites two other verses in which *ἑᾶων* is used in the sense of 'good things' and argues that Orpheus could have used *ἑοῖο* had he wanted to convey the sense of *ἑαυτοῦ*.³⁹ Such an argument may seem ludicrous to a modern philologist, but, within the context of these wisdom contests, it should be taken seriously as a display of the DA's facility with his hermeneutic tools and of his ability to make satisfactory sense out of a troublesome text.

Even more strikingly, the DA, like Socrates in the *Protagoras*, uses the concept of hyperbaton to provide an explanation of verses, the two earliest uses extant of this word as a technical term. Socrates claims that the adverb 'truly' is transposed from modifying the whole concept of it being difficult to become good to the word 'good.'⁴⁰

had *αἰδοῖον* as *phallos*, but Santamaría 2016 has convincingly shown that the DA construes the adjective *αἰδοῖον*, which in the text describes Protogonos as worthy of veneration, as the genital organ because both Protogonos and the genitals are, like the sun, generative of life.

34 Cf. the contests for authority in the interpretations of oracles in Herodotus such as that of Lasus and Onomacritus (7.6.3) or Themistocles and the other interpreters in the Athenian Assembly (7.141–3). Such contests are parodied in Aristophanes, cf. *Av.* 971–90 and *Eq.* 960–1099.

35 West 1983: 82 and 79. Cf. his assessment in p. 88: "the commentator, who is in general the least trustworthy of guides." Rusten 1985: 125, likewise speaks of "the unscrupulous commentator."

36 Col. XIII 6–7: ὅτι μὲν πάσαμ τῆμ πόησιν περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων | αἰνίζεταί κ[α]τ' ἔπος ἕκαστον ἀνάγκη λέγειν. Betegh's translation modified. (The papyrus reads κ[α]τ' ἔπος, which must be an error of anticipation of the aspiration in ἕκαστον; see Santamaría 2012: 63 n. 41).

37 Col. XIII 8–11. The interpretation of this line has caused much controversy. Betegh 2004 and others argue that the Orphic poem

38 *Pl. Prt.* 346e 1: "ἐπαίνημι—and there he has used a Mytilenaeian word, since he is speaking to Pittacus." ἐπαίνημι—καὶ τῆι φωνῆι ἐνταῦθα κέχρηται τῆι τῶν Μυτιληνῶν, ὡς πρὸς Πιττακὸν λέγων.

39 Col. xxvi 8–13. The lines he cites to bolster his argument are equivalent to *Od.* 8.335 and *Il.* 24.527–8, but it is not clear whether the DA cites them as lines of Orpheus or of Homer. KPT: 272 (*ad loc.*) take *δηλοῖ* as impersonal and reject the idea that the DA might have considered the lines Orphic. Noting the suggestion of Obbink 1997: 41 n. 4, however, Betegh 2004: 100 points out that all the other uses of *δηλοῖ* in the text are personal, and suggests that the question must be left open. The question makes little difference to the strategy of the DA, however, especially if these lines are considered part of a common stock of hexameters utilised by epic poets, Orphic as well as Homeric, in their compositions.

40 *Pl. Prt.* 343c–344a: "Now let us all combine in considering whether my account is really true. The opening of the ode must at once appear crazy if, while intending to say that it is hard for a man to become good, he inserted "indeed." There is no sort of sense, I imagine, in this insertion, unless we suppose that Simonides is

The DA argues that Orpheus uses hyperbaton in verses describing Zeus taking over the rulership of the cosmos.

“And when Zeus took from his father the prophesied rule / and the strength in his hands and the glorious daimon.” They fail to notice that these words are transposed (ὑπερβατά). They are to be taken as follows: “Zeus when he took the strength from his father and the glorious daimon.”⁴¹

In both cases, the interpreter is arguing that one must look beyond the obvious ordering of the words in the verse to see the true meaning of the poet’s lines, and this true meaning discovered by the interpreter is substantially different from the obvious one. Not only is the new meaning preferable to the old one because of its correspondence with the ideas and values of the interpreter, but the very act of uncovering this meaning shows the interpreter’s wisdom and hermeneutical expertise.

Many of the allegorical interpretations explicate things in the poem according to the cosmological vision of the

addressing himself to the saying of Pittacus as a disputant: Pittacus says—It is hard to be good; and the poet controverts this by observing—No, but to become good, indeed, is hard for a man, Pittacus, truly—not truly good; he does not mention truth in this connexion, or imply that some things are truly good, while others are good but not truly so: this would seem silly and unlike Simonides. We must rather take the “truly” as a poetical transposition (*hyperbaton*), and first quote the saying of Pittacus in some such way as this: let us suppose Pittacus himself to be speaking and Simonides replying, as thus—Good people, he says, it is hard to be good; and the poet answers—Pittacus, what you say is not true, for it is not being but becoming good, indeed—in hands and feet and mind foursquare, fashioned without reproach—that is truly hard.” ἐπισκεψώμεθα δὴ αὐτὸ κοινῇ ἅπαντες, εἰ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω. εὐθὺς γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ αἵματος μανικὸν ἂν φανείη, εἰ βουλόμενος λέγειν ὅτι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν, ἐπειτα ἐνέβαλε τὸ μέν. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἓνα λόγον φαίνεται ἐμβεβλήσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ τις ὑπολάβῃ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ῥήμα ὡς περ ἐρίζοντα λέγειν τὸν Σιμωνίδην· λέγοντος τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ὅτι “χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι,” ἀμφισβητοῦντα εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐκ, ἀλλὰ “γενέσθαι μέν χαλεπὸν” ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν, ὡς Πιττακέ, ὡς ἀληθῶς—οὐκ ἀληθεῖαι ἀγαθὸν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτῳ λέγει τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὡς ἄρα ὄντων τινῶν τῶν μέν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθῶν, τῶν δὲ ἀγαθῶν μέν, οὐ μέντοι ἀληθῶς—εὐηθεῖς γὰρ τοῦτο γε φανείη ἂν καὶ οὐ Σιμωνίδου—ἀλλ’ ὑπερβατὸν δεῖ θεῖναι ἐν τῷ αἵματι τὸ ἀλαθέως, οὕτωςί πως ὑπειπόντα τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ, ὡς περ ἂν εἰ θεῖμεν αὐτὸν λέγοντα τὸν Πιττακὸν καὶ Σιμωνίδην ἀποκρινόμενον εἰπόντα· ὦ ἄνθρωποι, “χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι,” τὸν δὲ ἀποκρινόμενον ὅτι ὦ Πιττακέ, οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μέν ἐστιν ἄνδρα “ἀγαθὸν χερσὶ τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόμῳ τετραγώνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον, χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέως.”

41 Col. VIII 4–8: “Ζεὺς μὲν ἐπεὶ δὴ πα[τρὸς ἐο]ῦ πάρα θέ[σ]φατον ἀρχῆν | [ἀ]λκῆν τ’ ἐγ χεῖρεσσι ἔ[λ]αβ[ε]γ κ[αὶ] δαίμον[α] κυδρόν.” | [τα]ῦτα τὰ ἐπη ὑπερβατὰ ἐό[ν]τα λαυθά[ν]ει, | [ἔσ]τιν δὲ ὡδ’ ἔχοντα: “Ζεὺς μὲν ἐπεὶ τ[ὴν ἀλ]κῆν | [πα]ρὰ πατρός ἐοῦ ἔλαβεγ καὶ δαίμονα [κυδρ]όν.”

DA, such as the equation of Moira (Fate) with πνεῦμα ‘breath’ and φρόνησις ‘understanding’ or the connection between Oceanus, air, and Zeus. Again, it is notable how the DA calls attention to his own expertise: “This verse has been made misleading and it is unclear to the many, but to those who understand correctly it is clear that Oceanus is the air and air is Zeus.”⁴² Orpheus has composed enigmas that only someone as skilled as the DA can explain, and the interpreter backs up his exegesis not only with reference to his general cosmological framework, but also with specific reference to details of the text, in this case the epithets ‘broad-flowing’ applied to Oceanus.⁴³ At another point, he makes an even more subtle argument with epithets, arguing that ‘Olympus’ must mean ‘time,’ since Orpheus never uses the epithet ‘broad’ of Olympus, whereas he does use that term of ‘heaven’ (Uranus).

Olympus and time are the same. Those who think that Olympus and the heaven are the same are entirely mistaken, for they do not know that the heaven cannot be longer rather than wider; but if someone were to call time long, he would not be wrong at all. And whenever he (*sc.* Orpheus) wanted to speak about heaven, he added the epithet ‘wide,’ whereas whenever (he wanted to talk) about Olympus, on the contrary, he never (added the epithet) ‘wide,’ but ‘long.’⁴⁴

Here the DA shows not only that he has an understanding of the lines superior to those who think that Olympus, the celestial home of the gods, is the same as the heaven, the celestial realm in which the gods make their home, but also that he has such a broad knowledge of the poetry of Orpheus that he can claim that Orpheus never used that

42 Col. XXIII 1–3: τρυτὸ τὸ ἔπος πα[ρα]γαγὸμ πεπόηται καὶ το[ῖς μ]ὲν | πολλοῖς ἀδελόν ἐστι, τοῖς δὲ ὀρθῶς γινώσκουσι | εὐδῆλον ὅτι Ὀκεανὸς ἐστὶν ὁ ἄηρ.

43 Col. XXIII 5–10: οἱ δ’ οὐ γινώσκοντες τῶν | Ὀκεανὸν ποταμὸν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ὅτι εὐρὺ ρέοντα | προσέθηκεν. ὁ δὲ σημαίνει τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην | ἐν τοῖς λεγομέν[ο]ις καὶ νομιζομένοις ῥήμασι. | καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀν[θ]ρώπων τοὺς μέγα δυνατ[ο]ντας (ΚΡΤ, Bernabé: δυναστ[θ]ντας Janko, *ap.* Kotwick 2017: 98) | μεγάλους φασὶ ρύηται. But those who do not understand think that Oceanus is a river because he (*sc.* Orpheus) added the epithet ‘broadly flowing.’ But he indicates his meaning in current and customary expressions. For they say that the very powerful among men ‘flowed great.’

44 Col. XII 3–10: Ὀλυμπ[ος] καὶ χ[ρό]νος τὸ αὐτόν. οἱ δὲ δοκοῦντες | Ὀλυμπ[ος] καὶ οὐρανὸν [τ]αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐξαμαρ-|τάν[ουσι] | οὐ γινώσκοντες ὅτι οὐρανὸν οὐχ οἶόν τε | μακ[ρό]τερον ἢ εὐρύτε[ρο]ν εἶναι, χρόνον δὲ μακρόν | εἴ τις [ὄνομα]ζο[ι] οὐκ ἄ[ν] ἐξα[μαρ]τάνοι· ὁ δὲ ὅπου μὲν | οὐρανὸν θέ[λοι] λέγειν, τῆμ[α] προσθήκεν εὐρὺν | ἐποιεῖτο, ὅπου [δὲ] Ὀλυμπον, το]ῦναγτίον, εὐρὺμ μὲν | οὐδέποτε, μα[κρόν] δέ]. Brisson 1997 provides the most detailed study of this passage.

epithet for that noun in any of his work. The DA's interpretations put the emphasis on exhibiting his own wisdom in understanding the hidden cosmological ideas and his own skill at uncovering them in the enigmatic poem of Orpheus. The text is not set out as a systematic treatise expounding a systematic cosmology to his audience that explains his doctrine to his (potential) converts; rather, whatever systematic ideas the DA may have remain implicit, much as Socrates' philosophical ideas remain implicit in his contest with Protagoras, while the focus remains on his ability to out-perform his rivals in exegesis.

His expertise is not merely in textual matters, but also in ritual. The DA's concern with ritual practice has been evident ever since the first columns of the Derveni Papyrus were published, revealing that the text was not merely a commentary on the poem. The DA discusses making several kinds of offering to divine powers: libations in cols. II and VI, sacrifices of many-knobbed cakes and (possibly) of birds in col. VI.

The powers to whom these offerings are directed may be the Erinyes or Eumenides or the souls of the dead, but the DA is providing not so much instructions for what sort of offerings are made, as explanations for why such offerings are appropriate: "They sacrifice innumerable and many-knobbed cakes, because the souls, too, are innumerable."⁴⁵ Again, the author is providing, not doctrinal or ritual instructions, but exegesis, demonstrating his understanding of the procedures rather than telling his readers what to do or to believe.

The DA is not just expert in sacrificial procedures, but also refers to his mantic expertise. In col. V, he refers to clients who want to consult an oracle, wondering if a certain thing (unfortunately lost in a lacuna) is right (θέμις) or not: a standard oracular question. "For them we go into the oracular shrine to inquire for oracular answers."⁴⁶ In

addition to oracular shrines, the DA also mentions oracular dreams, complaining that some people fail to understand the significance of dreams and, indeed, of other kinds of omens as well (τῶν ἄλλων παραγμάτων), all of which can serve as παραδείγματα—as warning signs of the will of the gods.⁴⁷ In the same way that Plato condemns those who fail to heed the correct path of philosophy, the DA passes a moral judgement on those who disregard such omens; they are overcome by error and by pleasures, and so they fail to learn and to understand.⁴⁸ The DA, then, is not only expert at bringing back a meaningful response from an oracular shrine for a client with a question; perhaps like Antiphon, he could also provide interpretations of dreams and other omens.⁴⁹

Perhaps the closest parallel to the DA's hermeneutics is the sort of explanation provided by Tiresias in Euripides' *Bacchae*, a character who is neither a simple parody nor the object of a rival's critique, but, as diviners always are in tragedy, someone with special access to the truth.⁵⁰ As

45 Col. VI 7–8: ἀνάριθμα [καί] πολυόμαλα τὰ πόπανα | θύουσιν, ὅτι καὶ αἱ ψυχὰι ἀνάριθμοί εἰσι. Col. VI 10–1: τὸν μέλλοντα θεοῖς θύειν | ὄ[ρ]νι[θ]ῆ[ε]ιον πρότερον suggests that birds are a kind of preliminary sacrifice, while col. II 7 has ὄρνιθιόν τι, which also suggests bird offerings. The new readings by Janko 2016 and Kotwick 2017, if accepted, would eliminate all the birds; Janko, *ap.* Kotwick 2017: 70, proposes ὄρ[χοι] in col. III 7, while in col. VI 10–1 θύειν | ὄ[ρ]νι[θ]ῆ[ε]ιον becomes θύειν φ[ο]ρτίον (Kotwick 2017: 74).

46 Col. IV 3–5: χρηστ[τ]ηριάζον[ται] ... | αὐτοῖς πάριμεν [εἰς τὸ μα] γτεῖον ἔπερ[ω]τήσ[οντες] | τῶν μαντευομένων. (Although πάριμεν is future, the word often has a present sense of regular actions, as in orators who regularly come forward to speak, e.g. Aeschin. 3.71, And. 2.1, D. 13.14, etc.) Because the following lines contain [τὰ] ἐν Ἄιδου δεινὰ after the lacuna, Janko attempts to make the whole consultation an inquiry of whether it is right not to believe in the terrors of Hades, and compares the later argument of Sextus Empiricus (*M.* 9.56) about the implausibility of the gods based on the implausibility of the terrors of Hades. Janko 1997:

68 (and now also Janko 2016: 19), imagines that Protagoras' treatise "on the terrors in Hades" (mentioned in D. L. 9.55) must have had a similar argument, and served as a source for the DA. Piano 2016: 13 reads εἰ θέμις προσ]δοκᾶν | ἐν Ἄιδου δεινὰ, shifting the meaning to the more plausible scenario of asking whether one should expect terrible things in Hades as retributions for unexpiated crimes (crimes that might then be ritually expiated if the client should avail himself of the services of the DA).

47 Col. V 6–8: οὐ γινώσκοντες ἐνύπνια (οὐ γινώσκ[χ]ογτες ἴ[δ]ω[ν]τες) ἐνύπνια Janko, *ap.* Kotwick 2017: 72 | οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων παραγμάτων ἕκαστον, διὰ ποίων ({πα} ποίων Janko, *ap.* Kotwick 2017: 72) | ἂν παραδειγμάτων π[ι]στεύοιεν. Rangos 2007: 37–8, rightly points out that οὐ γινώσκοντες ἐνύπνια must mean "not understanding what kind of things dreams are," rather than simply not understanding the (meaning of the) dream.

48 Col. V 8–10: ὑπό [τε γὰρ] ἄμαρτ(ι)ῆς | καὶ [τ]ῆς ἄλλης ἡδον[ῆ]ς νευικημέν[οι, οὐ] μανθ[ά]μο]υσιν | [οὐδὲ] πιστεύουσι. ἀπ[ι]στήθι δὲ κάμα[θ]ι τὸ αὐτό. In Pl. *Prt.* 357d, for example, Socrates reaches the conclusion that "being overcome by pleasure is ignorance in the highest degree." τὸ ἡδονῆς ἦττω εἶναι ἀμαθία ἢ μεγίστη.

49 As Tsantsanoglou 1997: 98–9, rightly argues, although he mistakes the general purpose of the treatise as being "to divulge his professional secrets to the faithful." Cic. *Div.* 51.116: *hic magna quaedam exoritur neque ea naturalis, sed artificiosa somniorum Antiphonis interpretatio eodemque modo et oraculorum et vaticinationum. sunt enim explanatores, ut grammatici poetarum.*

50 E. *Ba.* 272–97: "For two things, young man, are first among men: the goddess Demeter—she is the earth, but call her whatever name you wish; she nourishes mortals with dry food; but he who came afterwards, the offspring of Semele, discovered a match to it, the liquid drink of the grape, and introduced it to mortals. It releases wretched mortals from grief, whenever they are filled with the stream of the vine, and gives them sleep, a means of forgetting their daily troubles, nor is there another cure for hardships. He who is a god is poured out in offerings to the gods, so that by his means men may have good things. And do you laugh at him, because he was sewn up in Zeus' thigh? I will teach you that

Roth has pointed out, Tiresias' identification of the gods Dionysus and Demeter with the elements of wet and dry resembles Empedokles' penchant for connecting the traditional gods with his elemental theory, while his praise of them as benefactors of mankind through their gifts of wine and grain resembles Prodicus.⁵¹ Tiresias calls Demeter the Earth, just as the DA does, and his syncretistic praises of Dionysus, with the functions of Ares, Apollo, and Aphrodite, recall the ways in which the DA seems to elide the differences between gods. Like the DA, Tiresias uses etymologies and word plays to draw out hidden meanings, such as the connection between *μαντική* and Dionysiac *μανία* (299), or the elaborate retelling of Dionysus' birth story with the plays on *μήρος*, *ἄμηρος*, and *μέρος* (286–97). Roth argues that Euripides' Tiresias is similar, not only to figures like Plato's Euthyphro, with his interest in etymology and extraordinary versions of traditional myths, but also to other diviners such as Lampon, Dion's seer Miltas, or even Antiphon in his work as a dream-interpreter.⁵²

this is well: when Zeus snatched him out of the lighting-flame, and led the child as a god to Olympus, Hera wished to banish him from the sky, but Zeus, as a god, had a counter-contrivance. Having broken a part of the air which surrounds the earth, he gave this to Hera as a pledge <protecting the real> Dionysus from her hostility. But in time, mortals say that he was nourished in the thigh of Zeus, changing the word, because a god he had served as a hostage for the goddess Hera, and composing the story." *δύο γάρ, ὦ νεανία, / τὰ πρῶτ' ἐν ἀνθρώποισι· Δημήτηρ θεά— / γῆ δ' ἐστίν, ὄνομα δ' ὀπότερον βούληι κάλει· / αὐτῆ μὲν ἐν ξηροῖσιν ἐκτρέφει βροτούς· / ὅς δ' ἦλθ' ἔπειτ', ἀντίπαλον ὁ Σεμέλης γόνος / βότρουος ὑγρὸν πῶμ' ἤϊρε κείσηνέγκατο / θνητοῖς, ὃ παύει τοὺς ταλαιπώρους βροτούς / λύπης, ὅταν πλησθῶσιν ἀμπέλου ῥόης, / ὕπνον τε λήθην τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν κακῶν / δίδωσιν, οὐδ' ἔστ' ἄλλο φάρμακον πόνων. / οὗτος θεοῖσι σπένδεται θεὸς γεγώς, / ὥστε διὰ τοῦτον τάγαθ' ἀνθρώπους ἔχειν. / καὶ καταγέλαις νιν, ὡς ἐνεργάφη Διὸς / μηρῶι; διδάξω σ' ὡς καλῶς ἔχει τόδε. / ἐπεὶ νιν ἦρπας' ἐκ πυρὸς κεραυνίου / Ζεὺς, ἐς δ' Ὀλυμπον βρέφος ἀνήγαγεν θεόν, / Ἥρα νιν ἤθελ' ἐκβαλεῖν ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ· / Ζεὺς δ' ἀντεμνηχανήσαθ' οἶα δὴ θεός. / ῥήξας μέρος τι τοῦ χθόν' ἐγκυκλουμένου / αἰθέρος, ἔθηκε τόνδ' ἄμηρον ἐκδιδοῦς, / * * * / Διόνυσον Ἥρας νεικέων χρόνωι δέ νιν / βροτοῖ ῥαφῆναί φασιν ἐν μηρῶι Διός, / ὄνομα μεταστήσαντες, ὅτι θεάι θεός / Ἥραι ποθ' ὠμήρευσε, συνθέντες λόγον.*

51 Roth 1984: 61. Cf. Scodel 2011: 86–9, Santamaría 2012, and Ferrari 2013.

52 Most interestingly, he compares the way the athidographer Philochorus, who acted as an *exegetes* and a *mantis*, makes use of similar hermeneutic tools, etymologies and syncretistic identifications, to provide a superior account of the significance of the traditional stories about the gods. Such similarities are reinforced if indeed, as Obbink has argued, Philochorus actually quotes the DA in his identification of Gaia, Demeter, and Hestia. Obbink 1994 compares col. xx 12 with Philochorus (*FGrH* 328 F 185) in *Phld. Piet.* 248 1 pp. 63 + 23 Gomperz. Betegh 2004: 99 n. 20, however, suggests that it is more likely that Philochorus and the DA used a common source, or even (I might suggest) drew similar conclusions from the same Orphic poem. Any of

Lampon, Euthyphro, and the DA, then, may all be seen as the same type, religious thinkers who make use of sophisticated hermeneutic tools, not to destroy religion or respect for the gods (whatever a conservative satirist like Aristophanes might say), but to improve it. Although allegoresis, etymology, and other such devices have long had a bad reputation among historians of religion as markers of inauthenticity or insincerity, recent scholarship has shown the role that such interpretive traditions played in the continuing life of the Greek religious tradition. Allegoresis “saved myth,” as Brisson has argued, and Henrichs has pointed out that many of the sophistic ideas of Prodicus and others that were condemned by Aristophanes and his contemporaries as irreligious nevertheless show up in Hellenistic religion as part of authentic religious worship; the sincerely expressed ideas of worshippers honouring their gods.⁵³ It is worth noting that the spread of such ideas coincided, not with the disappearance of mystery cults and the demand for religious specialists, but rather with their spread and expansion in the Hellenistic period. The DA's hermeneutics, as peculiar as they might seem to us, were actually appropriate to winning the confidence of his clientele in his religious expertise.

5 Stoic Allegory in the Derveni Papyrus?

The DA's assertion of his own exegetical expertise, both ritual and textual, along with his denigration of common misunderstanding, and disparagement of his rivals, thus serve to bolster his claims to authority in a competitive context like that described by Plato or the Hippocratic authors. His allegorical techniques, which illustrate his claims, resemble most the kinds used by Euripides' Tiresias or mocked in Plato's *Cratylus*.⁵⁴ These features

these possibilities, however, still indicate the similarities between the DA and a figure like Philochorus.

53 Brisson 2004, English title: *How philosophers saved myths: allegorical interpretation and classical mythology*. Cf. Henrichs 1984, who traces some of the ideas of Prodicus in the Isis aretalogies. Burkert 1987: 78–88, discusses the use of allegory in various mystery cults.

54 Rusten 2011: 9 notes three basic types: word-equivalences; deity equivalences, and word redefinitions. “When we put together a catalogue of all the licenses he takes in reading, it is somewhat surprising to discover that instead of a repertory of ingenious and sometimes outrageous misinterpretations, there is a dreary sameness and predictability to most of them.” The argument of Burkert 1970 that the DA shows no sign of response to the Platonic critique of such etymologisations is valid, but cf. Baxter 1992: 138–9, who argues that the DA, while not escaping Plato's critique of etymologising as unsystematic, nevertheless “is a better thinker than he is usually given credit for ... the Derveni

of the text, however, have prompted some scholars to link the DA's methods to the Stoics, since the Stoics have been infamous ever since Cicero for their allegorical interpretations.⁵⁵ The critique of Stoic allegoresis in his treatise *On the Nature of the Gods* has cemented the association of allegoresis and Stoicism in modern scholarship, but, as recent scholarship has shown, the Stoics were merely continuing the practices developed by earlier thinkers.⁵⁶

Casadesús, however, argues that the similarities between the DA and the Stoics go beyond merely using etymologies and allegories, suggesting that the choice of examining poetic texts for cosmological allegories and even some of the specific allegories point to a closer relationship. While the Stoics certainly did break with Aristotle in lumping together the poets and the *physikoi* as sources for wisdom about the nature of the cosmos, Aristotle's predecessors, including Plato, likewise examined the poets for physical ideas, and Aristotle's distinction is more important in modern scholarship than it was in antiquity.⁵⁷ When the Stoics drew cosmological ideas from the poets, they were following in a long tradition of such activity, one of the most important sources for which appears to be the "sophist" Hippias. Hippias, as Clement tells us, boasts that he has compiled the important ideas from the greatest of poets:

commentator remains a prime candidate as a target of the *Cratylus*. Further more, even if the Derveni commentary itself was not in Plato's mind, its existence points to a tradition of such speculation."

55 Casadesús 2010: 237–8: "Comentarios coincidentes de las mismas escenas mitológicas que en ambos casos, además, se complementan con numerosas explicaciones etimológicas de los nombres de los dioses y diosas. Finalmente, el anónimo autor del papiro coincide con los filósofos estoicos en su dedicación a diversas prácticas de adivinación, las invocaciones a los demonios y las prácticas rituales de las que se consideraban especialistas, lo que los legitimaba para criticar la ignorancia, la falta de fe y el error en el que están sumidos la mayoría de los hombres. Posición de superioridad que también comparten el comentarista del papiro y los primeros filósofos estoicos."

56 Baxter 1992 discusses all the possible targets of Plato's critique, showing that he is targeting a long established tradition of such allegoresis and etymology, while Struck 2004 explores the history of allegoresis. Long 1992 argues specifically against the association of Stoics with allegoresis, showing not only that others practiced it, but that even the Stoics made less use of it than has been imagined.

57 Mansfeld 1986 (1990): 126–7: "Aristotle's all-important distinction between theology, or myth, and natural philosophy, argued at the beginning of *Metaphysics* and already taken for granted by Theophrastus, did not win over all the people in the field. Its impact upon the historiography of philosophy in modern times is probably greater than upon the same discipline (or its corollaries) as practised in antiquity."

Of these things some perchance are said by Orpheus, some briefly by Musaeus; some in one place, others in other places; some by Hesiod, some by Homer, some by the rest of the poets; and some in prose compositions, some by Greeks, some by Barbarians. And I from all these, placing together the things of most importance and of kindred character, will make the present discourse new and varied.⁵⁸

As recent scholars have pointed out, Hippias' catalogue lies in the background of doxographical accounts in Plato, Aristotle, and Peripatetics such as Eudemus.⁵⁹ Betegh argues that the Stoics too are making use of Hippias' classification of poetic accounts of gods understood as physical elements.⁶⁰ Hippias, it can be inferred from Plato, included Heraclitus, so the DA's quotations of this obscure philosopher—and, no doubt, the Heraclitean interest in fire as a fundamental element—stand in this Hippias tradition, rather than being another proto-Stoic trait.⁶¹

While a concentration on certain scandalous episodes, such as the castration of Uranus or Zeus' incestuous

58 Hippias *FGrHis* 6 F 4 = fr. 6 DK (*ap. Clem. Al. Strom.* 6.15.2) (= *OF* 1146): τούτων ἴσως εἴρηται τὰ μὲν Ὀρφεῖ, τὰ δὲ Μουσαίῳ κατὰ βραχὺ ἄλλῳι ἄλλαχού, τὰ δὲ Ἡσιόδῳ, τὰ δὲ Ὀμήρῳ, τὰ δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν ποιητῶν, τὰ δὲ ἐν συγγραφαῖς, τὰ μὲν Ἑλλήσι, τὰ δὲ βαρβάροις· ἐγὼ δὲ ἐκ πάντων τούτων τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὁμόφυλα συνθεῖς τοῦτον καινὸν καὶ πολυειδῆ τὸν λόγον ποιήσομαι.

59 Betegh 2007: 140: "In the wake of Bruno Snell's original paper, Joachim Classen, Andreas Patzer and Jaap Mansfeld have shown that Hippias in this work presented fairly extensive doxographical material, together with an interpretation that identified the different gods of the poets with different elements. On the basis of this exegesis, he then claimed that groups of authors professed the same doctrine. Hippias' doxographical material, together with the interpretation he offered of the poetical and prose texts, became the starting-point for the allegorizing theological and philosophical interpretation of these authors. Hippias' material pops up in Plato's *Cratylus* and *Theaetetus* and Aristotle's doxographical surveys." Cf. esp. Snell 1966 and Mansfeld 1983 (1990); see also Betegh 2002.

60 Betegh 2007: 141: "It seems to me that there is nothing in Philodemus' text to indicate that Chrysippus in his *On the Gods* presented an original exegesis of the early poets. It seems to me rather that Chrysippus did what Philodemus himself did in the relevant doxographical section of the *De Pietate*: he used the material available in Eudemus' survey of early 'theologians' going back to Hippias."

61 Mansfeld 1983 (1990): 53: "Hippias, not Plato, is our earliest source for statements about and quotations of Heraclitus. The date of our earliest evidence concerning Heraclitus has to be pushed up ca. 70 years, for we are no longer dealing with what Plato wrote in the mid-fourth cent., but with what Hippias compiled and said in the late fifth." *Contra* Casadesús 2010: 237, who cites "el papel cósmico que desempeña el fuego y la querencia de su autor de citar a Heráclito como testimonio" as a proto-Stoic trait.

relations, is hardly surprising, given that these tales are the ones most in need of alternative explanations, some of the specific allegories in the Derveni Papyrus have prompted scholars to try to link them with the Stoics.⁶² In his collection of Stoic traits of the Derveni Papyrus, Casadesús has claimed as Stoic the DA's tendency to explain various gods and elements such as air all as ways of referring to Zeus.⁶³ Such an identification appears far earlier, however, in the tragedians Aeschylus and Euripides, for example. Aeschylus sings "Zeus is Aither, Zeus is earth, and Zeus is heaven; Zeus is all, and all above," while Euripides proclaims, "Do you see this lofty, boundless Aither, which holds the earth around in moist embraces? This reckon Zeus, and this consider God."⁶⁴ Even if they are rejected by Aristotle, many in the Classical period looked to the tragedians for theological, cosmological, and ethical ideas, and the DA's ideas about Zeus, air, and even πνεῦμα do not need Stoic sources for their formulation.⁶⁵

Some of the DA's allegories reveal his similarities to other thinkers of the Classical period, in contrast to later thinkers. Casadesús has recently argued that the way that the DA explains the castration of Uranus resembles the explanation through physical etymology attributed to the Stoics in Cicero, but the passage actually shows the differences between the Stoic cosmology supported by the Stoic allegoresis and that of the DA.⁶⁶ For Cicero's Stoics, the separation of Uranus from his phallos signifies that the highest power needs no other partner to generate all things. "For they wish the highest element of celestial aither (that is, the fiery), which by itself generates all things, to

be devoid of that bodily part which requires union with another for the work of procreation."⁶⁷

For the DA, by contrast, the act of castration signifies the limitation of the fiery action of Uranus, which keeps all things in motion and separated from one another. The phallos is identified with the sun, which sits at a proper distance from the earth and thus keeps things in motion, sufficient for new generation but not too much.⁶⁸ The etymology of Cronus' name from χρούειν, to strike, indicates that he is the one responsible for striking off the phallos of Uranus, but also for allowing the particles of matter to strike against one another.⁶⁹ Rather than signifying the omnipotence of the highest power in the Stoic cosmos, the castration marks the shift of power from one generation in the cosmogony to another, as well as a change in the order of the cosmos; a transition more akin to the patterns of the so-called pre-Socratic cosmologies.⁷⁰

Brisson (2011) has recently argued that the DA's identification of Oceanus with air *does* require a Stoic or at least post-Aristotelian interpreter, adducing Aristotle's discussion of the cycle of evaporation in his *Meteorology* as a stream of water flowing vertically from earth to heaven and back around.

When the sun is near, the stream of vapour flows upwards; when it recedes, the stream of water flows down: and the order of sequence, at all events, in this process always remains the same. So if the earlier writers allegorized 'Oceanus,' they could perhaps have meant this river that flows in a circle about the earth.⁷¹

62 In Pl. *R.* 377e–378d, Socrates argues that stories such as what Cronus did to Uranus are not appropriate for children being educated (or anyone else, for that matter), whether they have an allegorical meaning or not, thus indicating a tradition of allegorical interpretations of these stories. Such critiques appear at least as early as Xenophanes.

63 Casadesús 2010: 237 lists "la equiparación del destino con el πνεῦμα y la inteligencia de Zeus; la teoría de la ἔνωσις y la visión panteísta; la coincidencia en la identificación del aire con Zeus; la tendencia a unificar las divinidades en una sola, incluyendo la equiparación de divinidades femeninas muy semejantes."

64 A. *Heliades* fr. 70 Radt: Ζεὺς ἐστὶν αἰθήρ, Ζεὺς δὲ γῆ, Ζεὺς δ' οὐρανός. / Ζεὺς τοὶ τὰ πάντα χῶτι τῶνδε [τοῖ] ὑπέρτερον. E. fr. 935 Kannic-
th (ap. Clem. Al. *Strom.* 5.14.114): Ὁραῖς τὸν ὑψοῦ τόνδ' ἀπειρον αἰθέρα, / καὶ γῆν περίξ ἔχονθ' ὑγραῖς ἐν ἀγκάλαις; / τοῦτον νόμιζε Ζῆνα, τόνδ' ἦγγού θεόν.

65 Betegh 2007: 146–9 argues that the identification of Moira, Zeus, πνεῦμα, and φρόνησις in columns 18 and 19 of the Derveni Papyrus owes nothing to the technical definition of πνεῦμα as developed by Chrysippus, but is more closely linked to the ideas in Anaximenes fr. 2 DK and Diogenes of Apollonia fr. 5 DK.

66 Casadesús 2011: 380–1.

67 Cic. *ND* 2.24.63 (= *SVF* II 1067): *caelestem enim altissimam aeth-
eriamque naturam, id est igneam, quae per sese omnia gigneret,
vacare voluerunt ea parte corporis, quae coniunctione alterius
egeret ad procreandum.*

68 Col. IX 5–10: "Now, knowing that fire, [in as much as] it is mixed with the others, agitates the things that are and hinders them from getting set together because of fomenting, he removed it to an adequate distance, so that once it is removed, it does not hinder the things that are from coagulating. For whatever is kindled is dominated (*sc.* by fire), and when dominated, it mixes with the other things." γινώσκ[ω]ν οὖν τὸ πῦρ ἀγαμειγμένον τοῖς | ἄλλοις ὅτι ταρασσοὶ καὶ χ[ωλ]ύοι τὰ ὄντα συνίστασθαι | διὰ τὴν θάλψιν ἐξαλλάσσει[σ]ον τε ἱκανόν ἐστιν | ἐξαλλαχθέν μὴ κωλύειν τὰ ὄντα συμπαγήναι. | ὅσα δ' ἄ[ν] ἀφθῆι ἐπικρα[τεῖται], ἐπικρατηθέν(τα) δὲ μίσγεται | τοῖς ἄλ[λ]οις.

69 Cf. Brisson 2003: 25: "The sun dispenses heat, which sets the particles in motion and makes them collide with one another; yet to enable the constitution of things, this motion must not be too violent. Thus, the source of heat must be situated at an appropriate distance, in the middle of the sky."

70 Betegh 2004 provides the most complete analysis.

71 Arist. *Mete.* 1.9 347a 6–8: πλησίον μὲν γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ ἡλίου ὁ τῆς ἀτμίδος ἄνω βρεῖ ποταμός, ἀφισταμένου δὲ ὁ τοῦ ὕδατος κάτω. καὶ

Brisson takes the imperfect in the protasis of the conditional clause to indicate that earlier writers did *not* in fact make such an allegory, but, as he notes, the optative in the apodosis makes the sentence very difficult to translate.⁷² However, even if Aristotle is not citing some specific, significant predecessor, he indicates that such an allegory is plausible to expect from his predecessors. As Brisson notes, Aristotle's discussion of the movement of the sun in this context cites Heraclitus, and the DA is just such a thinker who might combine an interpretation of Heraclitus with an allegorisation of the primal source of water, Oceanus, to show off his cleverness. Of course, the DA's identification of Oceanus and air seems to derive from other methods, but, as Brisson admits, the closest parallels in Stoic thought do not make the same allegorisation, either.⁷³ As the DA claims, the identity of Oceanus and air is made confusing and unclear to the many, and the loss of portions of his exegesis unfortunately ensures that modern scholars remain among the confused many.

6 Contextualising the DA

Previous explanations of the DA's methods have been unsatisfactory because they have seen as his principal aim the exposition of some doctrine, whether it be Orphic eschatology, pre-Socratic cosmology, or even the correspondence between the two. If the purpose of the text is rather to demonstrate the author's skill at his craft, the

peculiar exegeses become more comprehensible. He is not incompetently expounding a system; he is selecting examples to display his expertise.⁷⁴ The DA is advertising his skill at his craft, that of a religious specialist; the type parodied by Aristophanes, denounced as charlatans by the Hippocratics, and scorned by Plato.⁷⁵ Like Antiphon's *Tetralogies* or Gorgias' *Defense of Helen*, the treatise in the Derveni Papyrus illustrates the cleverness of the author; it is a textual example of the kind of sophistic debate portrayed in the Hippocratic treatise and Plato's *Protagoras*.⁷⁶ It is worth noting that Plato mentions Hippias among the contenders in that scene, although he never gets the chance for the long-winded speech he keeps trying to give. Hippias prides himself on his understanding of the underlying ideas embedded within the texts of the ancient wise men, but his exposition is too lengthy and systematic for the market-place contests.⁷⁷ The DA's treatise takes the Orphic poem line by line, but he never seems to make a systematic exposition of either his cosmological theories or his religious ideas.

The DA's boasts of superior knowledge, along with his demonstrations of exegetical cleverness, show that his treatise is aimed at winning clients in the public market-place, not at showing a select group of sectarians the secret of salvation. The references to the secrets known only to a few are thus best understood as a rhetorical device that enhances the value of the speaker's expertise, not an atheist's public revelation of the sacred mysteries, or even

τοῦτ' ἐνδελεχῆς ἐθέλει γίγνεσθαι κατὰ γε τὴν τάξιν. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἠνίττοντο τὸν ὠκεανὸν οἱ πρότερον, τάχ' ἂν τοῦτον τὸν ποταμὸν λέγοιεν τὸν κύκλῳ βέοντα περὶ τὴν γῆν.

72 Brisson 2011: 388, with n. 5: "Mais Aristote est très clair là-dessus: ses prédécesseurs n'ont pas développé cette interprétation allégorique; il est donc le premier à le suggérer, sans que l'on puisse savoir s'il s'est inspiré de l'un de ses contemporains." Such mixed conditions are attested, however, where the optative in the apodosis renders the protasis not a contrary to fact condition. Cf., e.g., X. *Mem.* 1.2.28: εἰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἐποίει τι φαῦλον, εἰκότως ἂν ἐδόκει πονηρὸς εἶναι· εἰ δ' αὐτὸς σωφρονῶν διετέλει, πῶς ἂν δικαίως τῆς οὐκ ἐνούσης αὐτῷ κακίας αἰτίαν ἔχοι; The first of two conditions has the imperfect protasis followed by the imperfect apodosis in a contrary to fact condition (Socrates did not in fact live a base life), but the second has an imperfect protasis that Xenophon considers true (Socrates did live wisely), followed by an apodosis with an optative verb (cf. also Thuc. 6.92, And. 2.12, etc.).

73 Brisson 2011: 391: "Qui plus est, même si, dans les passages relatifs au Stoïcisme que nous avons cités, on ne retrouve pas explicitement l'interprétation allégorique, évoquées par Aristote et présentant Océanos comme un fleuve d'air humide ou d'eau vaporisée, il est évident que c'est ainsi que les Stoïciens se représentaient le processus d'évaporation et de condensation de l'eau."

74 As Betegh 2004: 182 notes, the text is not organised to set out the underlying system: "Apart from the lacunose nature of the papyrus, what makes the reconstruction so difficult is that the DA does not explain his theory in a linear way, but distributes the elements of it in his exegetical remarks. In other words, the exposition is not governed by the internal logic of the theory." This is not, however, to deny that the theory has some sort of internal logic or that the DA had coherent ideas about the cosmos, but rather to claim that this text is not set up to display it.

75 All the same, the evidence for public honours and successful careers for such figures should not be forgotten—Lampon, Hierocles, and Diopithes in the fifth century, as well as later figures like Philochoros or Kleidemos, who seem to have served as *exegetai* as well as have written treatises on the ancient religious customs of Attica.

76 Some of the earliest prose treatises attested seem to have been exhibitions of their authors' particular crafts. The *Tetralogies* of Antiphon, like Gorgias' *Helen* and *Palamedes*, were surely meant to demonstrate their composers' skill with words. Antiphon is also credited with a book on dream interpretation, in which he likewise displays his ability to provide interpretations that surpass those of other experts, and his *Truth* may have been, like Gorgias' *On Not-Being*, a demonstration that he could win an argument on any point, regardless of its truth.

77 Cf. Thomas 2003 on the prose epideixis and its serious purposes for the sophists.

an indication of the limited circle of initiates who might understand his sermons.⁷⁸ The Derveni Papyrus is thus part of Plato's hubbub of books, competing for clientele in the marketplace of the 5th century amid the swirling controversies of the sophists of all types, rather than the work of a systematic Hellenistic scholar, whether Stoic or otherwise.⁷⁹

7 Allegory and the *Theogony of Hieronymus*

This agonistic context of sophistic competition appears all the more clearly when the use of allegory in the Derveni Papyrus is contrasted with the treatment of allegory in another Orphic poem, the account we have of the Orphic Theogony associated with Hieronymus. This text, by contrast, *does* come from a scholastic, rather than agonistic, context, and the way the allegories are incorporated into the account shows the systematising practices of Peripatetic philosophers rather than the agonistic stratagems of a sophistic ritualist. The account of an Orphic theogonic poem, which the 5th century AD Neoplatonist Damascius attributes to Hieronymus or Hellanicus, seems to involve allegorical interpretations of several elements within the story, including the first principles of water and mud, personified Time identified as Heracles, and a syncretised supreme Zeus. While scholars have also tried to argue that these allegories must be Stoic, a careful examination shows that, just like the allegories in the Derveni Papyrus, these allegories could all arise from the earlier philosophical debates of the Classical period, even if Damascius' report derives from a systematising account by the pupils of Aristotle.

Damascius provides the evidence for the existence of several different Orphic theogonies, but the question remains of how long before Damascius' own time each of these accounts was composed. The account of Aristotle's pupil Eudemus must date to the early Hellenistic period, while the story he derives from the Orphic *Rhapsodies*,

which he describes as the 'usual' version familiar to his contemporaries, was probably composed much later.⁸⁰

The account of Hieronymus or Hellanicus is hardest to date, since the identities of these figures remains disputed, and Damascius' uncertainty as to whether they are 'the same' further confuses the issue—especially because it remains unclear whether Damascius thinks that Hieronymus and Hellanicus might be the same person or whether he thinks their accounts are of the same tale.

But the theology delivered by Hieronymus and Hellanicus (if indeed he is not even the same)⁸¹ is as follows:—He says that water was from the beginning, and Matter, from which the Earth was produced, so that he supposes that the two first principles were Water and Earth; the latter of which is of a nature liable to separation, but the former a substance serving to conglutinate and connect it: but he passes over as ineffable the one principle prior to these two, for its recondite nature is evinced, in that there is no manifestation appertaining to it. The third principle after these two, which is generated from them, that is from the Water and Earth, is a Dragon having the heads of a Bull and Lion naturally produced, and in the middle, between these, is the countenance of the God: he has, moreover, wings upon his shoulders, and is denominated incorruptible Chronos

78 *Contra* Brisson 2010: 24–5: "Le secret souhaité par Orphée est néanmoins préservé. Si le commentaire offre l'accès au texte à un public plus large, ses destinataires sont cependant les seuls lecteurs susceptibles de comprendre l'exégèse. La désignation constante de la foule ignorante est le repoussoir qui fait d'eux un cercle restreint et choisi."

79 *Contra* Calame 1997: 76, who compares Crates of Athens, Philochorus, and Melanthis: "This distanced voice of the scholar who collects and describes his city's cultic customs is much like the Derveni exegete's voice."

80 *Dam. Pr.* 319.7–13: "But the cosmogony which is delivered by the Peripatetic Eudemus as being the theology of Orpheus, passes the whole Intelligible order in silence, as altogether ineffable and unknown, and incapable of discussion or explanation. He commences from Night, which Homer also constitutes as his first principle, if we would render his genealogy consistent. Therefore, we must not put confidence in the assertion of Eudemus, that Homer makes it commence from Oceanus and Tethys; for it is manifest that he regards Night as the greatest divinity." Ἡ δὲ παρὰ τῶν περιπατητικῶν Εὐδήμῳ ἀναγεγραμμένη ὡς τοῦ Ὀρφέως οὐσα θεολογία πᾶν τὸ νοητὸν ἐσιώπησεν, ὡς παντάπασιν ἄρρητὸν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον τρόπῳ κατὰ διέξοδόν τε καὶ ἀπαγγελίαν ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς Νυκτὸς ἐποιήσατο τὴν ἀρχήν, ἀφ' ἧς καὶ ὁ Ὀμηρος, εἰ καὶ μὴ συνεχῆ πεποιήται τὴν γενεαλογίαν, ἴστησιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀποδεκτὸν Εὐδήμου λέγοντος ὅτι ἀπὸ Ὀκεανοῦ καὶ Τηθύος ἀρχεται· φαίνεται γὰρ εἰδῶς καὶ τὴν Νύκτα μεγίστην οὕτω θεόν. *Dam. Pr.* 316.18, 317.13. In the *Rhapsodies* which pass under the name of Orphic, the theology ... such is the common Orphic theology. Ἐν μὲν τοίνυν ταῖς φερομέναις ταύταις βῆσιφθιαῖς ὀρφικαῖς ἢ θεολογία ... τοιαύτη μὲν ἢ συνήθης ὀρφικὴ θεολογία. I have argued elsewhere (Edmonds 2013: 148–59) that the *Rhapsodies* were a collection of varied Orphic poetry compiled probably in the second to third century AD as Hellenic philosophers sought to systematise the authoritative poetry of their tradition in the face of the challenges from Christianity and other cults, but the date does not directly affect my argument here.

81 *Dam. Pr.* 317.14: Ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸν Ἱερώνυμον φερομένη καὶ Ἑλλάνικον, εἴπερ μὴ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐστίν, οὕτως ἔχει.

(Time) and Heracles. Fate also, which is the same as Nature, is connected with him, and Adrastia, which is incorporeally co-extensive with the universe, and connects its boundaries in harmony. I am of opinion that this third principle is regarded as subsisting according to essence, inasmuch as it is supposed to exist in the nature of male and female, as a type of the generating principle of all things.⁸²

The similarities with the Orphic theogony related by the second century AD Christian apologist Athenagoras suggest that it must in any case predate that era. Athenagoras claims that the pagan authorities all agree that the gods were not eternal but came into existence, quoting the Oceanus passage from Homer and comparing it with a cosmogony by Orpheus.

The gods, as they affirm, were not from the beginning, but every one of them has come into existence just like ourselves. And in this opinion they all agree. Homer speaks of “Old Oceanus, the sire of gods, and Tethys;” and Orpheus (who, moreover, was the first to invent their names, and recounted their births, and narrated the exploits of each, and is believed by them to treat with greater truth than others of divine things, whom Homer himself follows in most matters, especially in reference to the gods)—he, too, has fixed their first origin to be from water:—“Oceanus, the origin of all.” For, according to him, water was the beginning of all things, and from water mud was formed, and from both was produced an animal, a dragon with the head of a lion growing to it, and between the two heads there was the face of a god, named Heracles and Chronos. This Heracles generated an egg of enormous size, which, on becoming full, was, by the powerful friction of its

generator, burst into two, the part at the top receiving the form of heaven, and the lower part that of earth. The goddess Gaia, moreover, came forth with a body; and Uranus, by his union with Gaia, begat females, Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos; and males, the hundred-handed Cottys, Gyges, Briareus, and the Cyclopes Brontes, and Steropes, and Argos, whom also he bound and hurled down to Tartarus, having learnt that he was to be ejected from his government by his children; whereupon Gaia, being enraged, brought forth the Titans. “The godlike Gaia bore to Uranus Sons who are by the name of Titans known, because they vengeance took on Uranus, Majestic, glitt’ring with his starry crown.”⁸³

Most scholars have accepted the arguments of West and Brisson that Stoic elements within this cosmogony indicate that it must have been composed by an Orphicist working after the advent of Stoicism, but I argue that none of these elements require a Stoic background. Rather than identifying Hieronymus and Hellanicus with obscure late figures, I propose to take up the suggestion of Lobeck identifying these figures with the Peripatetic Hieronymus of Rhodes, and the even earlier Hellanicus of Lesbos.⁸⁴ As

82 Dam. *Pr.* 317.14–318.6: Ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸν Ἱερώνυμον φερομένη καὶ Ἑλλάνικον, εἶπερ μὴ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐστίν, οὕτως ἔχει. “Υἷδωρ ἦν, φησίν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς, καὶ ὕλη, ἐξ ἧς ἐπάγη ἡ γῆ,” δύο ταύτας ἀρχὰς ὑποτιθέμενος πρῶτον, ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν, ταύτην μὲν ὡς φύσει σκεδαστήν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ ὡς ταύτης κολλητικόν τε καὶ συνεκτικόν, τὴν δὲ μίαν πρὸ τῶν δυεῖν ἀρρητον ἀφήσιν· αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ μὴδὲ φάναι περὶ αὐτῆς ἐνδείκνυται αὐτῆς τὴν ἀπόρρητον φύσιν· τὴν δὲ τρίτην ἀρχὴν μετὰ τὰς δύο γεννηθῆναι μὲν ἐκ τούτων, ὕδατος φημι καὶ γῆς, δράκοντα δὲ εἶναι κεφαλὰς ἔχοντα προσπεφυκίας ταύρου καὶ λέοντος, ἐν μέσῳ δὲ θεοῦ πρόσωπον, ἔχειν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὤμων πτερὰ, ὠνομάσθαι δὲ Χρόνον ἀγήραον καὶ Ἡρακλῆα τὸν αὐτὸν· συνεῖναι δὲ αὐτῷ τὴν Ἀνάγκην, φύσιν οὖσαν τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ Ἀδράστειαν ἀσώματον διωργισμένην ἐν παντὶ τῷ κόσμῳ, τῶν περὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ ἐφαπτομένην. Ταύτην <δὲ> οἶμαι λέγεσθαι τὴν τρίτην ἀρχὴν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐστῶσαν, πλὴν ὅτι ἀρσενόθηλον αὐτὴν ὑπεσθῆσθετο πρὸς ἐνδείξιν τῆς πάντων γεννητικῆς αἰτίας.

83 Athenag. *Leg.* 18: οὐκ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς φασιν, ἦσαν οἱ θεοί, ἀλλ’ οὕτως γέγονεν αὐτῶν ἕκαστος ὡς γιγνώμεθα ἡμεῖς· καὶ τοῦτο πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς ζυμφωνεῖται, Ὁμήρου μὲν [γὰρ] λέγοντος “Ὠκεανὸν τε, θεῶν γένεσιν, καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν,” Ὁρφῆως δὲ, ὅς καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν πρῶτος ἐξήρτην καὶ τὰς γενέσεις διεξῆλθεν καὶ ὅσα ἐκάστοις πέπρακται εἶπεν καὶ πεπίστευται παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἀληθέστερον θεολογεῖν, ὡς καὶ Ὁμηρος τὰ πολλὰ καὶ περὶ θεῶν μάλιστα ἔπεται, καὶ αὐτοῦ τὴν πρῶτην γένεσιν αὐτῶν ἐξ ὕδατος συνιστάντος “Ὠκεανός, ὅσπερ γένεσις πάντεσσι τέτυκται.” ἦν γὰρ ὕδωρ ἀρχὴ κατ’ αὐτὸν τοῖς ὄλοις, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ὕδατος ἴλως κατέστη, ἐκ δὲ ἐκατέρων ἐγεννήθη ζῶιον δράκων προσπεφυκυῖαν ἔχων κεφαλὴν λέοντος, διὰ μέσου δὲ αὐτῶν θεοῦ πρόσωπον, ὄνομα Ἡρακλῆς καὶ Χρόνος· οὗτος ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἐγέννησεν ὑπερμέγεθες αἰὼν, ὃ συμπληρούμενον ὑπὸ βίας τοῦ γεγεννηκότος ἐκ παρατριβῆς εἰς δύο ἐρράγη, τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ κορυφὴν αὐτοῦ Οὐρανὸς εἶναι ἐτελέσθη, τὸ δὲ κάτω ἐνεχθὲν Γῆ· προήλθε δὲ καὶ θεὸς † γῆ δισώματος. Οὐρανὸς δὲ Γῆι μυχθεῖς γενναῖα θηλείας μὲν Κλωθῶ, Λάχεσιν, Ἀτροπον, ἀνδρας δὲ Ἑκατόγχειρας Κόττον, Γύγην, Βριάρεων καὶ Κύκλωπας, Βρόντην καὶ Στερόπην καὶ Ἀργην· οὗς καὶ δῆσας κατεταρτάρωσεν, ἐκπεσεῖσθαι αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν παίδων τῆς ἀρχῆς μαθών. διὸ καὶ ὀργισθεῖσα ἡ Γῆ τοὺς Τιτάνας ἐγέννησεν· “Κούρους δ’ Οὐρανίωνας ἐγένεατο πότνια Γαῖα, / οὗς δὴ καὶ Τιτῆνας ἐπὶ κλησιν καλέουσι, / οὖνεκα τισάσθην μέγαν Οὐρανὸν ἀστερόεντα.”

84 The identities of both Hieronymus and Hellanicus have been much discussed. West dismisses Lobeck’s identification of Hieronymus with the Peripatetic Hieronymus of Rhodes on the grounds that such a discussion of cosmogonic schemata does not fit well with what we know of Hieronymus’ works. Cf. West 1983: 177: “What we know of [Hieronymus’ work], however, indicates that it was concerned with literary history and anecdotal biography, and it would be extremely surprising if it contained such details of an Orphic poem as Damascius has.” *Contra*

the analysis of the context of the DA has shown, the kind of allegorical interpretations embedded in the account could easily have been produced by an Orphicist working in the time of Euripides. However, they might also have been built into the account through the systematisation of the Peripatetic philosopher, Hieronymus, who, like his colleague Eudemus, collected and analysed accounts of the beginnings of the cosmos. Just as examining the use of allegory in the Derveni Papyrus illuminates the agonistic and sophistic context in which it was composed, an analysis of the allegories in Hieronymus' account of the theogony shows that it could be a product of Peripatetic systematising in the 3rd century BC rather than of late Stoic theology.

8 Stoic Allegory in the *Hieronyman Theogony*?

Both Damascius and Athenagoras tell us that this Orphic cosmogony begins with water and a muddy substance (ἰλύς or ὕλη). Many scholars have assumed that the presence of mud and water in the first generation of this cosmogony comes from Stoic allegorisation, citing a scholiast on Apollonius who relates that the founder of Stoicism, Zeno of Citium, understood Hesiod's Chaos as water, since the production of Earth from Chaos resembles the settling of mud out of water.⁸⁵ Zeno, however, may well have derived this image from earlier cosmologists such as Thales or Pherekydes, who were reworking Hesiod's cosmogony for their own purposes.⁸⁶ Nothing in the image is

dependent on Stoic ideas, so Zeno's use can only be taken as a *terminus ante quem* for this idea.

In this theogony, according to Damascius, Ananke, also called Adrasteia, appears spread incorporeally throughout the whole cosmos, an image similar to that attributed to Pythagoras.⁸⁷ West claims that the identification of Ananke with Adrasteia must be "a Hellenistic embellishment," but he himself notes that Adrasteia appears in Plato in a similar role as a principle of determinative fate.⁸⁸ Ananke is paired with Chronos, Time personified, whom, as both Damascius and Athenagoras relate, is generated from the primordial mud and water.

The role of Chronos in this theogony leads many scholars to assign it a late date, either after the allegorising of the Stoics or even after the influence of Persian cosmologies came into Greek religion through the influence of Mithraism.⁸⁹ While these later Stoic and Mithraic traditions undoubtedly elaborated on the concept, a personified Chronos appears in the late Archaic and Classical poetic tradition, and an Orphicist in these periods, composing a poem with theogonic themes though *bricolage* with ideas from these poets might well have added Chronos to his composition. Pherekydes would be the most apt source, if indeed we could be certain that his 6th century cosmology actually had Chronos, rather than Cronus, among its first principles. Unfortunately, as Brisson has pointed out, the four testimonies are evenly divided in the spelling, *chi* or *kappa*, and, although I think it plausible, given the other parallels, to imagine that Pherekydes did start with *chi* Chronos, we cannot rest much weight of argument upon it.⁹⁰

Lobeck 1829: 340. West 1983: 176–8 suggests Sandon, son of Helanikus, mentioned by the Suda as having written on Orpheus, whose Cilician name might be rendered as Hieronymus, but ultimately prefers to identify Hieronymus with Hieronymus the Egyptian mentioned by Josephus, about whom "we know next to nothing."

85 Sch. A. R. 1.496–8b (= *SVF* I 104). Zeno also says that Hesiod's Chaos is water, from the settlement of which mud comes into being, and when that solidifies, the earth is established. *καὶ Ζήνων δὲ τὸ παρ' Ἡσιόδου χάος ὕδωρ εἶναι φησιν, οὐ συνιζάνοντος ἰλὸν γίνεσθαι, ἧς πηγυμένης ἡ γῆ στερεμνιούται.* As West 1983: 183 notes: "It is odd that physical elements should exist before Unaging Time, and odder still that they should appear at all in a poetic theogony which goes on to talk about winged serpents and a cosmic egg." Algra 2004: 567–9 provides more context for Zeno's treatment of Hesiod here.

86 Cf. Ach. Tat. *Astron. Isagoga excerpta* 3.28–31 (Maass): *Θαλῆς δὲ ὁ Μιλήσιος καὶ Φερεκύδης ὁ Σύριος ἀρχὴν τῶν ὄλων τὸ ὕδωρ ὑφίστανται, ὃ δὴ καὶ Χάος καλεῖ ὁ Φερεκύδης ὡς εἰκὸς τοῦτο ἐλεξάμενος παρὰ τοῦ Ἡσιόδου οὕτω λέγοντος "ἦτοι μὲν πρῶτιστα Χάος γένετο."* (*Th.* 116). Baxter 1992: 121 and n. 54 suggests that Pherekydes' etymologisation of 'Pḥ (his own name for 'Péa) from ἐκρεῖν indicates that he is deliberately reworking the epic traditions in this way: "While the exact details of Pherekydes' account

cannot be recovered, what we can assert is that he supported his reworking of tradition by means of allegory and etymology, arriving at a rather watery and fluxy cosmogony."

87 *Aët. Placit.* 1.25 321.4–5: Πυθαγόρας ἀνάγκην ἔφη περιχεῖσθαι τῷ κόσμῳ.

88 West 1983: 195. Adrasteia's role in Pl. *Phdr.* 248c resembles the later Chrysipp. *SVF* II 292.15, but this similarity would again indicate that the later Stoic took the idea from earlier thinkers. Cf. also [Arist.] *Mu.* 401b 13.

89 Brisson 1985 (1995): 51: "Mais en Grèce ancienne, tandis qu'en philosophie le problème est clairement posé, sinon dans le *Timée* du moins dans les commentaires de ce dialogue, les mythes ne font pratiquement aucune allusion à Chronos (= le Temps). Il faudra attendre les débuts de l'ère chrétienne pour que Chronos soit enfin évoqué, dans le cadre d'un Orphisme très influencé par le Mithriacisme, nouvelle religion à mystères trouvant son origine en Iran." West 1983: 226, by contrast, dates it earlier, between the second half of the third century BC and 100 BC.

90 Brisson 1997: 159–61, cf. Schibli 1990: 17 n. 9. D. L. 1.119 (fr. 14 Schibli = 7 A 1, B 1 DK): "There is also preserved of the man from Syros a book he wrote, the beginning of which states: «Zas and Chronos always were and Chthonie; and Chthonie became named Gaia

Other sources, however, provide ample evidence that early Greek poetic thinkers were personifying Chronos as a fundamental power in the cosmos. References in Solon, Simonides, and Sophocles should not be dismissed as mere metaphor; even if the personification of Time is not involved in cosmogonic activities, he is still a god who affects the lives of mortals.⁹¹

Pindar, of course, is noted for his personifications of Time as the ‘father of all’ and even the ‘best saviour of just men,’ and one of his Olympian odes shows that the word play on the names of Chronos and Cronus, which Plutarch claims is common among the Greeks, goes back to Pindar’s time.⁹² Brisson quite rightly points out that these personifications have a role within their poems that does not need to be explained by reference to an Orphic cosmology or even ‘Orphic influence’ creeping in upon Pindar, but his works nevertheless show that Chronos was an

active deity in the Archaic period whom poets could work into their accounts.

Chronos in a cosmological role appears clearly in a fragment of the tragic *Peirithoos*, attributed to Euripides (and to Critias): “Unwearying Time circles full around in ever-flowing flux, itself begetting itself. And the twin Bears with the swift-wandering motions of their wings, keep watch upon the Atlantean pole.”⁹³ This image of Time as the cosmos rotating around the celestial pole recalls the description of Time attributed to Pythagoras, against which Aristotle seems to be arguing in his *Physics*.⁹⁴ Chronos as an originary, cosmological principle was thus part of poetic discourse before the time of Aristotle, even if the multiple monstrous heads of the Orphic poem’s Chronos are absent from the evidence, and the wings that sprout from his shoulders are given by Euripides to the Bear constellations who circle around the celestial pole.

By the time of Aristotle’s pupil, Eudemus, of course, cosmogonic Chronos was familiar from a number of sources, as Damascius’ summary of Eudemus’ catalogue of cosmogonies shows. The *magoi*, as Eudemus relates, posit Chronos as the predecessor of the fundamental powers of good and evil in the cosmos, Oromasdes and Arimanius, while the Sidonians have Chronos, along with Love and Cloudy Darkness (Omichles), as the primordial trio.⁹⁵

West argues, however, that the identification of the cosmic Chronos with Heracles in the theogony reported

when Zas gave her the earth as a gift of honour».” σώιζεται δὲ τοῦ Συρίου τό τε βιβλίον ὃ συνέγραψεν οὐ ἡ ἀρχή: Ζᾶς μὲν καὶ Χρόνος ἦσαν αἰεὶ καὶ Χθονίη· Χθονίη δὲ ὄνομα ἐγένετο Γῆ, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῇ Ζᾶς γῆν γέρας διδοί. *Dam. Pr.* 124b (I 321 R. = Eudem. fr. 150 Wehrli = Pherecyd. Syr. fr. 60 Schibli = 7 A 8 DK): “Pherecydes of Syros says that Zas always existed and Chronos and Chthonie, the first three principles.” Φερεκύδης δὲ ὁ Σύριος Ζάντα μὲν εἶναι αἰεὶ καὶ Χρόνον καὶ Χθονίαν τὰς τρεῖς πρώτας ἀρχάς. *Prob. ad. Verg. Buc.* 6.31 (Pherecyd. Syr. fr. 65 Schibli = 7 A 9 DK). “Pherecydes also agrees but cites different elements: Zen, he says, and Chthon and Cronus, signifying fire and earth and time, and that it is the aether which rules, the earth which is ruled, and time in which the regions taken together are governed.” *consentit et Pherecydes, sed diversa affert elementa: Ζῆνα inquit καὶ Χθόνα καὶ Κρόνον, ignem ac terram et tempus significans, et esse aethera qui regat, terram quae regatur, tempus in quo universa pars moderetur.* *Herm. Irris.* 12 (*Dox. Graec.* 654.7–10, fr. 66 Schibli = 7 A 9 DK): “Pherecydes says the principles are Zen and Chthonie and Cronus; Zen is the aether, Chthonie, the earth, and Cronus is time; the aether is that which acts, the aether is that which is acted upon, time is that in which events come to pass.” Φερεκύδης μὲν ἀρχάς εἶναι λέγων Ζῆνα καὶ Χθονίην καὶ Κρόνον· Ζῆνα μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα, Χθονίην δὲ τὴν γῆν, Κρόνον δὲ τὸν χρόνον, ὃ μὲν αἰθῆρ τὸ ποιοῦν, ἡ δὲ γῆ τὸ πάσχον, ὃ δὲ χρόνος ἐν ᾧ τὰ γινόμενα.

91 Sol. 36.3 West: ἐν δίκῃ Χρόνου; Simon. 531.5 *PMG*: ὁ πανδαμάτωρ... Χρόνος; S. *Aj.* 646–7: ἀπανθ’ ὁ μακρὸς κἀναριθμητος χρόνος / φύει τ’ ἄδηλα καὶ φανέντα κρύπτεται; S. *El.* 179: χρόνος γὰρ εὐμαρῆς θεός.

92 Pi. O. 2.19: Χρόνος ὁ πάντων πατήρ; fr. 159 Maehl. (*ap.* D. H. *Orat. Vett.* 2.1.4): ἀνδρῶν δικαίων Χρόνος σωτήρ ἄριστος; cf. fr. 33 Maehl. (*ap.* Plu. *Plat. Quaest.* 8.4.3 1007B): ἀνα<κτα> τὸν πάντων ὑπερβάλλοντα χρόνον μακάρων. In O. 10.50–55, Pindar derives the name of the hill of Cronus at Olympia from the role of Chronos in the first-born rite: καὶ πάγον / Κρόνου προσεφθέγγατο· πρόσθε γὰρ / νώνυμος, ἄς Οἰνόμαος ἄρχε, βρέχετο πολλὰ / νιφάδι. ταῦτα δ’ ἐν πρωτογῶνι τελετὰ / παρέστα μὲν ἄρα Μοῖραι σχεδόν / ὅ τ’ ἐξελέγχεον μόνος / ἀλάθειαν ἐτήτυμον / Χρόνος. Plu. *De Is et Os.* 363D claims that the Greeks allegorise Cronus as Chronos, and Schibli 1990: 27 suggests it may in fact derive from Pherekydes, which would explain the attestation of both forms in the evidence.

93 E. *Pirithous* fr. 594 Nauck² = Critias, *Pirithous* fr. 3 Snell = fr. 18 DK, quoted (as from Euripides’ *Peirithoos*) in Clem. Al. *Strom.* 5.6.36 and Sch. Ar. *An.* 179: ἀκάμας τε χρόνος περὶ τ’ ἀενάωι / βρέματι πλήρης φοιτᾷ τίκτων / αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν, διδυμοὶ τ’ ἄρκτοι / ταῖς ὠκυπλάνοισι πτερύγων ῥιπταῖς / τὸν Ἀτλάντειον τηροῦσι πόλον.

94 Aët. *Placit.* 1.21 318.4–5: Περὶ χρόνου. Πυθαγόρας τὴν σφαῖραν τοῦ περιέχοντος. As Brisson 1997: 156 points out, this definition of time is very similar to that Aristotle dismisses as silly in *Physics* 4.10, 218a 31–b 8.

95 Eudem. fr. 150 Wehrli (*ap.* *Dam. Pr.* 322.7–323.2): “But of the Magoi and all the Aëreion race, according to the relation of Eudemus, some denominate the Intelligible Universe and the United, Place, while others call it Time (Chronos): from whom separately proceed a Good Divinity and an Evil Dæmon; or, as some assert, prior to these, Light and Darkness. Both the one, therefore, and the other, after an undivided nature, hold the twofold co-ordination of the superior natures as separated and distinct, over one of which they place Oromasdes as the ruler, and over the other Arimanius. The Sidonians, according to the same writer, before all things place Chronos, and Pothos, and Omichles (Cloudy Darkness).” Μάγοι δὲ καὶ πάν τ’ ἄρειον γένος, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο γράφει ὁ Εὐδήμιος, οἱ μὲν Τόπον, οἱ δὲ Χρόνον καλοῦσι τὸ νοητὸν ἅπαν καὶ τὸ ἡνωμένον, ἐξ οὗ διακριθῆναι ἡ θεὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ δαίμονα κακόν, ἡ φῶς καὶ σκότος πρὸ τούτων, ὡς ἐπίους λέγειν. Οὗτοι δὲ οὖν καὶ αὐτοὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀδιάκριτον φύσιν διακρινομένην ποιοῦσι τὴν διττὴν συστοιχίαν τῶν κρειττόνων, τῆς μὲν ἡγήσασθαι τὸν Ὀρομάσδη, τῆς δὲ τὸν Ἀρειμάνιον. Σιδώνιοι δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν συγγραφέα πρὸ πάντων Χρόνον· ὑποτίθενται καὶ Πόθον καὶ Ὀμίχλην.

by Hieronymus could only result from a Stoic allegorical interpretation that identifies Heracles' twelve labors with the cycles of the Great Year, and his death upon a pyre with the cosmic ecpyrosis.⁹⁶ Yet, as Lobeck points out, the identification of Heracles with the temporal cycle derives from his connection with the sun, only part of which stems from the identification of his twelve labors with the signs of the zodiac through which the sun moves. Porphyry preserves an allegorisation that links the sun, as the power that wards off evils on the earth, with Heracles' cult title of Alexikakos, the 'verter of evils'.⁹⁷ The solar Heracles, and even his journey through the year as the passage of time, are thus independent of any Stoic allegorisation, although Stoic thinkers clearly picked up the identification and adapted it to their ideas of a cosmic ecpyrosis, fitting the mythic end of Heracles' life neatly into their image of the end of a cosmic cycle. The serpent form of this Heracles links him again with the circle of the sun, as well as 'unaging Chronos' symbolised by the snake that sheds its skin to renew itself.

In the theogony, this serpentine deity produces and splits open an egg, which divides into the heaven and the earth, giving birth to a god known as Protogonos, the first born. The final factor adduced by West and others who argue for a post-Stoic date for the theogony is the identification of Protogonos with Zeus and Pan. The etymological game that identifies Pan with the god of all "is surely Hellenistic," claims West, although he himself notes that this etymology appears in Plato's *Cratylus*, where Plato is, as Baxter has shown, critiquing the allegorical practices

of the generations previous to him.⁹⁸ The syncretism of Zeus with all of the other deities is, to be sure, an idea that the Stoics developed fully, but, as noted above, it appears already in the tragedians and other classical thinkers.⁹⁹ Clement also quotes from Euripides' *Peirithoos* an image of this supreme god, whirling around the celestial sphere like the unaging, primordial Chronos of the *Hieronyman Theogony*: "You, self-generated, who on Aither's wheel twirls the nature of all things, around whom light and shadowy spangled Night, and the innumerable host of stars dance ceaselessly."¹⁰⁰ Again, this image of the cosmic deity resembles most the figure from tragedy, rather than a later Stoic creation.

West argues that the collapse of Protogonos and Zeus into the same figure must, however, be a late stage of development, after the Stoic theory of Zeus' cyclical absorption and regeneration of the world.¹⁰¹ But Zeus' swallowing of Protogonos and the entire cosmos is designed to make the last born god, Zeus, the first born of the new creation; the identification of these two divine figures is the point of the swallowing myth.¹⁰² The Stoic theory of cosmic cycles elaborates upon this idea of connecting the first principle with the last, but the story itself is not dependent upon the theory.

9 Contextualising the *Hieronyman Theogony*

None of the elements, then, that scholars have argued must be Stoic are without precedent in the time of

96 Cf. Sen. *Ben.* 4.8.1: "he is Hercules, because his might is unconquered, and when it is wearied after completing its labours, will retire into fire;" *Herculem, quia vis eius invicta sit quandoque lassata fuerit operibus editis, in ignem recessura*. West 1983: 194 still cannot point to any actual Stoic identification of Heracles with Time: "This peculiar Stoic exegesis of the Heracles myth, while not actually identifying Heracles and Time, provides a sufficient basis for doing so. It is hard to see how the Orphic poet could have arrived at the identification except under the influence of that exegesis."

97 Lobeck 1829: 485. Porph. *Peri agalmata* fr. 8 (*ap.* Eus. *PE* 3.11.25): "But inasmuch as the sun wards off the evils of the earth, they called him Heracles (from his clashing against the air) in passing from east to west. And they invented fables of his performing twelve labours, as the symbol of the division of the signs of the zodiac in heaven; and they arrayed him with a club and a lion's skin, the one as an indication of his uneven motion, and the other representative of his strength in "Leo" the sign of the zodiac." Καθὸ δὲ ἀπαλεξικακός ἐστι τῶν ἐπιγείων ὁ ἥλιος, Ἡρακλέα αὐτὸν προσεῖπον ἐκ τοῦ κλάσθαι πρὸς τὸν ἀέρα, ἀπ' ἀνατολῆς εἰς δύσιν ἰόντα. Δώδεκα δ' ἄθλους ἐκμοχθεῖν ἐμυθολόγησαν, τῆς κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν διαιρέσεως τῶν ζωιδίων τὸ σύμβολον ἐπιφημίσαντες. Ῥόπαλον δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ λεοντὴν περιέθεσαν, τὸ μὲν τῆς ἀνωμαλίας μῆνυμα, τὸ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ζώιδιον ἐμφανιστικὸν ἰσχύος.

98 West 1983: 204; cf. Pl. *Cra.* 408bc. Baxter 1992 discusses the possible targets of Plato's satirical critique.

99 Cf. A. *Heliades* fr. 70 Radt: "Zeus is Aither, Zeus is earth, and Zeus is heaven; / Zeus is all, and all above," Ζεὺς ἐστὶν αἰθήρ, Ζεὺς δὲ γῆ, Ζεὺς δ' οὐρανός. / Ζεὺς τοὶ τὰ πάντα χῶτι τῶνδε [τοὶ] ὑπέρτερον. E. fr. 941 Kannicht (*ap.* Clem. Al. *Strom.* 5.14.114): "Do you see this lofty, boundless Aither, / which holds the earth around in moist embraces? / This reckon Zeus, and this consider God." Ὅραῖς τὸν ὑψοῦ τόνδ' ἄπειρον αἰθέρα, / καὶ γῆν περὶξ ἔχονθ' ὑγραῖς ἐν ἀγκάλαις; / τοῦτον νόμιζε Ζῆνα, τόνδ' ἠγοῦ θεόν. See n. xx above.

100 E. *Pirithous* fr. 593 Nauck² = Critias *Pirithous* fr. 4 Snell = fr. 19 DK (*ap.* Clem. Al. *Strom.* 5.14.114): ἔν τε τῷ Πειριθῶι δρᾶματι ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ τάδε τραγωιδεῖ· σὲ τὸν αὐτοφυῆ, τὸν ἐν αἰθερίῳ / ῥόμβῳ πάντων φύσιν ἐμπλέξανθ; / ὄν περὶ μὲν φῶς, περὶ δ' ὀρφναία / νύξ αἰολόχρωσ, ἄκριτός τ[ε] ἄστρων / ὄχλος ἐνδελεχῶς ἀμφιχορεύει.

101 West 1983: 204: "His equation with Zeus cannot, I think, be early. Zeus had a separate and quite dissimilar birth, generations later, and his greatest achievement was to swallow Protogonos and his universe. To swallow a universe was a heroic feat, but to swallow *himself* would surely have taxed even Zeus' resource beyond the limit. Protogonos was not Zeus, therefore, in the mind of the poet who constructed that narrative."

102 Cf. the discussions in Betegh 2004: 172–9, Rangos 2007: 52–8, and Bernabé 2008: 114–5 and 124–6, among others.

Euripides, and indeed the poetic images from the tragedians and the allegorical interpretations practised by their contemporaries (whom Plato attacks in the *Cratylus*) provide the closest parallels to the theogony Damascius records from the account of Hieronymus and Hellanicus. Damascius also relates that Eudemus, a Peripatetic contemporary with Hieronymus of Rhodes, catalogued a variety of theogonic accounts, so it is worth considering if Hieronymus might have done likewise.¹⁰³ Of Eudemus' catalogue we know little beyond the evidence of Damascius, but Betegh has recently argued that Eudemus, like Plato and Aristotle, draws upon Hippias' previous systematising of accounts of poets and *physikoi*. As the Platonic references show, Hippias grouped together the accounts he interpreted as signifying the same idea, so Heraclitus and Thales were linked with Homer and Orpheus, since they all traced the beginning of the cosmos back to some sort of flux.¹⁰⁴ In an account of one of the poems with theogonic material attributed to Orpheus circulating at that time, Hieronymus might likewise have made use of Hippias, or he could have drawn an account with allegorical explanations from other such thinkers of Hippias' generation. Epigenes, for example, seems to have written on the poems of Orpheus, and he may even have interpreted Orphica allegorically, explaining that the parts of a loom represent the process of ploughing and sowing seeds.¹⁰⁵

103 The suggestion is made by Matelli 2010: 445: "La più approfondita conoscenza critica dei testi di Ieronimo in base alla nuova edizione dei frammenti, il nuovo quadro della religiosità di Rodi nel III sec. a. C., la considerazione che all'interno della scuola di Aristotele ci fu interesse per l'orfismo, possono a mio giudizio portare a rivedere la questione. L'attribuzione della paternità della Teogonia a un doppio nome "Ieronimo o Ellanico (a meno che siano la stessa persona)" da parte di Damascio (*Pr.* 123) potrebbe far pensare che Ieronimo avesse riportato una Teogonia citando l'autorità dello storico del V sec. a. C., Ellanico, sua fonte."

104 Betegh 2002. See the arguments in Snell 1966, Mansfeld 1983, and Betegh 2007.

105 Epigenes seems to have discussed various features of Orphic poetry. Clem. Al. *Strom.* 5.8.49: "Does not Epigenes, in his book on the *Poetry of Orpheus*, in exhibiting the peculiarities found in Orpheus, say that by the curved rods (*κερκίσι*) is meant ploughs; and by the warp (*στήμοσι*), the furrows; and the woof (*μίτος*) is a figurative expression for the seed; and that the tears of Zeus signify a shower; and that the parts (*μοίραι*) are, again, the phases of the moon, the thirtieth day, and the fifteenth, and the new moon, and that Orpheus accordingly calls them white-robed, as being parts of the light? Again, that the Spring is called flowery, from its nature; and Night still, on account of rest; and the Moon Gorgonian, on account of the face in it; and that the time in which it is necessary to sow is called Aphrodite by the Theologian." One could speculate that the explication of the weaving comes from an interpretation of the abduction of Kore while weaving, perhaps in the *Peplos*, in terms of natural phenomena.

Hieronymus might also have drawn from the work of Hellanicus of Lesbos, which could explain Damascius' confusion of their accounts. Although Hellanicus is better known as the inventor of chronographic history in his account of the priestesses of Argive Hera, the fragments of his work attest to his interest in mythological tales and his use of allegorical etymologies.¹⁰⁶ The fragmentary remains of both Hellanicus and Hieronymus make it difficult to ascertain in what work, out of those whose names have survived, an account such as Damascius' might appear, but the nature of the allegorical material in the theogony makes the attribution plausible, even if certainty can never be achieved on the basis of the surviving evidence.

Such a Peripatetic systematisation of allegorical accounts that appeared in earlier texts, whether mediated by a late sophistic author such as Hellanicus or not, could produce the kind of account found in Damascius, while Athenagoras could then be drawing his account of the Orphic theogony from Orphic texts that circulated in the Classical period—or from later reworkings of such texts, since the pseudepigraphic tradition of Orphic poems often operated by reworking older material rather than composing entirely anew.

10 Ramifications of Peripatetic Work on the Orphica

The conclusion that the account of the Orphic theogony that Damascius draws upon could have been produced in a Peripatetic context could prompt a re-examination of other works that have been placed in Stoic contexts on the basis of the use of allegory. The treatise, *On the World*,

Epigenes' treatise provides the first evidence for specific titles of Orphic works—*Katabasis*, *Hieros Logos*, *Peplos*, and *Physika*—as well as, like Herodotus, attributing to Pythagoreans (Cercops and Brontinos) works that circulated under the name of Orpheus. Linforth 1941: 114–9 identifies Epigenes as the follower of Socrates mentioned by Plato (*Ap.* 33e, *Phd.* 59b) and Xenophon (*Mem.* 3.12). Ion of Chios, a fifth century tragedian and sophist, seems also to have discussed Orphica in his *Triagmoi*, claiming that Pythagoras himself put the name of Orpheus on his own poems. Herodorus also wrote a treatise on the poetry of Musaeus and Orpheus, in which he resorted to the hypothesis of two different men named Orpheus to reconcile the chronology of the Argonaut with the appearance of various Orphic poems. Cf. Herodor. *FGrHist* 31 F 42 (*ap.* Sch. A. R. 1.23–25a) (= *OF* 1010 11 and 1129 11); Herodor. *FGrHist* 31 F 12 (*ap.* Olymp. *ap.* Phot. *Bibl.* 86 Migne 103 272c, Codex 80 Bekker 61a.33) (= *OF* 1129 1).

106 Cf. Hellanic. *FGrHist* 4 F 111 (*ap.* D. H. *Ant. Rom.* 1.35), in which Hellanicus derives the name of Italy from Heracles' lost *vitulus*, or F 89 (*ap.* Sch. A. R. 1.1129), where the Idaean Dactyls get their name from touching the fingers of Rhea.

attributed to Aristotle, has been dated to the first centuries AD because of the similarities with Stoic ideas, especially of Posidonius, but the realisation that Peripatetics such as Eudemus and Hieronymus were dealing with the Orphica in their systematic accounts of cosmologies suggests that a Peripatetic context for this work might after all be plausible.¹⁰⁷

Again, certain kinds of allegory have prompted scholars to push the date of the *On the World* to the time of the Stoics, despite the Peripatetic elements in the text. In particular, the section on the names of the supreme god, which includes a variety of etymological allegories, has seemed out of keeping with the Aristotelian rejection of allegory, while the quotation from an Orphic “Hymn to Zeus” has been read as a later Stoic expansion of the section in the Derveni Papyrus.

God being one yet has many names, being called after all the various conditions which he himself inaugurates. We call him Zen and Zeus, using the two names in the same sense, as though we should say ‘him through whom we live.’ He is called the son of Cronus and of Time, for he endures from eternal age to age. He is God of Lightning and Thunder, God of the Clear Sky and of Ether, God of the Thunderbolt and of Rain, so called after the rain and the thunderbolts and other physical phenomena. Moreover, after the fruits he is called the Fruitful God, after cities the City-God; he is God of Birth, God of the House-court, God of Kindred and God of our Fathers from his participation in such things. He is God of Comradeship and Friendship and Hospitality, God of Armies and of Trophies, God of Purification and of Vengeance and of Supplication and of Propitiation, as the poets name him, and in very truth the Saviour and God of Freedom, and to complete the tale of his titles, God of Heaven and of the World Below, deriving his names from all natural phenomena and conditions, inasmuch as he is himself the cause of all things. Wherefore it is not badly said in the Orphica,

¹⁰⁷ Maguire 1939: 116 critiques earlier attempts to link the treatise with Posidonius, preferring to see it as drawing upon neo-Pythagorean sources, but he also points out that many ideas are very commonplace: “I wish to insist on the utter triteness of all the ideas.” Cf. Reale – Bos 1995, who argue for a Peripatetic origin. Bos 1991: 312 notes that, although few are willing to accept that the treatise is actually by Aristotle, more have accepted that it may come from a Peripatetic context and that Stoics may have drawn on the ideas in it, rather than vice versa.

Zeus of the flashing bolt was the first to be born
and the latest;
Zeus is the head and the middle; of Zeus were all
things created;
Zeus is the stay of the earth and the stay of the
star-spangled heaven;
Zeus is male and female of sex, the bride
everlasting;
Zeus is the breath of all and the rush of unweary-
ing fire;
Zeus is the root of the sea, and the sun and the
moon in the heavens;
Zeus of the flashing bolt is the king and the ruler
of all men,
Hiding them all away, and again to the glad light
of heaven
Bringing them back at his will, performing terri-
ble marvels.¹⁰⁸

While such a study is beyond the scope of this essay, in light of the Peripatetic interest in cataloguing Orphica, in Eudemus and perhaps in Hieronymus, as well as the evidence that the wide-spread use of allegory in the age of Euripides helped to shape those catalogues, it is worth reconsidering the dating of this treatise and questioning which of its ideas may indeed have been discussed among the pupils of Aristotle.

¹⁰⁸ [Arist.] *Mu.* 7 (401a 12–401b 7): Εἰς δὲ ὧν πολυώνυμος ἐστὶ κατοννομαζόμενος τοῖς πάθεσι πᾶσιν ἄπερ αὐτὸς νεοσχοῖ. Καλοῦμεν γὰρ αὐτὸν καὶ Ζῆνα καὶ Δία, παραλλήλως χρώμενοι τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, ὡς καὶ εἰ λέγοιμεν δι’ ὃν ζῶμεν. Κρόνου δὲ παῖς καὶ χρόνου λέγεται, διήκων ἕξ αἰῶνος ἀτέρμονος εἰς ἕτερον αἰῶνα· ἀστραπαῖός τε καὶ βρονταῖός τε καὶ αἰθρίας καὶ αἰθέριος κεραυνῖός τε καὶ ὑέτιος ἀπὸ τῶν ὑετῶν καὶ κεραυνῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καλεῖται. Καὶ μὴν ἐπικάρπιος μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν, πολιεύς δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων ὀνομάζεται, γενέθλιός τε καὶ ἐρκείος καὶ ὁμόγνιος καὶ πατρῶιος ἀπὸ τῆς πρὸς ταῦτα κοινωνίας, ἑταιρείός τε καὶ φίλιος καὶ ξένιος καὶ στρατίος καὶ τροπαιοῦχος καθάρσιός τε καὶ παλαμναῖός τε καὶ ἰκέσιος καὶ μειλίχιος, ὡσπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσι, σωτήρ τε καὶ ἐλευθέριος ἐτύμως, ὡς δὲ τὸ πᾶν εἰπεῖν, οὐράνιός τε καὶ χθόνιος, πάσης ἐπάνυμος φύσεως ὧν καὶ τύχης, ἅτε πάντων αὐτὸς αἴτιος ὧν. Διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς οὐ κακῶς λέγεται “Ζεὺς πρῶτος γένητο, Ζεὺς ὕστατος ἀρχικέρανος· / Ζεὺς κεφαλή, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ’ ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται· / Ζεὺς πυθμῆν γαίης τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος· / Ζεὺς ἄρσην γένητο, Ζεὺς ἄμβροτος ἔπλετο νόμφη· / Ζεὺς πνοιή πάντων, Ζεὺς ἀκαμάτου πυρός ὄρμη· / Ζεὺς πόντου ῥίζα, Ζεὺς ἥλιος ἠδὲ σελήνη· / Ζεὺς βασιλεύς, Ζεὺς ἀρχὸς ἀπάντων ἀρχικέρανος· / πάντας γὰρ κρύψας αὐθις φάος ἐς πολυγηθῆς / ἐκ καθαρῆς κραδίης ἀνεύεγκατο, μέρμερα βέζων.”

11 Conclusion

The examination of the use of allegory in the Derveni Papyrus and in the Orphic theogony that Damascius associates with Hieronymus reveals the contrasting contexts of the two works. The DA uses allegory to show off his expertise in the exegesis of sacred rites and authoritative texts. The very complexity and apparent scandal of the text serves to emphasise the cleverness of the interpreter who expounds its hidden meanings to his audience, and the treatise thus serves as an advertisement for his expert services in the marketplace, where, in Plato's memorable image, a hubbub of books compete. Embroiled in this agonistic context and deploying his rhetoric to extoll his own expertise, the DA is no scholastic theologian, setting out his cosmology in a systematic treatise like the Stoic or later Peripatetic or Platonist philosophers, but an active ritual practitioner using his allegorical interpretations to show potential clients how clever he can be at unravelling the riddles of life. By contrast, the theogony associated with Hieronymus and Hellanicus seems to derive from a systematic exposition of a poetic cosmogony, possibly a part of a series, like that of Eudemus, and perhaps even deriving from the first systematising efforts of fifth century thinkers like Hippias and Hellanicus that built allegories into their interpretations. The allegories of the DA prompt us to look beyond the rejection of allegory in Plato and Aristotle to the background of allegorical hermeneutics against which these two great philosophers were arguing. All the allegories found in the Derveni Papyrus and the *Hieronyman Theogony* find their closest parallels not in Stoic allegoresis, but in the allegories of thinkers in the age of Euripides. As an increasing number of recent studies have shown, allegoresis was hardly the exclusive province of the Stoics or even a marker of the decay of the Hellenic religious spirit, as it was once considered, but rather it was a product of the sophistic revolution that animated theological and philosophical thinking for centuries. Orphic poetry, so often characterised by obscure or scandalous tales, provided generations of thinkers, from the DA through to Damascius, the opportunity to explain through allegorical exegesis all of those things which seem misleading and unclear to the many.

References

- Algra, K. 2001. "Comments or Commentary? Zeno of Citium and Hesiod's *Theogonia*" *Mnemosyne* 54, 562–81.
- Baxter, T. M. S. 1992. *The Cratylus. Plato's Critique of Naming*, Leiden – New York – Köln.
- Bernabé, A. 2002. "La théogonie orphique du papyrus de Derveni," *Kernos* 15, 91–129.
- Bernabé, A. 2004–2005. *Poetae Epici Graeci. Testimonia et fragmenta. Pars. II: Orphicorum et Orphicis similium testimonia et fragmenta*, fasc. 1 and 2, Monachii – Lipsiae.
- Bernabé, A. 2007a. *Poetae Epici Graeci. Testimonia et Fragmenta. Pars II: Orphicorum et Orphicis similium testimonia et fragmenta*, fasc. 3, Berolini – Novi Eboraci.
- Bernabé, A. 2004. "Orphisme et présocratiques: bilan et perspectives d'un dialogue complexe," in A. Laks – C. Louget (eds.), *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie présocratique? What is Presocratic Philosophy*, 205–47.
- Bernabé, A. 2008. "The Derveni Theogony: Many Questions and Some Answers," *HSPH* 103, 99–134.
- Betegh, G. 2002. "On Eudemus Fr. 150 (Wehrli)," in I. Bodnár – W. W. Fortenbaugh (eds.), *Eudemus of Rhodes*, New Brunswick – London, 337–57.
- Betegh, G. 2004. *The Derveni Papyrus: Cosmology, Theology and Interpretation*, Cambridge.
- Betegh, G. 2007. "The Derveni Papyrus and Early Stoicism," *Rhizai* 4, 133–52.
- Bos, A. P. 1991. "Supplementary Notes on the 'De mundo'," *Hermes* 119, 312–32.
- Brisson, L. 1985. "La figure de Chronos dans la théogonie orphique et ses antécédents iraniens," in D. Tiffeneau (ed.), *Mythes et représentations du temps*, Paris, 37–55.
- Brisson, L. 1995. *Orphée et l'Orphisme dans l'Antiquité gréco-romaine*, Vermont.
- Brisson, L. 1997. "Chronos in Column XII of the Derveni Papyrus," in Laks – Most, 149–6.
- Brisson, L. 2003. "Sky, Sex and Sun. The Meanings of αἰδοῖος/αἰδοῖον in the Derveni Papyrus," *ZPE* 144, 19–29.
- Brisson, L. 2004. *How Philosophers Saved Myths: Allegorical Interpretation and Classical Mythology*, Chicago.
- Brisson, L. 2010. "L'opposition profanes / initiés dans le Papyrus de Derveni," in É. Rebillard – C. Sotinel (eds.), *Les frontières du Profane dans l'Antiquité tardive*, Roma, 21–35.
- Brisson, L. 2011. "Okéanos dans la colonne XXIII du Papyrus de Derveni," in M. Herrero de Jáuregui – A. I. Jiménez San Cristóbal – E. R. Luján Martínez – R. Martín Hernández – M. A. Santamaría Álvarez – S. Torallas Tovar (eds.), *Tracing Orpheus. Studies of Orphic Fragments in Honour of Alberto Bernabé*, Sozomena 10, Berlin – Boston, 385–92.
- Burkert, W. 1967. "Orpheus und die Vorsokratiker. Bemerkungen zum Derveni Papyrus und zur pythagoreischen Zahlenlehre," *A&A* 13, 93–114.
- Burkert, W. 1970. "La genèse des choses et des mots: Le papyrus de Derveni entre Anaxagore et Cratyle," *EPH* 1970, 443–55.
- Burkert, W. 1987. *Ancient Mystery Cults*, Cambridge (Mass.) – London.

- Burkert, W. 1997. "Star Wars or One Stable World? A Problem of Presocratic Cosmogony (PDerv. col. XXV)," in Laks – Most, 167–74.
- Calame, C. 1997. "Figures of Sexuality and Initiatory Transition in the Derveni Theogony and its Commentary," Laks – Most, 65–80.
- Casadesús, F. 2010. "Similitudes entre el Papiro de Derveni y los primeros filósofos estoicos," in A. Bernabé – F. Casadesús – M. A. Santamaría (eds.), *Orfeo y el orfismo: nuevas perspectivas*, Alicante, Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes, 192–239: <http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra-visor/orfeo-y-el-orfismo-nuevas-perspectivas--o/pdf/> (accessed 13/06/18).
- Casadesús, F. 2011. "The Castration of Uranus and its Physical Consequences in the Derveni Papyrus (cols. XIII and XIV) and the First Stoic Philosophers," in M. Herrero de Jáuregui – A. I. Jiménez San Cristóbal – E. R. Luján Martínez – R. Martín Hernández – M. A. Santamaría Álvarez – S. Torallas Tovar (eds.), *Tracing Orpheus. Studies of Orphic Fragments in Honour of Alberto Bernabé*, Sozomena 10, Berlin – Boston, 377–83.
- Casadio, G. 1986. "Adversaria Orphica et Orientalia," *SMSR* 52, 291–322.
- Detienne, M. 2003. *The Writing of Orpheus: Greek Myth in Cultural Context*, Baltimore.
- Dillery, J. 2005. "Chresmologues and Manteis. Diviners and the Problem of Authority," in S. I. Johnston – P. T. Struck (eds.), *Mantiké: Studies in Ancient Divination*, Leiden, 167–231.
- Edmonds III, R. G. 1999. "Tearing Apart the Zagreus Myth: A Few Disparaging Remarks on Orphism and Original Sin," *CLAnt* 18, 1–24.
- Edmonds III, R. G. 2004. *Myths of the Underworld Journey: Plato, Aristophanes, and the 'Orphic' Gold Tablets*, Cambridge.
- Edmonds III, R. G. 2008. "Extra-ordinary People: *Mystai* and *Magoi*, Magicians and Orphics in the Derveni Papyrus," *CPh* 103, 16–39.
- Edmonds III, R. G. 2008. "Recycling Laertes' Shroud: More on Orphism and Original Sin". Center for Hellenic Studies online (<http://chs.harvard.edu/chs/redmonds>) (accessed 13/06/18).
- Edmonds III, R. G. 2013. *Redefining Ancient Orphism: A Study in Greek Religion*, Cambridge.
- Ferrari, F. 2013. "From Orpheus to Teiresias: Solar Issues on the Derveni Papyrus," *ZPE* 186, 57–75.
- Ford, A. 2014. "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time (432 BC): Text, Interpretation and Memory in Plato's *Protagoras*," *Poetica* 46, 17–39.
- Gagarin, M. 2002. *Antiphon the Athenian: Oratory, Law, and Justice in the Age of the Sophists*, Austin.
- Griffith, M. 1990. "Contest and Contradiction in Early Greek Poetry," in M. Griffith – D. Mastronarde (eds.), *Cabinet of the Muses: Essays on Classical and Comparative Literature in Honor of Thomas G. Rosenmeyer*, Atlanta, 185–207.
- Henrichs, A. 1984. "The Sophists and Hellenistic Religion: Prodicus as the Spiritual Father of the Isis Aretologies," *HSPH* 88, 139–58.
- Janko, R. 1997. "The Physicist as Hierophant: Aristophanes, Socrates and the Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus," *ZPE* 118, 61–94.
- Janko, R. 2001. "The Derveni Papyrus (Diagoras of Melos, *Apopyrgizontes logoi?*): a New Translation," *CPh* 96, 1–32.
- Janko, R. 2002–2003. "God, Science, and Socrates," *BICS* 46, 1–18.
- Janko, R. 2016. "Parmenides in the Derveni Papyrus: New Images for a New Edition," *ZPE* 200, 3–23.
- Jouanna, J. 1975. *La nature de l'homme*. Éd., trad. et comm., Berlin.
- Jouanna, J. 1999. *Hippocrates*, Baltimore – London.
- Jourdan, F. 2003. *Le Papyrus de Derveni*, Paris.
- Kahn, Ch. 1997. "Was Euthyphro the Author of the Derveni Papyrus?," in Laks – Most, 9–22.
- Kern, O. 1922. *Orphicorum Fragmenta*, Berlin.
- Kotwick, B. 2017. *Der Papyrus von Derveni*, Berlin – Boston.
- KPT = Kouremenos, Th.-G. Parássoglou – K. Tsantsanoglou 2006. *The Derveni Papyrus. Edited with Introduction and Commentary*, Firenze.
- Laks, A. 1997. "Between Religion and Philosophy: The Function of Allegory in the Derveni Papyrus," *Phronesis* 42, 121–42.
- Laks, A. – Most, G. 1997. *Studies in the Derveni Papyrus*, Oxford.
- Ledbetter, G. M. 2003. *Poetics before Plato: Interpretation and Authority in Early Greek Theories of Poetry*, Princeton.
- Linforth, I. M. 1941. *The Arts of Orpheus*, Berkeley – Los Angeles.
- Lobeck, C. A. 1829. *Aglaophamus sive de theologiae mysticae Graecorum causis libri tres*, Regimontii Prussorum.
- Long, A. 1992. R. Lambertson – J. J. Keaney (eds.), *Homer's Ancient Readers: The Hermeneutics of Greek Epic's Earliest Exegetes*, Princeton.
- Maguire, P. 1939. "The Sources of ps. Aristotle *De mundo*," *YCS* 6, 109–67.
- Mansfeld, J. 1983. "Cratylus 402a–c: Plato or Hippias?," in L. Rossetti (ed.), *Atti del Symposium Heracliteum 1981*, Roma, vol. 1, 43–55.
- Mansfeld, J. 1986. "Aristotle and others on Thales, or the Beginnings of Natural Philosophy. With some Remarks on Xenophanes," *Mnemosyne* 38, 109–29.
- Mansfeld, J. 1990. *Studies in the Historiography of Greek Philosophy*, Assen.
- Matelli, E. 2010. "Peripato e orfismo a Rodi," in A. Bernabé – F. Casadesús – M. A. Santamaría (eds.), *Orfeo y el orfismo: nuevas perspectivas*, Alicante, Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes, 421–54. <http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra-visor/orfeo-y-el-orfismo-nuevas-perspectivas--o/pdf/> (accessed 13/06/18).

- Most, G. 1994. "Simonides' Ode to Scopas in Contexts," in I. J. F. de Jong – J. P. Sullivan (eds.), *Modern Critical Theory and Classical Literature*, Leiden – New York, 127–52.
- Most, G. 1997. "The Fire Next Time: Cosmology, Allegoresis, and Salvation in the Derveni Papyrus," *JHS* 117, 117–35.
- Obbink, D. 1994. "A Quotation of the Derveni Papyrus in Philodemus' *On piety*," *CErc* 24, 111–35.
- Obbink, D. 1997. "Cosmology as Initiation vs. the Critique of Orphic Mysteries," in Laks – Most, 39–54.
- Oliver, J. 1950. *The Athenian Expounders of the Sacred and Ancestral Law*, Baltimore.
- Piano, V. 2016. "P.Derveni III–VI: una riconsiderazione del testo," *ZPE* 197, 5–16.
- Rangos, S. 2007. "Latent Meaning and Manifest Content in the Derveni Papyrus," *Rhizai* 1, 35–75.
- Reale, G. – Bos, A. P. 1995. *Il trattato sul cosmo per Alessandro attribuito ad Aristotele: Monografia introduttiva, testo greco con traduzione a fronte commentario, bibliografia regionata e indici*, Milano.
- Roth, P. 1984. "Teiresias as Mantis and Intellectual in Euripides' *Bacchae*," *TAPhA* 114, 59–69.
- Rusten, J. S. 1985. "Interim Notes on the Papyrus from Derveni," *HSPH* 89, 121–40.
- Rusten, J. S. 2011. "Unlocking the Orphic Doors. Interpretation of Poetry in the Derveni Papyrus between Pre-Socratics and Alexandrians," in I. Papadopoulou – L. Muellner (eds.), *Poetry as Initiation. The Center of Hellenic Studies Symposium on the Derveni Papyrus*, Cambridge (Mass.)-London, 115–34.
- Santamaría Álvarez, M. A. 2012. "Tiresias in Euripides' *Bacchae* and the Author of the Derveni Papyrus," in P. Schubert (ed.), *Actes du 26e Congrès international de papyrologie (Genève 2010)*, Genève, 677–84.
- Santamaría Álvarez, M. A. 2016. "A Phallus Hard to Swallow: The Meaning of αἰδοῖος/-ον in the Derveni Papyrus," *CPh* 111, 139–64.
- Schibli, H. S. 1990. *Pherekydes of Syros*, Oxford.
- Scodel, R. 2011. "Euripides, the Derveni Papyrus, and the Smoke of Many Writings," in A. P. M. H. Lardinois – J. Blok – M. Poel (eds.), *Sacred Words: Orality, literacy, and religion. International Conference on Orality and Literacy in the Ancient World*, Leiden, 79–100.
- Snell, B. 1966. "Die Nachrichten über die Lehren des Thales und die Anfänge der griechischen Philosophie- und Literaturgeschichte," in Id., *Gesammelte Schriften*, Göttingen, 119–28.
- Struck, P. T. 2004. *Birth of the Symbol: Ancient Readers at the Limits of their Texts*, Princeton.
- Thomas, R. 2003. "Prose Performance Texts: Epideixis and Written Publication in the Late Fifth and Early Fourth Centuries," in H. Yunis (ed.), *Written Texts and the Rise of Literate Culture in Ancient Greece*, Cambridge (Mass.), 162–88.
- Tsantsanoglou, K. 1997. "The First Columns of the Derveni Papyrus and their Religious Significance," in Laks – Most, 93–128.
- West, M. L. 1983. *The Orphic Poems*, Oxford.
- West, M. L. 1997. "Hocus-Pocus in East and West. Theogony, Ritual and the Tradition of Esoteric Commentary," in Laks – Most, 81–90.