Green Politics, Expertise, and Democratic Discourse in the Two Germanies, 1989-2019

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Abstract: Environmental movements became a major vehicle for promoting citizen participation in both East and West Germany during the 1980s. Their critiques of industrial society, however, reflected the different constellations of power in their respective countries. Movements in both East and West formed green parties, but their disparate understandings of power, expertise, and democracy complicated the parties’ efforts to coalesce during the unification process and to play a major role in German politics after unification. I propose that the persistence of this East-West divide helps explain the continuing discrepancy in the appeal of Alliance 90/The Greens in the old and new German federal states. Nevertheless, I also suggest that the Greens have accomplished their goal of opening technical issue areas—particularly energy—to political debate. This is currently working to enhance their image throughout Germany as champions of technological innovation and democratic openness in the face of climate inaction and right-wing populism.

Keywords: democracy, East-West differences, environmental movements, expertise, Greens

The thirtieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and reunification provides scholars of German politics an opportunity to revisit our analyses from that tumultuous time and to evaluate how they have held up in the intervening decades. This paper takes as its starting point a research project on environmental movements I conducted in Berlin, Leipzig, and Wittenberg from 1989 through 1991. My research focused on the relationship between environmental activism, technology, and democracy. I found that this relationship differed in fundamental ways in East and West, and the differences helped explain the movements’ failure to coalesce during the unification process.¹ I have often thought these same factors might help explain the subsequent development of Alliance 90/The Greens as the ultimate “Wessi party”² and its inability to win a following in the new federal states. In this article I briefly describe the evolution of different environmentalisms in East and West Germany during the 1980s and their contributions to the formation of the Greens. I will then examine the trajectory of the party in the old and new federal states up to the present. I will discuss how the Greens’ recent upswing in polling throughout
Germany reveals the extent to which they have influenced political discourse along the lines of both eastern and western movements.

**Origins: Two Germanies, Two Societal Critiques**

Environmental movements arose in West Germany in the 1970s and East Germany in the 1980s. In the former, environmental activism often took the form of “citizen initiative” groups. These were single-issue local groups that originally formed either in order to procure some service for the community (e.g. day care) or, increasingly from the early 1970s on, to protest large, state-sponsored industrial projects (e.g. power plants). They were “new social movements” organized not along traditional lines of economic conflict, but around new issues of quality of life and a critique of growth.  

Citizen initiatives reached their zenith with the antinuclear movement. By the mid 1970s, more people identified themselves as members of citizen initiative groups than of all political parties combined. Environmental initiatives were by far the largest subgroup. Importantly, their protest against particular projects grew into *Systemkritik* against what they perceived as an undemocratic planning process.

The movements’ critique was reminiscent of Max Weber’s thesis on the subordination of politics to bureaucratic expertise in advanced democratic states. In Weber’s account, bureaucracy develops as part of the modernization of democratic states, in response to demands for equality before the law. The politician satisfies societal demands for political responsibility and flexibility. But technical superiority gives the expert greater claim to authority and becomes a tool for enhancing bureaucratic power. The more that essentially political questions are formulated as technical imperatives and assigned to the bureaucracy, the weaker the citizens’
influence over their own governance becomes. The politician stands as a “dilettante” opposite the trained expert, essentially rubber-stamping decisions (s)he has little role in formulating. Industry’s influence expands because its technical information is essential to the authority of the bureaucracy.6

Environmental citizen initiatives protested lack of citizen access to the planning process – particularly for nuclear power projects - and an overreliance on technical expertise. They rejected established political parties, defining them as part of the problem, and they began to form their own voting lists. The national-level Greens were founded in 1980 and first entered the Bundestag in 1983. Petra Kelly famously referred to them as “the anti-party party;” others described them as the parliamentary arm of the citizen initiative movement. Their aim was to shed light on the workings of political institutions in order to democratize decision making. They called for public deliberation rather than technocratic decision making. There were multiple ideological strands within the early Greens that ranged from left to right, but this critique, which they inherited from the citizen initiative movement, was one of the defining features of their politics in office. The Greens implemented several practices designed to avoid professionalization and keep their parliamentarians tied to the grass roots. The rotation principle required parliamentary representatives to leave office after two years (half of their term) and be replaced by other party members. The imperative mandate required them to represent the views of the party base rather than exercising their own judgment on votes.

The Greens supported citizen participation in issue areas with high technical content – such as nuclear power - as a means to democratize technical discourse. They did not reject expertise per se—rather, they rejected the government’s alleged tendency to mask political questions as technical imperatives and withdraw them from public discussion. The Greens
fostered the development of "counterexpertise", in which critical citizens reevaluated the goals, assumptions, and data contained in studies authored by the scientific establishment.

The societal critique advanced by East German environmental movements was very different. In the German Democratic Republic (GDR), no open criticism of the ruling SED government was permitted. The Party tried to co-opt any private activity that might become political. Environmental damage was endemic in East Germany. Concerned citizens began to organize in study groups affiliated with the Protestant Church. Religion was virtually the only sphere of private activity tolerated by the regime, and these groups provided a nonpolitical setting in which people could discuss their ideas. Among other themes, church-affiliated study groups conducted discussion evenings about progress, science, and technology.7

GDR environmental groups at first focused on activities such as bicycle trips and forest walks. In 1982, the government forbade the publication of environmental data. Church-affiliated groups responded by trying to collect data themselves or to acquire it from Western groups. Environmental information centers sprang up, including the Umweltbibliothek (environmental library) in East Berlin, which printed its own newsletters. In order to minimize infiltration by the Ministry for State Security (Stasi), the groups remained small, locally centered, and largely independent of each other. They gradually began to attract people disillusioned with the political system who had no legitimate outlet for airing their grievances. By the mid 1980s, they were beginning to take on a more overtly critical tone, especially after the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident and a Stasi raid on the Berlin Umweltbibliothek the following year.8

The Chernobyl accident was a watershed event for environmental movements in both Germanies, but it had different effects in each. In the West, it turned an already skeptical population firmly and permanently against nuclear power. It bolstered the movements' critique of
the CDU/FDP coalition's piecemeal approach to environmental hazards and helped pressure the Kohl government into founding the Ministry for Environment, Nature Protection, and Nuclear Safety later that year.⁹ In the East, it strengthened a gathering wave of distrust in government authorities. Their initial silence, followed by reassurances that no fallout had reached the GDR, were impossible to reconcile with the news that most citizens were receiving from Western broadcast sources. Moreover, the explosion of a Soviet-made reactor gave the lie to Soviet and East German experts' claim of technological superiority.¹⁰

East German groups were generally less critical of technology, and of technical expertise, than their West German counterparts.¹¹ As in the Federal Republic (FRG), environmental issues in the GDR became a vehicle for Systemkritik. The East German elite, however, owed their positions not to expertise, but to party loyalty. According to their ideology, the state followed immutable scientific rules to arrive at the good society. But the discrepancy between the official information and the visible environmental degradation became so great that it delegitimated the regime in the eyes of many citizens. “Whereas West German groups attacked the technocratic aspect of their state, however, East German groups attacked the apparent irrationality of theirs.”¹²

By 1989, environment was one of the main themes of protest in the GDR and was linked with critiques of authoritarianism. To protesters, environmental destruction was a direct result of the lack of citizen voice in governance. The Green Party was founded in November 1989 by 150 members of grassroots environmental groups. It was one of several environmental organizations formed in the waning days of the GDR. It was not founded as an anti-party party, but rather was dedicated to opposing the “Stalinist treatment of human beings, economy, and environment.”¹³ The outsider/insider identity of the Western movements seemed self-defeating to my interviewees from the East.
Thus, both movements that eventually contributed to Alliance 90/The Greens demanded democratization, but democracy meant different things to them. For Western environmentalists, it meant a decentralized, participatory politics in which deliberation could counter bureaucratic secrecy. Eastern environmentalists found themselves facing too much politics—a system in which Party functionaries overrode experts and had no mechanism for listening to the public. For them, democratization meant functioning representative institutions, along with neutral experts. Hence, while FRG groups rejected technical expertise as a basis for political power, GDR groups seemed to propose that very thing as a remedy for the arbitrariness of one-party rule.

An Incomplete Unification

After Honecker’s resignation and the fall of the Berlin Wall, many GDR protest groups wanted to help form their own government. Honecker's successors invited opposition groups, including the Green Party and other environmental organizations, to join a "Roundtable", whose charge was to make (nonbinding) recommendations for political reform. The Roundtable's first public statement put environmental issues first: "[the participants] demand disclosure of the ecological, economic, and financial situation in our country." After the March 1990 East German elections, however, in which the large, West-based parties triumphed, it was clear that quick reunification of the two Germanies would be the path chosen. GDR environmental groups were generally unenthusiastic about reunification, and their FRG counterparts were wary of imposing themselves on their Eastern counterparts and disenfranchising them. The Eastern and Western groups could not agree on a merger in advance of the December 1990 Bundestag elections, so they ran separately (under the special rules of this election, the new federal states formed a separate
voting unit). In the West, the internally divided Greens focused on issues such as climate change and failed to clear the 5 percent hurdle. In the East, the Green Party allied with other grassroots groups to form the Green Party/Alliance 90, which won 6 percent of the vote and entered the Bundestag with only eight members.

Eastern and Western Greens eventually did merge to form Alliance 90/The Greens, but their disagreements revealed fundamental differences in perspective that set the tone for the next decades. The Western perspective—a Systemkritik of late capitalist democracy—prevailed, as West Germany had essentially absorbed the GDR. The party regrouped in the old federal states and struggled for relevance in the new ones. Alliance 90/The Greens became almost exclusively a western German party at the national level, clearing the 5 percent hurdle only rarely in federal elections in any eastern state but solidifying its support in the west, especially in the city-states (Hamburg, Bremen, Berlin) and in Baden-Württemberg, where it regularly polled over 10 percent (see Figure 1).
The environmental groups that had contributed to Alliance 90 in the new federal states felt excluded from the conversation. Their own evolution in secret had hampered the development of a grand ideology or guiding philosophical critique to complement that of the...
West. Their approach had been pragmatic and results-oriented. Although environmental issues took a backseat to economic issues after unification, the former remained salient in the eastern states. For example, whereas 82 percent of respondents in one large survey had deemed “a clean and intact environment” to be “very important” in 1990, by 1995 the figure was 65 percent, still a majority. But the west-centeredness of the Greens in united Germany made it difficult for the party to gain a foothold in the east. The Greens struggled to rise much above the 5 percent cutoff in the eastern state legislatures as well. In its leadership, the party also remained largely western. Katrin Göring-Eckardt, a Green member of the Bundestag since the late 1990s, was the only top politician in the party from eastern Germany. It is striking, she says, that “some in our party know the eastern United States better than eastern Germany.”

**The Evolution of Green Politics in United Germany**

In the ensuing decades, four related trends have gradually changed this picture. First, the Greens began to take an active role in governance. They carried deep ideological divisions into the Bundestag that dated back to the party’s founding. *Fundis* argued that entering into governing coalitions and fostering the professionalization of parliamentary representatives would be tantamount to abandoning *Systemkritik*—they wanted to maintain a position outside the center of power in order legitimately to critique it. *Realos*, by contrast, took a more pragmatic position, urging the party to prepare itself to govern. Indeed, the Greens entered their first state-level governing coalition in Hessen in 1985. The December 1990 election debacle prompted a reckoning within the party. Many argued that the structures designed to keep MPs tied to the grass roots had hampered the Greens’ ability to respond quickly to changing political
circumstances. The Greens discarded the imperative mandate and the rotation principle, a move that resulted in the exodus of prominent Fundis from the party.

The ideological tensions between the Fundi and Realo wings were essentially settled in favor of the Realos by the time the Greens entered into a governing coalition with the Social Democrats (SPD) at the national level in 1998. In the meantime, they have formed governing coalitions with all other parties except the right-wing populist AfD and, since 2011, have been the senior partner in a Green/Black (CDU) coalition in the state of Baden-Württemberg.

The Greens began to translate their positions into policy change. Counterexpertise, popularized by the citizen initiative movement and incorporated into the federal government by the Greens, came to fruition in the German energy debate. Twenty-seven scientifically trained antinuclear activists had founded the Eco-Institute in Freiburg in 1977, which first coined the term “Energiewende” (energy turning point). At the time of its founding, there was no real place at universities or established research institutions for experts who did not share the government and industry elite’s support for nuclear and fossil fuel energy. The Eco-Institute gave a home to critical scientists dedicated to questioning the politics behind expert opinion and opening energy policy to broader societal discussion. It was a 1980 Eco-Institute book that proposed the then-revolutionary idea that future economic growth would not require ever-expanding energy consumption, and that future German energy needs could be met without coal or nuclear power.

The Greens helped bring these alternative scientific viewpoints into public debate. Their efforts resulted in policy innovation, particularly during the Red (SPD)-Green government (1998-2005). Among the Greens-led policy changes of that period are the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG), aided by the advocacy of prominent SPD member Hermann Scheer, and the
agreement to phase out nuclear power by 2022. The EEG promoted a model for energy transition that was decentralized, technologically forward-looking, and enormously popular. It was based on a feed-in tariff, which enabled small producers to feed electricity into the grid for a guaranteed price over a 20-year period. It gave priority grid access to renewable energy and resulted in a boom particularly in small-scale solar installations. A major reason the Energiewende is so popular is that it gives individuals the opportunity to do something for and with their communities. This kind of local investment has increased community solidarity and helped against negative demographic change, a particularly salient issue in Germany's eastern states.\textsuperscript{21} The Energiewende has also showed some promise in reconciling environmental and economic issues in the new federal states. Citizen energy companies are viewed as a means to bring new, environmentally friendly businesses to areas with high unemployment.\textsuperscript{22}

Having gained seats in the 2002 federal elections, the Greens successfully pushed the coalition to move federal responsibility for renewable energy from the skeptical Economics Ministry to the more supportive Environment Ministry. This move also had the symbolic purpose of framing energy supply in terms of environmental protection (the Greens’ calling card) rather than economic growth.

After the Red-Green coalition dissolved in 2005, subsequent CDU-led coalitions have been less friendly to renewable energy. Moreover, the SPD, in coalition with the CDU, has become a less reliable supporter of green policies. When the Merkel administration attempted to shift federal support from renewables to coal and to backtrack on the commitment to end nuclear power, however, the announcements were met with a wave of protest. Mass demonstrations followed the chancellor’s apparent reversal in early 2011 of her commitment to decommission Germany’s aging nuclear power plants. The Fukushima disaster in Japan shortly thereafter sent
tens of thousands more antinuclear activists into the streets. Merkel's apparent waffling contributed to the CDU's loss of two state elections that year, resulting in a Red/Green coalition in Rhineland-Palatinate and a Green/Red (and eventually Green/Black) coalition in Baden-Württemberg. In the new German states, the Greens also gained ground, doubling their share of the vote in Saxony-Anhalt (to 7.1%) and entering the state parliament (Landtag) for the first time in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.23

The political backlash forced Merkel's reluctant government to recommit to ending nuclear power by 2022 and to accelerate the timetable for the Energiewende. The Merkel administration did succeed in moving responsibility for renewable energy back to the Economics Ministry in 2013. But its attempts since 2014 to recentralize energy production, partly in order to bolster Germany's large utilities, which had failed to invest in renewables and had largely been left out of the boom, have provoked renewed protest.24 The German public clearly prefers the Greens' participatory, decentralized model. The government was compelled to list "preserving the diversity of participants" as a primary goal of subsequent revisions of the EEG, and it is roundly criticized when it falls short of this goal in practice.25

Due in part to the ambitious nature of the Energiewende, Germany has become a model of forward-looking environmentalism. As Andrei Markovits writes, the Greens in government have fundamentally remade Germany’s “brand” in their own image: “Nobody vaguely sane and with any kind of political ambition would speak ill of the environment. Being green on this dimension has become tantamount to being a good citizen, a good German, a good European.”26 This translates into continued very high public support for the Energiewende. In a September 2019 survey by the German Agency for Renewable Energy, for instance, 89 percent of
respondents agreed that stronger use and expansion of renewable energies are “very or extraordinarily important” (66 percent) or “important” (23 percent).  

The second key trend favoring the Greens is the decline of the center-right and center-left Volksparteien (catch-all parties) in recent decades. In Western Europe, party alignment had already weakened noticeably by the 1980s. The strength of left-wing parties was eroded by a shift in the workforce from blue-collar to white-collar employees and the gradual weakening of the trade union movement. Even where working class-affiliated parties remained electorally strong, explains Martin Schain, “their ties to their working-class base became less secure and more conditional on their policy agenda.” At the same time, Christian Democratic parties in Europe were experiencing a loosening of bonds with their voters due to the weakening of Christian religious identities.

This trend is visible in the decline in adherence to both the SPD and the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU). Particularly the SPD has seen its voter base shrink after multiple terms as the junior partner in the Union/SPD national coalition (2005-2009, 2013 to present). Both parties seem depleted in the final years of the Merkel government. While the Greens are not the only beneficiaries of this development, it makes them appear as a realistic alternative.

The third important trend, related to the weakening of the Volksparteien, is the rise of right-wing populist groups, including PEGIDA, (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident), founded in Dresden in 2014, and the Alternative for Germany party (AfD), which formed in opposition to the federal government’s euro rescue policy and first gained a following among Euroskeptics. During the 2015 refugee crisis it began presenting itself as an anti-refugee alternative to the CDU. While the AfD grew rapidly in both old and new federal states, it had a
special appeal for the “forgotten” eastern Germans who felt left behind in the decades since unification.\textsuperscript{31}

The danger in the rising appeal of right-wing populist parties, writes Martin Schain, is that they shift the political conversation of the entire party system in their direction.\textsuperscript{32} In 2016, for example, CSU chief Horst Seehofer was widely criticized for pandering to potential AfD voters when he split with Chancellor Merkel on the issue of refugees and immigration. In 2018, fearing a loss of voters to the AfD in the upcoming Bavarian state elections, the CSU again took a hard line, this time nearly upsetting the national governing coalition. As it turned out, the CSU did decline in Bavaria, falling below 40\% in the Landtag for the first time since 1954.\textsuperscript{33}

The Greens have resisted this trend, and they have benefited from taking the clearest stand of any German party against the AfD. They have waged explicitly anti-AfD, pro-diversity, pro-Europe, liberal campaigns, and it has paid off for them. In the aforementioned 2018 Bavarian election, they nearly doubled their share of the vote, becoming the second largest party faction with 17.6\% and outpolling the AfD (10.2\%) by a wide margin. They are winning young urban voters in the west and now in the east. “There are a lot of people who don’t want the east to be perceived solely as a region where right-wing populists and Nazis set the tone,” says a Green member from Brandenburg.\textsuperscript{34} Their voter base is much different from that of the AfD. Whereas the latter’s core supporters are overwhelmingly working-class males, the Greens are the only German party whose base is majority female. They have the second highest income range (after the Free Democrats, FDP). They, along with SPD and Left Party, are supported more strongly in urban areas. And, while the age of their average voter has risen over time, at forty-eight it is still younger than the average SPD or FDP voter.\textsuperscript{35}
Finally, the Greens’ influence has been enhanced by the advent of climate change as a dominant issue throughout Germany. Put simply, the Greens own the climate change issue. Weather extremes in Germany in recent years, including severe storms, flooding, prolonged heat waves/drought and wildfires, have affected everyone and have convinced even skeptics that climate change is an emergency. The Greens, champions of counterexpertise and the Energiewende, have been proven prescient. They bucked the scientific establishment when it was politically risky to do so, and their priorities now align more closely with those of the German public than ever before.

This development has caught the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition flat-footed as the Merkel government struggles to explain its recent actions to prolong the use of coal and its failure to achieve its own carbon emission targets. Just before the 2019 European Parliament elections, a twenty-six-year-old German named “Rezo” posted a YouTube video called “Destruction of the CDU,” which immediately went viral and was partially blamed for the party’s subsequent poor showing. The video panned the governing coalition’s climate policy for flying in the face of scientific expertise. Rezo’s critique is reminiscent of the East German protests of the 1980s, in which the supposed experts were unmasked as technically incompetent. Now that same accusation is leveled against the grand coalition government. In this issue area at least, it has ceded credibility on science to the Greens and their allies. “We are the only credible party for action on climate change,” says a Brandenburg Green leader.

From Störenfried to Stabilizer: Environmentalism, Expertise, and Democracy Today
These four related developments have all contributed to a recent bump in support for the Greens throughout Germany and, for the first time, in the new federal states. Although they are far outpolled by the AfD there, their support is rising sharply. From January to August 2019, party membership surged 27 percent in Saxony, 26 percent in Brandenburg, and 22 percent in Thuringia, the three eastern states that held elections in 2019. The Greens are clearing the 5 percent hurdle more often in the Landtage of the new federal states. They will now likely be part of government in all but one of them, partly because no other parties will coalesce with the AfD. In addition to these four in the east, they are currently part of the governing coalitions in seven of the western Landtage for a total of eleven.

In addition to the decline of the Volksparteien and their opposition to the AfD, the relationship between environmentalism, expertise, and democracy has evolved in a manner that goes some way toward reconciling the east-west divide in Green support. The Weberian critique that put off eastern German environmentalists has largely fallen away as the party has gained experience in governance. Grassroots democracy, one of the four pillars of the Greens’ original platform, is no longer implemented through the rotation principle or the imperative mandate, things that gave credibility to the anti-party party moniker but hindered the party’s capacity to govern. The Greens have not completely abandoned their idealism, but they now lead with their pragmatism. As Markovits puts it: “The Greens have become established without being the establishment.”

The environment took a backseat to economic issues in the new federal states after unification, but, through the lens of climate change and the energy transition, they are increasingly viewed more as two sides of the same coin. Economic regeneration, if it happens, will happen through technologically progressive development. In the May 2019 EU elections, the
Greens were polling as Germany’s most popular political party, winning 22.6 percent of the vote. They even received 29 percent of the eighteen to twenty-nine year-old vote, more than double the second-place CDU/CSU total. This group tends to identify climate change as the most important political issue. The Greens are benefiting from their reputation for being socially and technologically forward-looking. In a sense, their steering of the technical conversation satisfies both western and eastern environmentalists’ critiques from 1989—it has moved the conversation into the political realm (west), and the Greens and their allies are the experts (east).

It is ironic, says political science professor Werner Weidenfeld, that the party that was once a symbol of radical change has now come to represent stability: “The Greens do not really fundamentally change the political course of Germany anymore, they much rather stabilize it. For example, when the other parties started questioning European integration, it was the Greens who declared themselves in favor of a strong Europe in all clarity.” While it remains to be seen how the Greens will evolve in the future, their current position is testament both to how much they have shaped Germany’s political course and to how much they in turn have been shaped by it.

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Notes

2 Dominique Eigenmann, “Die Grünen erschliessen neue Bundesländer,” Basler Zeitung, 19 August 2019. For brevity’s sake, I will refer to Alliance 90/The Greens in the postunification period simply as “the Greens.”


5 Dieter Rucht, Von Wyhl nach Gorleben: Bürger gegen Atomprogramm und nukleare Entsorgung (Munich, 1980), 86.

6 H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber (New York, 1946), ch. 8 – Bureaucracy.

7 Interview with Matthias Voigt, Grünes Netzwerk Arche and Greenpeace DDR, 14 June 1990.


11 Technological optimism was also evident among the general populace, according to a March 1990 survey. IST Gesellschaft für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft und Statistik, “Die Umweltsituation der DDR im Urteil ihrer Bürger” (Berlin/Heidelberg, 1990), 10.

12 Hager (see note 1), 106.

13 “Erklärung der Gründungsinitiative für eine Grüne Partei in der DDR” in Die Opposition in der DDR, ed. Gerhard Rein (Berlin, 1989), 120.

14 Helmut Herles and Ewald Rose, eds., Vom Runden Tisch zum Parlament (Bonn, 1990), 23.

15 Hager (see note 1), 111.

17 Caterina Lobenstein, “Manche kennen den Osten der USA besser als den Osten Deutschlands,” Die Zeit, 4 April 2019.

18 Hubert Kleinert, Aufstieg und Fall der Grünen: Analyse einer alternativen Partei (Bonn, 1992), 372.

19 Jochen Roose, Made by Öko-Institut: Wissenschaft in einer bewegten Umwelt (Freiburg, 2002), 102.

20 Ibid., 18-19.


23 Bundeswahlleiter, available at https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/service/landtagswahlen.html/


30 Ibid.

31 Hans Vorländer, Maik Herold, and Steven Schäller, *PEGIDA and New Right-Wing Populism in Germany* (New York, 2018), ch. 3; available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67495-7.

32 Schain (see note 20), 15-16.


34 Eigenmann (see note 2).

35 Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Studie 2017.

37 Rachel Loxton, “‘We are Heading Up’: Why the Green Party is Gaining Support in Eastern Germany,” *The Local*, 30 August 2019. Quote is from Clemens Rostock.


39 Markovits and Klaver (see note 17), 8.

40 Stefan Braun, “Das junge Deutschland wählt grün,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung Online*, 26 May 2019; available at https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/ruene-europawahl-junge-1.4463996, accessed 19 February 2020. The Greens also led among the thirty to forty-four age group and were virtually tied with the CDU for the forty-five to fifty-nine group.