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Putting Him on a Pedestal: (Re)collection and the Use of Images in Plato's *Phaedrus*

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Introduction

What is the right way to treat an image? Plato notoriously both condemns the power of images and makes use of memorably vivid and dramatic images himself, all the while providing caveats about their deceptive qualities and limitations. Clearly, there are right and wrong ways to handle images. One of the most vivid illustrations in the Greek tradition of the wrong way to treat an image is undoubtedly the story of the unhappy young man who fell in love with the statue of Aphrodite at Knidos, the great masterpiece made by Praxiteles. Concealing himself in the temple at night, he tried to sexually assault the statue, leaving behind a dark stain on the thigh of the statue that the temple attendants continue to point out to wondering tourists.

> Finally, the violence of his desires made him lose his reason, his audacity serving him for pimp. One evening, at sunset, he slid unseen behind the temple door and hid in the darkest corner, holding his breath. The keepers closed the gate as usual, and this new Anchises found himself alone inside. Who would dare recount the sort of deeds he consummated that wicked night? In short, at daybreak this sign of his amorous embraces was discovered, a sign which ever since has marked the goddess as a reminder of her suffering. As for the young man, they say he threw himself upon the rocks, or into the sea. In any case he disappeared forever.[1]
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> PS. LUCÍAN, *Amores* 16.19—31

Other stories of such *agalmatopkilia* occur in a variety of sources, and a number of scholars have recently commented on the implications of this fetish for understanding the way the Greeks looked at art and the way that they worshipped their gods.[2]

In the *Phaedrus*, Plato presents a curiously similar image to this story of the sexual assault of a statue, with the description of how the dark horse of the soul tries to sexually assault the image of the beautiful beloved, only to be restrained by the reverent awe of the

1 πέρας αί σψοδραί των έν αΰτώ πόθων επιτάσεις άπενοήθησαν, εΰρέθη δέ τόλμα τής επιθυμίας μαστροπός· ήδη γάρ έπί δύσιν ήλιου κλίνοντος ήρεμα λαθών τους παρόντας οπισθε τής θύρας παρεισερρύη καί στάς αφανής ένδοτάτω σχεδόν οΰδ' άναπνέων ήτρέμει, συνήθως δέ των ζακόρων έξωθεν τήν θύραν έψελκυσαμένων ένδον è καινός Άγχίσης καθείρκτο. καί τί γάρ αρρήτου νυκτός έγώ τόλμαν ή λάλος έπ' ακριβές ΰμίν διηγούμαι; των έρωτικών περιπλοκών ιχνη ταυτα μεθ' ήμέραν ώψθηκαίτόν σπίλον είχενή θεός ών έπαθεν έλεγχον, αυτόνγε μήντόν νεανίαν, ώς è δημώδης ιστορεί λόγος, ή κατά πετρών φασιν ή κατά πελάγιου κύματος ένεχθέντα παντελώς άψανή γενέσθαι. (trans. Andrew Kallimachos)

2 Steiner 2001 raises the issue of the place of statues in Greek thought, while Eisner 2007 suggests that there is a particular mode of religious viewing of statues in Greek and Roman religion. Kindt 2012 examines a number of stories about interactions with religious statues, including the problem with *agalmatopkilia.*

soul's charioteer, who falls back, stunned by the vision of the beloved as by a divine image. The dark horse, like a rampant stallion, with stretched out tail and violent exertions, endeavors to leap upon this beautiful form,

> Struggling, and neighing, and pulling he forces them again with the same purpose to approach the beloved one, and when they are near him, he lowers his head, raises his tail, takes the bit in his teeth, and pulls shamelessly... And as the charioteer looks upon the beloved, his memory is borne back to the true nature of beauty, and he sees it standing with prudence upon a holy pedestal, and when he sees this he is afraid and falls backward in reverence, and in falling he is forced to pull the reins so violently backward as to bring both horses upon their haunches.[3]
>
> 254de

The charioteer sees the beautiful beloved as an image of the divine beauty, like a statue (*agalma)* of a god on its pedestal *(en hathro)* and resists the dark horse's attempts to have sex with it.[4] If the charioteer maintains control, the soul mayreturn again to the divine realm, but if the dark horse succeeds in getting its pleasure, the soul is condemned to wander long ages in the shadowy realms.

Plato uses this image of two ways of treating an image as an illustration of how—and how not—to treat images in general, whether they be the image of beauty presented by the beautiful beloved or even images of wisdom and justice presented by the writings of a philosopher. In every case, the image must serve as a reminder, a stimulus to recollection and a track that marks the path that memory and reason must follow to arrive at truth, rather than something to be enjoyed as an end in itself. The proper treatment of an image is thus itself an image of the process of recollection, and the ritual actions of adornment, sacrifice, and following in a procession that are appropriate to the treatment of statues of gods become images, not just of how the lover should treat the beautiful beloved, but of how the orator should compose a speech and of the way the philosopher should treat all the images of divine truth that appear in the world. The graphic image of the horse sexually assaulting the boy is likewise an image of what can go wrong when an image is used not as a reminder but as a source of pleasure in itself.

In the *Phaedrus,* then, Plato plays with the problematic status of images, employing some of his most vivid and memorable images to illustrate how images may be used philosophically in the process of recollection.[5] Both the worship paid to the beloved icon and good speeches employ images and mnemonic associations to lead the follower, step by step, toward the truth. While Phaedrus fixes his desire upon the images, both the beloved boy and the speeches, Socrates uses these images as signs on his philosophic path, reminders of whence

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3 βιαζόμενος, χρεμετίζων, έλκων ήνάγκασεν αύ προσελθεΐν χοΐς παιδικοίς έπί τούς αυτούς λόγους, καί επειδή εγγύς ήσαν, έγκύψας καί έκτείνας τήν κέρκον, ένδακών τον χαλινόν, μετ' άναιδείας έλκει· 254bc ίδόντος δέ του ήνιόχου ή μνήμη πρός τήν του κάλλους ψύσιν ήνέχθη, καί πάλιν εΐδεν αυτήν μετά σωφροσύνης έν άγνω βάθρω βεβώσαν ίδούσα δέ έ'δεισέ τε καί σεψθεΐσα άνέπεσεν ύπτια, καί άμα ήναγκάσθη εις τούπίσω έλκύσαι τάς ήνίας οίίτω σψόδρα, ώστ' έπί τά ισχία αμψω καθίσαι τώ ϊππω. (Translations of Plato are taken, with minor modifications, from the 1925 Fowler translation.)

4 When Plato refers to the beautiful beloved as like a statue in the *Phaedrus,* the word is often (e.g., 25мб, 252d7) άγαλμα, although other terms do appear (εικόνας 25ot>4, εϊδωλον 25ods, cp. 255d8, 276ag). For a recent overview of the terminology for Greek religious statues, see Nick 2002:11-25, with a catalog of literary testimonia pp. 211-231.

5 Gonzalez 2007 rightly emphasizes that recollection is a process, an ongoing practice rather than a single action, and he also importantly links this kind of process with the ways Plato talks about eros: the things recollected, like the objects of eros, are neither possessed by the subject nor totally divorced.

he has come and whither he is going.

The Process of Recollection through Images

The *Phaedrus* is notable as a dialogue in which the stimulus of visual images is connected with the process of philosophic recollection; it is the beloved's beauty that sets the soul in motion along the path of recollection.[6] Since Platocharacteristically never sets out a systematic account of how images relate to the process of recollection, to clarify this relation we must look to references he makes in other dialogues, as well as to the ways some more systematic receivers of his ideas, such as Aristotle, Proclus, and even the modern semiotician Peirce, treat the matter.

Perhaps the most significant discussion occurs in the *Phaedo,* where Plato has Socrates discuss different forms of recollection with Simmias, showing how certain visual images provoke recollection in different ways.

> "Well, you know that a lover when he sees a lyre or a cloak or anything else which his beloved is wont to use, perceives the lyre and in his mind receives an image of the boy to whom the lyre belongs, do you not? But this is recollection, just as when one sees Simmias, one often remembers Cebes, and I could cite countless such examples."
>
> "To be sure you could," said Simmias.
>
> "Now," said he, "is that sort of thing a kind of recollection? Especially when it takes place with regard to things which have already been forgotten through time and inattention?"
>
> "Certainly," he replied.
>
> "Well, then," said Socrates, "can a person on seeing a picture of a horse or of a lyre be reminded of a man, or on seeing a picture of Simmias be reminded of Cebes?"
>
> "Surely."
>
> "And on seeing a picture of Simmias he can be reminded of Simmias himself?"
>
> "Yes," said he.
>
> "All these examples show, then, that recollection is caused by like things and also by unlike things, do they not?"
>
> "Yes."[7]

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6 Cp., the excellent discussion of Nightingale 2011:157-168, who, however, focuses on the act of gazing (*theoria*), rather than other aspects of the interaction with the beautiful beloved as an *agalma.*

7 ούκούν οίσθα άτι οί *έρασταί,* όταν ϊδωσιν λύραν ή ίμάτιον ή άλλο τι οις τά παιδικά αύτών ε'ιωθε χρήσθαι, πάσχουσι τούτο- έ'γνωσάν *τε* τήν λύραν καί έν τή διανοία ελαβον το είδος τού παιδός ου ήν ή λύρα; τούτο δέ έστιν άνάμνησις- ώσπερ γε καί Σιμμίαν τις ίδών πολλάκις κέβητος άνεμνήσθη, καί άλλα που μυρία τοιαύτ' αν εί'η. μυρία μέντοι νή Δία, έ'ψη è Σιμμίας.

ούκούν, ή δ' δς, το τοιούτον άνάμνησις τίς έστι; μάλιστα μέντοι όταν τις τούτο πάθη περί έκεΐνα ά ύπό χρόνου καί τού μή έπισκοπείν ήδη έπελέλησto; πάνυ μέν ούν, *εφη.*

τί δέ; ή δ' 8ς· έ'στιν ϊππον γεγραμμένον ίδόντα καί λύραν γεγραμμένην ανθρώπου άναμνησθήναι, καί Σιμμίαν ίδόντα γεγραμμένον κέβητος άναμνησθήναι;

πάνυ γε.

ούκούν καί Σιμμίαν ίδόντα γεγραμμένον αυτού Σιμμίου άναμνησθήναι;

έ'στι μέντοι, εφη.

άρ' ούν ού κατά πάντα ταύτα συμβαίνει τήν άνάμνησιν είναι μέν άψ' όμοιων, είναι δέ καί από άνομοίων; συμβαίνει.

αKK' όταν γε από των όμοιων άναμιμνήσκηταί τις τι, άρ' ούκ άναγκαίον τόδε προσπάσχειν, έννοείν ε'ιτε τι έλλείστει τούτο κατά τήν ομοιότητα ε'ιτε μή έκείνου ου άνεμνήσθη; ανάγκη, εφη.

Phaedo 73d-74a

Socrates emphasizes that visual similarity is not the only way in which an image can make the viewer think of the thing which it represents for the viewer, the thing that is signified by that image functioning as a sign, but Plato does not pursue the distinctions systematically.[8]

The modern semiotician Peirce draws a more systematic distinction between three types of signs that relate to their signifieds in different ways: the *index,* which bears a physical or causal relation to its signified; the *icon,* which shares a visual or other qualitative resemblance to its signified; and the *symbol,* which has an indirect or arbitrary relation to its signified.[9] The differences between these kinds of signs may be illustrated with the example of fire. Smoke is an *index* of fire; it indicates that fire is present to have produced it. A stylized picture of flames, by contrast, is an *icon,* since the picture bears a visual resemblance to what it represents. The English word 'fire' itself is a *symbol,* since, whether written or spoken, it bears no visual or auditory resemblance to the phenomenon, nor is there any direct or causal relation between the word and the thing. Peirce's terms provide us with a useful vocabulary to make systematic distinctions, even if Plato himself avoided doing so.

Peirce may well have drawn his terminology from the Platonic tradition, for Proclus likewise makes a distinction between *icons (eikones)* and *symbols (sumbola),* between images that represent through similarity and those that represent indirectly or even through contraries.[10] Icons work through a kind of mimesis, whereas symbols work through analogical reasoning and can thus represent the opposite of what they appear to present—an important point for Proclus in his discussion of the more scandalous elements in Homer.[11]

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8 Studies, such as Said 1987 or Vernant 1990, that attempt to draw distinctions between types of images in Greek thought provide a useful way of thinking about possible differences, but Plato seems deliberately to avoid making systematic distinctions between icons, idols, and other forms of images, using different vocabulary interchangeably.

9 Peirce expresses these distinctions in different ways in his corpus, but the following represent his differentiations. Peirce 1991: 30 "It follows that there are three kinds of representations, ist. Those whose relation to their objects is a mere community in some quality, and these representations may be termed *Likenesses.* 2nd. Those whose relation to their objects consists in a correspondence in fact, and these may be termed *Indices* or *Signs.* 3rd. Those the ground of whose relation to their objects is an imputed character, which are the same as *general signs,* and these may be termed *Symbols!'* Cp., Peirce 1991:183 "This explains why there should be three classes of signs; for there is a triple connection of *sign, thing signified, cognition produced in the mind.* There maybe a mere relation of reason between the sign and the thing signified; in that case the sign is an *icon.* Or there may be a direct physical connection; in that case, the sign is an *index.* Or there may be a relation which consists in the fact that the mind associates the sign with its object; in that case the sign is a *name!' Likenesses* and *icons* are terms for signs that represent through similarity of quality (visual or otherwise), whereas a *name* is one kind of *symbol,* which represents through arbitrary or customary association.

10 As Dillon 1976 notes, Proclus is not very systematic in his distinction between *icons* (εικόνες) and *symbols* (σύμβολα), but he does repeatedly distinguish between representation through similarity and indirect representation. See also the comments in Lamberton 2012 for the relation of Proclus' theories of signs to Peircean semiotics. Smyth 1999: 57 suggests Peirce's reception of "Neoplatonic elements in the Romantic tradition" deriving from Emerson, but does not make the connection with his categories of signs.

11 Proclus *in Remp.* 86.15-19. In all of these imaginings in the manner of the mythmakers, one thing is designated by another. This is not always through icons representing models; rather, sometimes symbols are used, and the relationship with the things that are indicated exists by virtue of analogy, ἐν πάσαις γάρ ταῖς τοιαύταις ψαντασίαις κατά τούς μυθοπλάστας άλλα έξ άλλων ένδείκνυται, καί ού τά μέν εικόνες, τά δέ παραδείγματα, όσα διά τούτων σημαίνουσιν, άλλα τά μέν σύμβολα, τά δέ έξ αναλογίας έχει τήν πρός ταύτα συμπάθειαν, (trans. Lamberton 2012, modified) Cp. also, 1.77.13-29 and 1.198.13-24.

Proclus is less interested in *how* the process happens, but, in his treatise *On Memory and Recollection,* Aristotle describes the process of recollection as a movement (*kinesis)* and uses the verb 'to hunt' (*thêreuomen*) for the process by which we move by recollection from one thing to another in the search for the thing to be recollected. Aristotle focuses on the process of recollection as a movement from the present stimulus to the thing being recollected, step by step from sign to signified. He identifies three kinds of steps, to something similar, to something opposite, and to something neighboring.

> And this is exactly why we hunt for the next thing in the chain, starting in our thoughts from the present or from something else, and from something similar, or opposite, or neighboring. By this means recollection occurs.[12]
>
> ARISTOTLE, *de memoria* 451Ы8-20, trans, SORABJI, modified

Aristotle illustrates the neighboring (to *suneggus)* with the example of letters in the alphabet, but Plato's chains of association have many more varied kinds of links than these.[13]

Plato uses all of the kinds of image signs that Peirce describes, but, in the discussion between Socrates and Simmias in the *Phaedo,* he is most interested in the process of indirect reasoning from symbol to signified, the movement upon which Aristotle focuses. Someone may be reminded of a horse or a lyre or Simmias by seeing a picture of a horse or a lyre or Simmias (an *icon* in Peircean terms). However, he may also be reminded of Cebes, because Cebes owns the horse or the lyre of which he is seeing the picture or because Cebes is the inseparable friend of Simmias. This is a *symbolic* relation in Peircean terms, just as the name of Cebes may also cause him to recall the man himself. The point here, however, is the chain of indirect relations that can be set up, since someone may be reminded of Cebes by hearing the name of Simmias or even the name of Simmias' horse Buttercup, which makes him think of the horse Buttercup, which is owned by Simmias, who is the friend of Cebes. From the name Buttercup to Cebes is a movement along a symbolic chain by means of recollection. Plato does not, in the *Phaedo,* pursue these chains further, but he does note the the process of recollection is triggered by a sense impression that starts off the chain of associations.

In the *Phaedrus,* Plato likewise features the importance of visual images that begin the process of recollection, but he emphasizes the process of reasoning that enables the recollecter to follow the tracks back to the signified. The recollection moves (*ionta*) by reasoning (*logismô*) from a multiplicity of sense perceptions back to the one thing that unites them, the true reality glimpsed by the soul before its incarnation.

> For a human being must understand according to the so-called form, moving from a multiplicity of perceptions to a unity collected together by reasoning. And this is recollection of those things which our soul beheld once upon a time while it was journeying together with the god and

12 διό καί τό εφεξής θηρεύομεν νοήσαντες άπό τού νύν ή άλλου τινός, καί άψ' όμοιου ή εναντίου ή τού σύνεγγυς, διά τούτο γίγνεται ή άνάμνησις·

13 Aristotle's example (452313-16) suggests that he too might have been thinking of a wide range of possibilities within his three categories, το δ' αίτιον άτι ταχύ άπ' αλλου έπ' άλλο έρχονται, οιον άπό γάλακτος έπί λευκόν, από λευκού δ' έπ' άέρα, καί από τούτου έψ' υγρόν, άψ' ου έμνήσθη μετοπώρου, ταύτην έπιζητών τήν ώραν. The reason is that people go quickly from one thing to another, e.g., from milk to white, from white to air, and from this to fluid, from which one remembers autumn.

looking beyond the things which we now say to exist, and ascending up into the really real.[14]

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This ability to recollect, rather than simply remember, distinguishes humans from animals, as Aristotle also argues, because it is a kind of reasoning.[15] Humans can thus even use their reasoning to fashion the image of an immortal being, even though they have never seen or even adequately conceived of a real god.[16]

Simple visual similarity or imitation is thus not the only way in which a sign can remind the viewer of the signified; the process of recollection involves moving by reasoning from one related thing to another, whether it be from Simmias' horse to Simmias to Cebes or from a particular appearance of beauty to the idea of the beautiful itself. The different kinds of semiotic connections can, I argue, help us to understand how, in the *Phaedrus,* Plato uses the image of the beautiful beloved as a divine statue to illustrate the complex ways in which this process might work—or might go wrong.

Treating Him Right

In the palinode, Socrates claims that the visual appearance of beauty provides the most brilliant reminder of the true realities that the soul saw before incarnation, while other things, like justice, provide only dim images.

> Now, for justice and prudence and all the others revered by souls there is no brightness in the likenesses here, but only a few, approaching the images through the muddled sense organs, behold the nature of that represented, and those only with great difficulty... But regarding beauty, just as I said earlier, it shone forth among those realities, and since we came hither we have perceived it shining most clearly through the clearest of our senses. For sight is to us the keenest of the perceptions that come through the body. Wisdom is not seen through this, for wisdom would create terribly fierce loves if any such clear image of it were provided coming to the sight, as also would all other such lovely things. But here and now beauty alone has this nature, that it is most clearly apparent and most

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14 δει γάρ άνθρωπον συνιέναι κατ' είδος λεγόμενον, έκ πολλών ίόντ' αισθήσεων εις εν λογισμφ συναιρούμενου- τούτο δ' έστίν άνάμνησις εκείνων ά ποτ' εΤδεν ήμών ή ψυχή συμπορευθεΐσα θεω καί ύπεριδούσα ά νυν είναι ψαμεν, καί άνακύψασα εις τό ον όντως, διό δή δικαίως μόνη πτερούται ή του φιλοσόφου διάνοια· πρός γάρ έκείνοις άεί έστιν μνήμη κατά δύναμιν, πρός οισπερ θεός ών θεΐός έστιν. τοίς δέ δή τοιούτοις άνήρ ΰπομνήμασιν όρθώς χρώμενος, τελέους άεί τελετάς τελούμενος, τέλεος όντως μόνος γίγνεται· I here follow Thompson 1868 in emending ιόν to ίόντ' to keep the άνθρωπον as the subject of the process of collection by reasoning, understanding λεγόμενον as a characteristic hedging of terminology when discussing the forms, rather than as the abstract subject of the process of reasoning, 'the thing said'.

15 Cp. Aristotle *de Mem.* 45338-10. του μέν μνημονεύειν καί των άλλων ζφων μετέχει πολλά, του δ' άναμιμνήσκεσθαι οΰδέν ώς είπείν των γνωριζομένων ζφων, πλήν άνθρωπος, αίτιον δ' ότι τό άναμιμνήσκεσθαί έστιν οιον συλλογισμός τις· Many other animals share in remembering, while of the known animals one may say that none other than man shares in recollecting. The explanation is that recollection is a sort of reasoning.

16 246cd. But we, though we have never seen or rightly conceived a god, imagine an immortal being which has both a soul and a body which are united for all time. άλλά πλάττομεν οΰτε ίδόντες οΰτε ίκανώς νοήσαντες θεόν, αθάνατόν τι ζώον, έχον μέν ψυχήν, έχον δέ σώμα, τόν άεί δέ χρόνον ταΰτα συμπεψυκότα.

inspiring of love.[17]
250b, de

Beauty is thus the image of truth that is most easily approached starting with the senses, so it most easily evokes the madness of eros that drives the lover along the path of recollection.

The image of the divine statue illustrates the correct way for the lover to respond to this stimulus. The philosophic lover selects from among the beautiful youths he sees one who reminds him of the nature of the god he followed before incarnation and treats that youth like a statue of the god.

> Now each one chooses his love from the ranks of the beautiful according to his character, and he fashions him and adorns him like a statue, as though he were his god, to honor and worship him.[18]
> 252de

As the anecdote with which we began shows, a lover can behave very badly towards a divine statue, but the philosophic lover treats this image of the god *(agalma)* with honor *(timé)* and religious ritual behavior *(orgia).* This divine statue reminds the lover of the vision of Beauty itself, described as an image sitting upon a statue base; the beautiful beloved as a statue is an image of Beauty as a statue.[19]

What then is the proper way to behave to a divine statue? What honors and rites are appropriate and how should they be conducted? Plato here relies upon his ancient readers' understanding of Greek cult practice, but even modern scholars can pick up on some of the suggestions from the language Plato uses of *orgia* and *teletai.* The appropriate behavior to this image of the divine includes sacrifice, adornment of the image, and, most importantly, following the image as if in a ritual procession.

When the lover sees the beloved, he feels reverence (*sebetai)* and would go beyond that feeling to the action of sacrifice *(tkuoi),* if he did not think that such an act would be condemned as madness *(mania).*

> But he who is newly initiated, who beheld many of those realities, when he sees a godlike face or form which is a good image of beauty, shudders at first, and something of the old awe comes over him, then, as he gazes, he reveres the beautiful one as a god, and if he did not fear to be thought stark mad, he would offer sacrifice to his beloved as to an idol or a god.[20]

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17 δικαιοσύνης μέν οὖν καί σωφροσύνης καί όσα άλλα τίμια ψυχαΐς ούκ έ'νεστι φέγγος ούδέν έν τοίς τήδε όμοιώμασιν, άλλά δι' άμυδρών οργάνων μόγις αύτών καί ολίγοι έπί τάς εικόνας ίόντες θεώνταιτότού είκασθέντος γένος... περί δέ κάλλους, ώσπερ εϊπομεν, μετ' εκείνων τε έλαμπεν ον, δεύρό τ' έλθόντες κατειλήφαμεν αύτό διά τής εναργέστατης αίσθήσεως των ήμετέρων στίλβον εναργέστατα, όψις γάρ ήμίν όξυτάτη των διά τού σώματος έρχεται αισθήσεων, ή φρόνησις ούχ όράται—δεινούς γάρ άν παρείχεν έρωτας, ε'ι τι τοιούτον έαυτής εναργές εϊδωλον παρείχετο εις όψιν ιόν—καί τάλλα όσα έραστά· νύν δέ κάλλος μόνον ταύτην έ'σχε μοίραν, ώστ' έκφανέστατον είναι καί έρασμιώτατον.

ι8 τόν τε ούν έ'ρωτα τών καλών πρός τρόπου εκλέγεται έκαστος, καί ώς θεόν αύτόν εκείνον όντα έαυτώ οιον άγαλμα τεκταίνεταί τε καί κατακοσμεί, ώς τιμήσων τε καί όργιάσων.

19 254b ίδόντος δέ του ηνιόχου *η* μνήμη πρός τήν του κάλλους ψύσιν ήνέχθη, καί πάλιν εΤδεν αυτήν μετά σωφροσύνης έν άγνω βάθρω βεβώσαν. And as the charioteer looks upon him, his memory is borne back to the true nature of beauty, and he sees it standing with prudence upon a holy pedestal.

20 ό δέ άρτιτελής, ὸ των τότε πολυθεάμων, όταν θεοειδές πρόσωπον ι'δη κάλλος εύ μεμιμημένον ή τινα σώματος ιδέαν, πρώτον μέν έ'ψριξε καί τι τών τότε ΰπήλθεν αυτόν δειμάτων, είτα προσορών ώς θεόν σέβεται, καί εί μή έδεδίειτήντής σψόδρα μανίας δόξαν, θύοι άν ώς άγάλματικαί θεωτοίς παιδικοΐς.

251a

Beyond this initial impulse to sacrifice, the lover performs the kind of adornment of statues *(katakosmei)* that was a common element of cult. However, he also fashions *(tektainetai)* the statue to better represent the god. Precisely how a statue is made more like the god is not specified, but the pouring of divine qualities over the soul of the beloved it is compared to the rites of the Bac- chai pouring liquids.[21] Our knowledge of ancient ritual does not permit us to understand the ritual to which this metaphor refers, but we have testimonies to various other rituals that involve the *kosmesis* of the statue of the god, whether providing it with washing and anointing it, new garments, or decorating it with jewelry or other precious items.[22] The adornments and purifications serve to increase the material statue's likeness to the divine entity which it represents, just as the lover's treatment of the beloved increases the likeness to the divinity their souls follow; they are both kinds of assimilation of something in the mortal realm to the divine. This project of assimilation to the divine appears elsewhere in the Platonic dialogues as the ultimate goal of the philosophic life, so the image of the interactions with the beautiful beloved as performing such rituals with the statue of the god serves to illustrate with the familiar ritual actions both the erotic relationship and the philosophic life of which it is a part.[23]

Another ritual action that appears as part of the lover's interaction with the beloved statue is the common ritual of the festive procession that follows in the train of the divine

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2ῖ 253ab καί τούτων δή τόν ἐρώμενον αίτιώμενοι έ'τι τε μάλλον άγαπώσι, καν έκ Διός άρύτωσιν

ώσπερ αί βάκχαι, έπί τήν του ερωμένου ψυχήν έπαντλούντες ποιουσιν ώς δυνατόν όμοιότατοντώ σφετέρω θεω. Now they consider the beloved the cause of all this, so they love him more than before, and if they draw the waters of their inspiration from Zeus, like the bacchantes, they pour it out upon the beloved and make him, so far as possible, like their god.

22 The Plynteria at Athens involved taking the adornments off the statue of Athena Polias, purifying them and washing the statue (the festival also included a procession). The Pana- thenaia procession brought a new peplos each year to adorn the statue of Athena on the acropolis. Cp. Sourvinou-Inwood 2011, esp. 214-219. Sourvinou-Inwood also discusses rites for Artemis of Ephesos, where the ritual procession involved the services of a *kosmophoros,* someone who carried the jewelry and other adornments, as well asa *kosmeteira,* an official whose duty it was to care for the adorning. (Sourvinou-Inwood 2011:184, with n. 162). The Neoplatonist commentator Hermias discusses how the consecration of an image makes it more divine *[in Plat. Phaedrum,* p. 87.4-12 Couvreur): "But how can an image also be said to be inspired? Perhaps the thing itself cannot respond actively to the divine, inasmuch as it is without life; but the art of consecration purifies its matter, and, by attaching certain marks and symbols to the image, first gives it a soul by these means, and makes it capable of receiving a kind of life from the universe, thereafter preparing it to receive illumination from Divinity." Πώς δέ καί αγαλμα λέγεται ένθουσιάν; Ή αῦτό μέν οῦκ ένεργεί περί τό θειον, δ γε άψυχόν έστιν, άλλά τήν ύλην ή τελεστική διακαθήρασα καί τινας χαρακτήρας καί σύμβολα περιθεῖσα τω άγάλματι πρώτον μέν έ'μψυχον αῦτό διά τούτων έποίησε καί (οιόν τε) ζωήν τινα έκ τού κόσμου καταδέξασθαι, έπειτα μετά τούτο έλλαμψθήναι παρά τού θείου αύτό παρεσκεύα- σεν όπερ αγαλμα άεί χρηματίζει έως δύνανται δέχεσθαι οί έπιτήδειοι· τό μέν γάρ αγαλμα ώς αν τελεσθή μένει έψεξής έως αν πάντη άνεπιτήδειον γένηται πρός τήν θεών έλλαμψιν

23 όμοίωσις θεω κατά τό δυνατόν *Tkt.* 176b; cp. *Rep.* 613b εις όσον δυνατόν άνθρώπω όμοιουσθαι θεω. See also *Tim.* goce. Cp. Sedley 1999 for this tradition, as well as Annas 1999: 52-71 for a discussion of the place of this assimilation to the divine in Platonic ethics. See also van Riel in this volume for the relation to making images. Morgan 2012 approaches this issue from the angle of divine possession or inspiration (*enthousiasmos*), showing how Plato in the *Phaedrus* reworks ideas of the passive possessed poet into a more active process of reflection and incorporation of the divine.

image. Like sacrifice or adorning the statue, such a procession was a part of many different rituals, and the imagery of the discarnate souls following the divinity at the head of the procession through the cosmos to the hyperouranian realm would surely recall such ritual processions for Plato's readers.[24] On earth, the lover likewise follows in the footsteps of the god, but he does so through the process of recollection, discovering within himself the traces that lead him back by memory to the vision of the divine.

> Following the tracks back from within themselves to find the nature of their god, they succeed on their way, because they have been compelled to keep their eyes fixed upon the god, and as they reach and grasp him by memory they are inspired and receive from him character and habits, so far as it is possible for a man to have part in the divine. Now they consider the beloved the cause of all this, so they love him more than before, and if they draw the waters of their inspiration from Zeus, like the bacchantes, they pour it out upon the beloved and make him, so far as possible, like their god.[25]
>
> 2533b

This movement back along the tracks (*ichneuontes*) by memory not only recalls following the gods in the heavens, but also the movement in the recollection process from manifold sense perceptions by reasoning to the unity in 249c. It is also echoed in Socrates' later comment of the way he behaves when he encounters someone who understands the logical processes of collection and division.

> Now I myself, Phaedrus, am a lover of these processes of division and collection, so that I may be able to speak and to think; and if I consider any other man able to see things that can naturally be collected into one and divided into many, I follow that one and "walk in his track as if he were a god."[26] 266b

The repetition of the term for track (*ichnion*) links these passages, as the process of recollection by means of collection and division is given illustration with the image of the ritual procession. The proper way to use the vision of the beautiful beloved is like following the image of a god in a procession, moving along the path marked out by the movement of the god to the final destination, where the final rituals, the *teletai,* are performed. Such rituals are indeed the final reward of the one who makes proper use of recollection, "Indeed a man who employs such memories rightly is always being initiated into perfect mysteries and he alone becomes truly

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24 Parke 1977: 22-23 notes the importance of processions in many festivals, including the massive celebrations of the Panathenaia and the procession to Eleusis for the Mysteries. He notes as well the parody in Aristophanes *Ecclesiazeusai* 730 ff., to which might be added the parody of the Dionysiac phallic processions in the *Archamians* 241-263. For an overview of festival processions in textual and visual evidence, see True, et al. 2004.

25 ἰχνεύοντες δέ παρ' εαυτών άνευρίσκειν τήν του αφετέρου θεού ψύσιν εύπορούσι διά τό συντόνως ήναγκάσθαι πρός τον θεόν βλέπειν, καί έψαπτόμενοι αύτού τή μνήμη ένθουσιώντες έξ εκείνου λαμβάνουσι τά έ'θη καί τά επιτηδεύματα, καθ' οσον δυνατόν θεού άνθρώπω μετασχείν καί τούτων δή τον έρώμενον αίτιώμενοι έ'τι τε μάλλον άγαπώσι, καν έκ Διάς άρύτωσιν ώσπερ αί βάκχαι, έπί τήν τού ερωμένου ψυχήν έπαντλούντες ποιουσιν ώς δυνατόν όμοιότατον τω σφετέρω θεω.

26 Τούτων δή έ'γωγε αύτός τε εραστής, ώ Φαίδρε, των διαιρέσεων καί συναγωγών, ϊνα οιός τε ώ λέγειν τε καί ψρονεΐν έάν τέ τιν' άλλον ήγήσωμαι δυνατόν εις έν καί έπί πολλά πεψυκόθ' όρον, τούτον διώκω "κατόπισθε μετ' ιχνιον ώστε θεοΐο." The dactylic verse resembles several Homeric lines (*Odyssey* 2.406,3.30,5.193,7.38, as well as *Iliad*22.157), but may be an ad hoc improvisation rather than a quotation from a hexameter source no longer extant.

perfect."[27]

Treating Him Wrong

The rewards of those who use recollection rightly are thus like the joys of celebrating the most perfect festivals, but Plato also illustrates the fate of those who use recollection wrongly. Just as one can treat a statue of a god improperly, so too one can treat the beautiful beloved or other image of the divine improperly. In contrast to the perfectly initiated philosopher, the one whose extraordinary experience of the divine was long ago and only imperfectly preserved may fail to make the connection between the image of beauty before him and the vision of divine beauty before incarnation.

> Now he who is not newly initiated, or has been corrupted, is not borne swiftly back thither from here toward the beautiful itself when he sees

the namesake of it here, with the result that, when he sees it, he does not worship it, but rather abandoning himself to pleasure he attempts to mount like a four-footed beast and to beget children, and consorting with hubris he neither fears nor is ashamed in his pursuit of pleasure against nature.[28]

250e

Because he is not moved from this earthly world back to the divine *(ouk oxeôs enthende ekeise pheretai)*, he fails to treat the image reverently, and so his reaction to beauty is not true erotic madness but simply bestial lust. The graphic description of the horse attempting to have sex with the statue, the divine image that the beautiful beloved presents, represents this improper reaction. The dark horse tries to leap upon the beloved *(epipêdan tô erômenô)*, dragging his unwilling yokemate and the charioteer along, forcing them to approach the beloved and jogging their memory about the pleasures of sex.[29] Note the use of a memory related term here

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27 249c τοίς δέ δή τοιούτοις άνήρ ύπομνήμασιν όρθώς χρώμενος, τελέους άεί τελετάς τελούμενος, τέλεος όντως μόνος γίγνεται· No English translation can capture the word play of "τελέους άεί τελετάς τελούμενος, τέλεος"—perfect, eternally perfected in perfect perfections.

28 ό μέν ούν μή νεοτελής ή διεφθαρμένος ούκ όξέως ένθένδε έκεΐσε φέρεται πρός αΰτό τό κοΰλος, θεώμενος αύτού τήν τήδε επωνυμίαν, ώστ' ού σέβεται προσορών, άλλ' ήδονή παραδούς τετράπο- δος νόμον βαίνειν επιχειρείκαί παιδοσπορείν, καί ύβρειπροσομιλών ού δέδοικεν ούδ' αίσχύνεται παρά φύσιν ήδονήν διώκων. Although παρά φύσιν ήδονήν has been taken to indicate Plato's disapproval of homosexual activity, the passage makes much more sense when understood as a reference to the dark horse's attempt to assault the statue, truly an act παρά φύσιν. The reference to παιδοσπορείν in any case rules out a critique of pederasty in particular; see Nussbaum 1999:189-192.

29 254a. Now whenever the charioteer beholds the love-inspiring vision, and his whole soul is warmed by the perception, and is full of the tickling and prickings of yearning, the horse that is obedient the charioteer, constrained then as always by modesty, controls himself and does not leap upon the beloved; but the other no longer heeds the pricks or the whip of the charioteer, but springs wildly forward, causing all possible trouble to his mate and to the charioteer, and he forces them to go toward the beloved and to make for themselves a reminder of the pleasure of sex. όταν δ' ούν ò ήνίοχος ίδών τό ερωτικόν ομμα, πάσαν αίσθήσει διαθερμήνας τήν ψυχήν, γαργαλισμού τε καί πόθου κέντρων ύποπλησθή, ό μέν εύπειθής τω ήνιόχω των ίππων, άεί τε καί τότε αίδοί βιαζόμενος, έαυτόν κατέχει μή έπιπηδάν τω έρωμένω· è δέ ούτε κέντρων ήνιοχικών ούτε μάστιγος έ'τι έντρέπεται, σκιρτών δέ βία φέρεται, καί πάντα πράγματα παρέχων τω σύζυγί τε καί ήνιόχω αναγκάζει ίέναι τε πρός τά παιδικά καί μνείαν ποιείσθαιτής των αφροδισίωνχάριτος.

(*mneian*); the improper reaction to the beautiful beloved resembles the proper reaction, but leads back by memory to the wrong object—sexual pleasure—rather than the correct one.[30]

The result of this improper treatment is the complete contrast to the blissful life of the initiate. Rather than experiencing the initiates'joys of the festivals in the proximity of the gods, the one who engages in sex with the statue suffers the torments that the Greek mythic and religious tradition reserved for the restless dead, 'to roam around the earth for nine thousand years and then he will go off below the earth, a mindless shade.'[31] This language echoes the fate described for the unphilosophic in the *Phaedo,* where the comparison with the unburied or uninitiated restless dead is developed at greater length.[32]

Rhetoric and Writing as Images of Truth

The same contrast between proper and improper treatment of an image appears in the second half of the *Phaedrus,* where the image in question is not the beautiful beloved who provokes the recollection of the divine beauty, but a rhetorical speech that leads the souls of those who receive it. Just as the sight of the beautiful beloved leads the lover's soul in the path of the divine image back to the vision of truth, so too a rhetorical speech can lead the soul of the hearer toward the truth—or lead him astray.

Socrates defines rhetoric as a kind of soul-leading through words, and this action of leading works through the making of resemblances between things, linking their images together.

> Is not rhetoric in its entire nature an art which leads the soul by means of words? ... it would be the art by which a man will be able to produce a resemblance between all things between which it can be produced, and to bring to the light the resemblances produced and disguised by anyone else.[33]
>
> 261a, 261e

This process of *psychagogia* happens through the power of *logos*,[34] both speech and reasoning, just as Socrates is led out into the countryside by the *logoi* that Phaedrus promises him. This leading of the soul, however, is inherently neither good nor bad; it all depends on how it is done.[35] The correct method involves knowing how, through the processes of collection and division, to move to the truth, and how to adorn the *logos* to address the particular soul.

> A man must know the truth about all the particular things of which he speaks or writes, and must be able to define everything separately; then when he has defined them, he must know how to divide them by classes until further division is impossible; and in the same way he must understand the nature of the soul, must find out the class of speech adapted to each nature, and must arrange and adorn his discourse accordingly.[36]

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30 Cp. Morgan 2000:218 on this point.

31 257a. ἐννέα χιλιάδας ἐτών περί γην κυλινδουμένην αυτήν καί υπό γης ανουν παρέξει.

32 Cp. Edmonds 2004:184-195·

33 τά μέν ολον ή ρητορική αν ε'ιη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διά λόγων; αυτή αν εί'η, ή τις οιός τ' έ'σται παν
παντί όμοιουν των δυνατών καί οις δυνατόν, καί άλλου όμοιουντος καί άποκρυπτομένου εις φως αγειν.

34 27id. λόγου δύναμις τυγχάνει ψυχαγωγία οὖσα. It is the function of speech to lead souls.

35 Cp. 258d; 277de.

36 πριν αν τις τό τε αληθές έκαστων είδη πέρι ών λέγει ή γράφει, κατ' αὖτό τε παν όρίζεσθαι

277bc

The rhetorical *logos* is adorned (*diakosmêi*) like the statue of the divine, since both provide an image of the truth that the soul can follow through the process of recollection. This process takes place through the same collections and divisions that Socrates has already claimed are necessary for the soul to reason back through memory from the sense perception of beauty to the unitary divine Beauty (249c), the step by step movement of recollection that moves, not physically but through reason. These steps may be, as Aristotle suggested, from similar to similar or from opposite to opposite, or they may be simply from one thing to another that is somehow associated with it, like Cebes and his horse. You may recall that Socrates claims that he follows in the tracks of one who understands such collections and divisions like a god; recollection is a process of reasoning that follows the tracks, the signs of the movement along the path, back to truth.

The process is the same whether the word is spoken or written, since the written word is merely an image of the spoken word, an image of an image of an image of the truth.[37] Socrates and Phaedrus thus agree that writing is a kind of ritual play, like creating the gardens of Adonis for the festival.[38]

> The gardens in letters he will, it seems, sow for amusement, and will write, when he does write, to treasure up reminders for himself, when he comes to the forgetfulness of old age, and for every other who goes along the same track.[39]
> 276d

Once again, the process is described as following a track (*ichnos*), but it serves as a reminder, something that counters forgetfulness, just as the *pharmakon* against forgetting that Theuth devises.[40]

A *pharmakon,* however, can either bea wondrous magic potion or a dreadful poison, working good or harm. Just as Thamus raises doubts about the invention of Theuth, so too the process of soul-leading through speeches may be good or bad. If the soul is led to truth, it is good, but if the *psychagogia* does not lead the soul to truth, then it is evil. Socrates right at the beginning

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δυνατός γένηται, όρισάμενός τε πάλιν κατ' εί'δη μέχρι του άτμητου τέμνειν έπιστηθή, περί τε ψυχής ψύσεως διιδών κατά ταῦτά, τό προσαρμόττον έκαστη φύσει είδος άνευρίσκων, οίίτω τιθή καί διακοσμη τόν λόγον. Cp. 273de. έάν μή τις των τε άκουσομένων τάς φύσεις διαριθμήσηται, καί κατ' εί'δη τε διαιρείσθαι τά όντα καί μια ιδέα δυνατός ή καθ' έν έκαστον περιλαμβάνειν, ου ποτ' έ'σται τεχνικός λόγων πέρι καθ' όσον δυνατόν άνθρώπω. Unless a man take account of the characters of his hearers and is able to divide things by classes and to comprehend particulars under a general idea, he will never attain the highest human perfection in the art of speech.

37 276a8-g. τόν του είδότος λόγον λέγεις ζώντα καί έ'μψυχον, ου ό γεγραμμένος εϊδωλον αν τι λέγοιτο δικαίως. You mean the living and breathing word of him who knows, of which the written word may justly be called the image. In 264c, a speech is compared to a body, δείν πάντα λόγον ώσπερ ζωον συνεστάναι σώμα τι έχοντα αυτόν αΰτου, ώστε μήτε άκέψαλον είναι μήτε απουν, άλλά μέσα τε έχειν καί ακρα, πρέποντα άλλήλοις καί τω άλω γεγραμμένα. Every discourse must be organized, like a living being, with a body of its own, as it were, so as not to be headless or footless, but to have a middle and members, composed in fitting relation to each other and to the whole. Cp. also the idea that bodies of the dead are *eidola* of the person, while the real thing is the soul, in *Laws* 95gb4.

38 276b.

39 άλλά τους μέν έν γράμμασι κήπους, ώς έ'οικε, παιδιάς χάριν σπερεί τε καί γράψει, όταν δέ γράψη, έαυτω τε υπομνήματα θησαυριζόμενος, εις τό λήθης γήρας έάν ϊκηται, καί παντί τω ταῦτόν ίχνος μετιόντι.

40 274β. μνήμης τε γάρ καί σοφίας ψάρμακον ηΰρέθη. For I have discovered a magic potion for memory and wisdom.

of the dialogue claims that Phaedrus has found the *pharmakon* to lead him anywhere, speeches in books, but it is not clear where Lysias' speech may lead them.[41]

Socrates, it is true, is dazzled after the speech, not, however, by the speech itself, but rather by the vision of the beautiful Phaedrus, with whom he joins in bacchic revels.

> More than that, it is miraculous, my friend; I am quite overcome by it. And this is due to you, Phaedrus, because as I looked at you, I saw that you were delighted by the speech as you read. So, thinking that you know more than I about such matters, I followed in your train and joined you in the divine frenzy.[42]
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> 234d

Phaedrus, by contrast, fails to realize that the speech itself is a problem, that it leads not to truth but to the merely apparent or probable (to *eikos)*, like the speeches of other unscrupulous rhetoricians in the lawcourts.[43]

Such speeches lead the soul along the path in the same manner as philosophic speeches, step by step through associations, but 'praising the "shadow of an ass" under the name of a horse', associating the good elements of a horse— its value at home and for fighting in war— with a mere image of something that only appears somewhat like a horse.[44] And, as Socrates points out, misleading someone to think an ass is a horse is merely absurd, but misleading a city to think that evil is good is a serious problem.

Phaedrus' real problem, however, is less that he is enchanted by the conclusions to which Lysias' speech leads him than that he looks upon the speech itself as a delight (*agalma*) and source of pleasure.[45] Rather than use the speech as a stimulus to move to new conclusions through reasoning, as Socrates induces him to do, he had intended to spend the day memorizing it word for word so that he could fix it in his mind. His eros for *logoi* is like the nameless youth's desire for the statue, a misguided response to the stimulus of beauty of form. Although he gushes enthusiastically that "nobody could ever speak about

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41 230de. συ μέντοι δοκείς μοι τής έμής έξόδου τό φάρμακον ηὕρηκέναι. ὡσπερ γάρ οί τά πεινώντα θρέμματα θαλλόν ή τινακαρπόν προσείοντες άγουσιν, συ έμοίλόγους οίίτω προτείνων έν βιβλίοις τήν τε Αττικήν ψαίνη περιάξειν άπασαν καί όποι άν όίλλοσε βούλη. Butyou seem to have found the charm to bring me out. For as people lead hungry animals by shaking in front of them a branch of leaves or some fruit, just so, I think, you, by holding before me discourses in books, will lead me all over Attica and wherever else you please.

42 δαιμονίως μέν oSv, ώ εταίρε, ώστε με έκπλαγήναι. καί τούτο έγώ έ'παθον διά σέ, ώ Φαιδρέ, πρός σέ άποβλέπων, άτι έμοί έδόκεις γάνυσθαι υπό του λόγου μεταξύ άναγιγνώσκων ηγούμενος γάρ σέ μάλλον ή έμέ έπαΐειν περί των τοιούτων σοί είπόμην, καί επόμενος συνεβάκχευσα μετά σου της θείας κεφαλής.

43 272e τό παράπαν γάρ οὔδέν έν τοΐς δικαστηρίοις τούτων αλήθειας μέλειν ούδενί, άλλά τού πιθανού· τούτο δ' είναι τό είκός. For in the courts, they say, nobody cares for truth about these matters, but for that which is convincing; and that is probability.

44 260c. περί όνου σκιάς ώς ϊππου τόν έπαινον ποιούμενος.

45 Although note the arguments of Nussbaum 1986 for reasons that Lysias' conclusions might also appeal to Phaedrus.

it more exhaustively or worthily" than Lysias has done, he becomes even more excited at the idea that Socrates might offer him something better, even threatening in jest to engage in sexual assault if he does not get what he wants. "We are alone in a solitary spot, and I am stronger than you and younger; so, under these circumstances, take my meaning, and be persuaded, not under compulsion but willingly, to speak."[46]

All along, however, Socrates has a different plan in mind, a joint ritual celebration like the metaphorical one of the two lovers in the palinode. Not only does he claim to have been a fellow bacchi c reveler with Phaedrus at end of the speech, but he pretends from the beginning that such was Phaedrus' intent as well. "And meeting the man who is sick with the love of discourse, he was glad when he saw him, because he would have someone to share his Korybantic revel, and told him to lead on."[47] The wild ecstatic festivities of the Bacchic and Korybantic rites would be, in the terms of the palinode, kinds of telestic madness, but they also recall the ritual celebrations of the Adonis festival to which writing is likened, as well as the ritual celebrations and processions in the train of the gods and their images.

Conclusions

Throughout the dialogue, then, Plato draws the contrast between Socrates' and Phaedrus' treatment of images, first and foremost the image of writing, but also their attitudes towards erotic relations with the visible image of beauty in the world. The graphic scene of the dark horse trying to have sex with the beloved statue serves as a vivid image of how not to treat an image, to satisfy one's desire with the symbol rather than continuing along the path toward truth. This image illustrates what happens when someone like Phaedrus idolizes Lysias' speech or when anyone substitutes writing for the recollection of truths. By contrast, the proper use of writing is to treat it as a playful ritual that leads beyond itself. In the image of the myth, the lover likewise celebrates rituals around the status of his beloved, honoring the memory of the god whom he was following to truth in the heavens. The process of recollection is a process of moving through memory from particulars towards the divine truth of which they are the images, and so important is this art that Socrates will follow in the tracks of the one performing it like a god.[48]

The tracks (*ichnê*) are the signs which the lover follows in the process of recollection, which raises again the question of how Plato sees the relation of the image to the thing it represents. The stain on the statue's thigh is a track (*ichnos*) that indicates the misguided lover who created it. Like the tracks *(ichnê)* left behind in a written speech for readers to follow,

46 235b. παρά τά ἐκείνω εἰρημένα μηδέν' αν ποτε δύνασθαι εἰπείν ἄλλα πλείω καί πλείονος αξια. 236d. ἐσμέν δέ μόνω ἐν ἐρημία, ισχυρότερος δ' ἐγώ καί νεώτερος, ἐκ δέ απάντων τούτων 'σύνες δ τοι λέγω,' καί μηδαμώς πρός βίαν βουληθης μάλλον ή ἑκών λέγειν. Note how Phaedrus holds back the punchline, as it were, of the joke until the ends of the phrases. "I am stronger than you... and younger", rather than older and stronger, as an adult erastes would be. Likewise, he saves the verb 'to speak' until the end, to substitute for χαρίζεσθαι or some such verb.

47 228c. ἀπαντήσας δέ τω νοσούντι περί λόγων ἀκοήν, ἰδών μέν, ἰδών, ήσθη ότι ἕξοι τόν συγκορυ- βαντιώντα, καί προάγειν ἑκέλευε.

48 The Neoplatonist Olympiodorus shows he has picked up on the message: *in Gorgiam* 47.5. Καί μή νομίσητε άτι οί φιλόσοφοι λίθους τιμώσι καί τά είδωλα ώς θεία· **άλλ'** επειδή κατ' αϊσθησιν ζώντες ού δυνάμεθα έψικέσθαι τής άσωμάτου καί άύλου δυνάμεως, πρός ύπόμνησιν εκείνων τά είδωλα έπινενόηται, ἵνα όρώντες ταύτα καί προσκυνούντες εις έννοιαν έρχώμεθα των άσωμάτων καί άύλων δυνάμεων. And do not think that philosophers honor stones and images as divine. But, because we live in the sensory world and are not able to reach up to the bodiless and immaterial power, we have devised for ourselves images as a reminder of those things, so that by seeing them and doing reverence to them we may come to a notion of those bodiless and immaterial powers.

such a sign may be considered an index in Peircean terms; that is, they do not directly resemble the things they signify but they indicate its existence and lead the way back toward it through a process of reasoning.[49] So too, the tracks that the lover follows from the vision of the beautiful boy are indices of the divine beauty, and it is worth considering whether the Peircean index may bea useful way to think about the relation between what Plato sometimes calls Forms and the particulars. The Beautiful itself leaves its tracks in the physical appearance of someone or thing, just as Justice leaves its tracks in a law or custom. Beauty's tracks are easier to see and to follow, however; the footprints of Justice are delicate and faint. Socrates always seeks to follow such tracks in his philosophical discourses, leading both himself and his interlocutors step by discursive step toward those originals that left the impressions.

Throughout the dialogue, Plato poses the problem of the image, how it can be used improperly for immediate gratification or properly for recollection. The vivid image of the dark horse's attempted assault picks up on the theme of *agalmatophilia* in Greek culture, providing a striking image of the wrong way to treat an image, while images of ritual celebration point to the proper treatment of an image. An image, be it a vision of a beautiful beloved or a beautifully crafted speech, sets the soul in motion, leading it along the path. After their discussion by the banks of the Ilissus, then, what path will Socrates and Phaedrus take? What path Plato's readers? The questions of whence and whither continue to haunt the dialogue, from its opening lines to its final 'let's go'.

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49 One of Peirce's favorite examples of the index is indeed the footprint in the sand by which Robinson Crusoe learns that some other person has come onto his deserted island; cp. Peirce 1991:252.

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