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The Berlin–Tokyo Film Axis and a Troubled Coproduction: The Makers of *New Earth*/*The Samurai's Daughter* (1937)

Abstract

Coproductions are often notoriously difficult, and this was certainly the case in 1936-1937 for the most important co-production between Nazi Germany and Japan. What should have been one joint film for the international market turned out to be two different versions: *New Earth* in Japanese and English by Itami Mansaku and *The Samurai's Daughter* in German and Japanese by Arnold Fanck. This article focuses on three filmmakers—producer Kawakita Nagamasa and the directors Fanck and Itami—to better understand the production and reception of the films and what led to the split between the directors. The push for a power axis between Nazi Germany and imperial Japan metamorphosed Kawakita from a cosmopolitan cultural mediator between Japan, Germany, and China to a nationalist film functionary during Japan's invasion of China and implicated his career in fascist war efforts. The Nazi German-Japanese alliance led the famed mountain film director Fanck to acclimate his film to serve the binational political agenda. But the same push for alliance alienated Itami, whose liberal and anti-authoritarian positions were at odds with the politics of the day. Yet, Itami's position was not representative of that of imperial Japan, therefore his duel with Fanck and the resultant failed coproduction cannot serve as a metaphor for the superficial or 'hollow' alliance between Nazi Germany and Japan, as some scholars have claimed.

'One mountain, two tigers.' This Chinese proverb captures the fraught Japanese-German coproduction that unsuccessfully yoked the directors Itami Mansaku (1900–1946) and Arnold Fanck (1889–1974) and eventually resulted in two different films: Itami's Japanese-English

version, *New Earth* (*Atarashiki tsuchi* 新しき土, 1937), and Fanck's German-Japanese version, *The Samurai's Daughter* (*Die Tochter des Samurai*, 1937).¹ Fanck's concern to create an authentic representation of Japan compelled him to seek a Japanese co-director, and he decided on Itami, who was 'one of Japan's finest directors and also a liberal man.'² However, the two soon diverged on political and ideological views and directorial methods and preferences. They both operated out of their comfort zone. Fanck usually filmed without following a written script, but Itami always wrote his own scripts. In this case, Fanck wrote a script and compelled Itami to follow it. Itami disliked Fanck's script and came up with his own, but Fanck 'would have none of this, insisting that his first real Japanese-German film collaboration have a clear, pro-Fascist political message.'³ Thus, the two used the same script by Fanck, but as Iris Haukamp has shown in her recent book dedicated to this film, *A Foreigner's Cinematic Dream of Japan: Representational Politics and Shadows of War in the Japanese-German Coproduction 'New Earth' (1937)*, Itami constantly and sometimes subtly departed from Fanck's script, improvising dialogue for his version and filming scenes that reflected his own beliefs and values. Itami's involvement in the coproduction ensured that the quality of the acting in Fanck's version was high because Itami coached the actors and actresses, whereas Fanck focused on landscape and location shooting, a natural task for a director famed for his mountain films (*Bergfilme*). In most respects, however, the two filmmakers worked independently: Fanck's scenes were shot in the morning and Itami's in the evening with the same cast and at the same locations.⁴ Such internal strife prolonged the production period and placed a tremendous financial burden on the sponsors.⁵

The clash between the two directors posed an enormous challenge for Kawakita Nagamasa (1903–1981), a little-known Japanese producer and film businessman. As Karl Sierek

puts it in his study *Der lange Arm der Ufa: Filmische Bilderwanderung zwischen Deutschland, Japan und China 1923–1949*, Kawakita became a crisis manager for the troubled production.⁶ The producer, however, downplayed the conflict between the two directors and was undeterred from seeking further joint film ventures with Germany, despite the excessive cost overrun of *New Earth*.⁷ Sierek details Kawakita's long and convoluted career as both a Germanophone and sinophilic promoter of cross-cultural understanding as well as an authoritative film functionary who sought to establish a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere for film during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Sierek reconstructs the history of Ufa's international influence on film and media policies in East Asia by tracing the careers of figures such as Kawakita and Amakasu Masahiko, the 'notorious'⁸ Japanese director of Man'ei Studio in Manchukuo, and at the same time he illustrates Kawakita's complicity in supporting imperial Japan's invasion of China through propaganda. Sierek's research elaborates the workings of a military-cinematographic complex and presents cinema as a site where media and power politics play out. In this trans-Siberian triangle of Germany, Japan, and China, film was instrumentalized by politics. In another study of the occupation cinema in wartime Shanghai, Poshek Fu argues that Kawakita adopted a laissez-faire policy that gave indigenous cinema much autonomy, partly out of pragmatic reasons, thus offering a different take on Kawakita's engagement in East Asia.⁹

Taking advantage of recent scholarship, this article focuses on the background and the production and reception history of what was falsely proclaimed to be the first Japanese-German coproduction. In particular, it foregrounds the three major players in this project: the directors Fanck and Itami and the reasons that led to their split and two rival versions of the same film, as well as Kawakita and his place in the complex transnational film history that interlinks Germany and East Asia. It argues that this failed coproduction cannot be seen, as Michael Baskett and

Haukamp suggest, as a metaphor for a ‘hollow alliance’ between Nazi Germany and Japan, because it failed due to personal and artistic differences between the two directors, Fanck and Itami, and Itami’s position was not representative of that of imperial Japan.¹⁰ The phrase ‘hollow alliance’ was first used by Johanna Menzel Meskill, who argued that Nazi Germany and Japan signed the anti-Comintern pact without engaging in much substantial or effective association or collaboration with each other.¹¹ But the coproduction resulted in two different versions because the two directors were both strong-willed individuals, similar to two tigers that find themselves on the same mountain. Whereas the concurrent forging of a political and military alliance between Germany and Japan led Fanck to acclimate his film to the binational political agenda, it alienated Itami, whose liberal and anti-fascist positions were out of sync with the new development. *New Earth* was not a film that Itami chose to make, and it had a deleterious effect on his health and career.¹² *The Samurai’s Daughter* turned out to be Fanck’s last film, and after the war he unsuccessfully attempted to distance himself from the Nazi regime.¹³ The image of Fanck that Haukamp presents is far more complex and nuanced, but also damning.¹⁴ This essay reconstructs the backstory of the high-profile coproduction which reveals the different positions of the three makers of the films that led to an open conflict between the two directors and Kawakita’s effort in accommodation and damage control.

The Genesis of New Earth / The Samurai’s Daughter

The coproduction would not have been possible without Kawakita Nagamasa. Due to his father’s work at the Baoding Military Academy, Kawakita spent part of his childhood in China, became fluent in the Chinese language, and studied Chinese literature and philosophy at Peking University in the early 1920s. In China he made the acquaintance of a German baron, Georg

Eduard Freiherr von Stietencron, who recommended that he go to Germany to learn the language and culture. In late June 1923 he arrived at Lingen, a small city near Hamburg, and his life changed forever. In late 1923 or early 1924, Kawakita watched a theater production of *Madame Butterfly* in Hamburg. Its unbearably distorted image of Japan jumpstarted his career in film trade and transnational film production between Germany and East Asia, whereby he hoped to promote cross-cultural understanding. Fritz Lang's film *Die Nibelungen: Siegfried* (1923) made such an impression on him that he chose film as the vehicle for cultural mediation—a stroke of luck for the German film industry, because at that time the thriving Weimar cinema wanted to gain a market share in East Asia alongside Hollywood.

With support from his business partner Stietencron, trader Otto Schacke, and French financier André Germain, Kawakita established his film import-export and production company Tōwa Shōji Ltd on 10 October 1928. Tōwa imported many German and European films to Japan and Kawakita became the key figure of a Berlin–Tokyo film axis.¹⁵ After Ufa and Tōwa signed their contract in 1929, Japanese viewers watched numerous German films, such as *Asphalt* (dir. Joe May, 1929), *The Adventures of Prince Achmed* (*Die Abenteuer des Prinzen Achmed*, dir. Lotte Reiniger, 1926), *Girls in Uniform* (*Mädchen in Uniform*, dir. Leotine Sagan, 1931), *The Congress Dances* (*Der Kongress tanzt*, dir. Erik Charell, 1931), and Leni Riefenstahl's *Olympia* (1938). Kawakita regarded the premiere of Riefenstahl's two Olympic films in Tokyo as a highlight of his professional life.¹⁶ His many close ties in China aided him in opening a Shanghai branch of Tōwa in 1930.¹⁷ By introducing European and Japanese films to China through Tōwa, Kawakita had a lasting impact on the Chinese film industry as well.

Whereas Tōwa imported many European films to Japan during the 1930s, the company exported few Japanese products to Germany despite the popularity of Japonisme and chinoiserie

in European cinemas.¹⁸ Therefore, Kawakita tried to stimulate Japan's film export by arranging his own productions. His vision was to make 'a film with Japanese landscape, Japanese culture, Japanese actors and actresses, but by a European director'.¹⁹ As the geopolitical climate shifted in favor of a Berlin–Tokyo power axis, the opportunity arose for Kawakita, who was fluent in Chinese and German, to fully exploit his linguistic, cultural, and diplomatic skills.

In 1935, Kawakita and Fanck signed a contract for Fanck to direct a Japanese-German coproduction. Haukamp explores the question of who initiated the project: Was it Kawakita, Fanck, or the German government? In fact, it was none of them, but Friedrich Wilhelm Hack and possibly also Sakai Naoe, secretary to the naval attaché in Berlin, who acted as the German-Japanese Society's interim managing director. Hack and Sakai were co-presidents of the German-Japanese Society in Berlin. According to Sakai's own interview with NHK (Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai), he gave Hack the idea of making a Japanese-German coproduction. But Haukamp views Sakai's memory as unverifiable and attributes the initiative to Hack.²⁰ After a stint at the research institute of the South Manchurian Railway Company in Tokyo, Hack had been stationed in the German colony of Qingdao as an occupation soldier at the beginning of the First World War and was subsequently captured and interned at the Fukuoda POW camp. During his six-year imprisonment in Japan, he worked as an interpreter and familiarized himself with the Japanese language and culture. After returning to Germany in 1921, he entered the arms trade with Japan. After Japan invaded Manchuria following the Mukden Incident on September 18, 1931, which incurred international condemnation, Hack wanted to improve Japan's image in Germany and actively 'lobbied against anti-Japanese sentiments in Berlin' by organizing press conferences that changed reporting on Japan and Manchuria.²¹ As co-president of the German-Japanese Society, he approached Goebbels with the idea of a film coproduction, and Goebbels promised to support

the project with 100,000 Reichsmark. Hack and Fanck were friends, and the latter embraced this idea, according to Haukamp, also for financial and professional reasons.²² Hack then contacted Hayashi Bunzaburō, the Berlin representative for Kawakita's film production and distribution company Tōwa.²³ This is confirmed in a 1936 article written by Kawakita's wife, Kawakita Kashiko, in which she relates that 'on 20 September 1934, Hayashi informed Tōwa about Fanck's inclinations to come to Japan to make a film.'²⁴ At the time, Kawakita's company Tōwa faced competition from similar companies such as Tōhō.²⁵ Thus the initiative from the German-Japanese Society came at an opportune time for Tōwa as well. This was why Kawakita met with Fanck in the evening of the day he arrived in Berlin, 3 July 1935.²⁶ This shows that Kawakita's active pursuit of the project was more commercially than politically motivated. Soon after finalizing the contract with Fanck, Kawakita left for Japan to work out the details with Ōsawa Yoshio, head of J.O. [Jenkins-Ōsawa] Studios and Kabayama Aisuke, the president of the Society for International Cultural Relations.²⁷ (Ōsawa later became a member of the Tōhō's board of directors. Like Kawakita, he was classified as a 'war criminal class B' after the war due to Tōhō's extensive production of propaganda films and was suspended from work between 1947 and 1950.²⁸)

Haukamp argues against previous studies that suggest the Anti-Comintern Pact between Nazi Germany and imperial Japan led to this coproduction.²⁹ The idea of a coproduction emerged in 1934, but Hack facilitated pre-negotiations between Joachim von Ribbentrop; Ōshima Hiroshi, the Japanese military attaché in Germany; and head of military intelligence Wilhelm Canaris in early 1935.³⁰ Hack continued to play an important role in negotiating the Anti-Comintern Pact. With help from the German Foreign Ministry and thanks to Kawakita's good connections with the Japanese Ministry of Culture, Hack was invited to Japan under the

guise of an adviser for the film but in truth as a secret agent to lay the groundwork for the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was eventually signed on 25 November 1936. Hack left the film team soon after his arrival at the Mampei hotel but frequented the German embassy in Tokyo.³¹

The coproduction was billed as the ‘first’ Japanese-German coproduction. However, as Haukamp reveals, this was actually the fourth Japanese-German coproduction, following *Bushido: The Iron Law* (*Bushido: Das eiserne Gesetz*, co-directed by Karl Heiland and Kako Zanmu, produced by Tōa/DNFU, 1926), *Nippon: Love and Passion in Japan* (*Nippon: Liebe und Leidenschaft in Japan*, consisting of three Shōchiku silents, *Samimaro*, *Bonfire*, and *Big City*, edited together by Carl Koch, produced by Tōwa Shōji/Ufa), and *Kagami* (Kishi Kōichi, produced by Kishi Puro/Ufa, 1933).³² *New Earth* continued the tradition of making Japanese films for export and presenting an ‘authentic’ image of Japan to the world.³³ To misleadingly label *New Earth* as ‘the first coproduction’ was ‘a marketing tactic’.³⁴ But it was ‘the first – and last’ Japanese-German coproduction to receive such high-level government support and such intensive media attention in both Japan and Germany, with Japan carrying most of the financial burden.³⁵ Haukamp’s knowledge of the earlier coproductions leads him to see *New Earth* as less or at least not solely politically and ideologically motivated, but as part of the efforts to export Japanese films in order to increase national prestige.³⁶

The Duel between Fanck and Itami

A primary concern during the planning of this coproduction, as was the case in its forerunners, was deciding which image of Japan to project. To prepare for the undertaking, Fanck studied eighteen Japanese films, mostly recent, successful *gendai geki* (contemporary films) selected for him by his Japanese partners.³⁷ According to an interview Fanck gave before his departure for

Japan, he did not want to conjure up the old specter of the Japan-Kitsch of *Madame Butterfly*; instead, he wanted to show Japan ‘as it really is’, but from a European perspective using European film technique. Haukamp notes the ‘unequal power relations’ between the two directors, with Fanck, the foreign director, enjoying more authority.³⁸ But she problematizes the reductionist interpretation of the troubled coproduction as a conflict between a German fascist and a Japanese liberal. Haukamp refutes this perpetrator-victim narrative and offers a detailed and extensive comparison of the two versions.³⁹ Her comparison shows Itami’s agency, his open opposition to Fanck, and his active if subtle subversion of Fanck’s script. Not all of the subtle differences between Fanck’s and Itami’s films could be readily picked up by viewers and reviewers at the time, because that would have required watching the two films side by side and undertaking in-depth and meticulous scholarly analysis to discern the political-ideological, textual, and aesthetic differences. Haukamp’s book remedies the existing Germano-centric research about the film by giving a detailed account of the Japanese director Itami and other Japanese film artists. To better understand what caused the split between the two directors it is necessary to know more about Itami.

Fanck catered to the taste of his German audience, who were more attracted to an ancient Japan than a modern Japan.⁴⁰ This partly explains one of the constraints Fanck was operating under. In his 1973 memoir, Fanck described the two Japans that he and Itami wanted to show in *New Earth*: “[Itami] wanted to represent Japan abroad, stressing all its modern, European achievements, such as imposing railway bridges, modern electric trains, modern skyscrapers, but avoiding old Japanese customs or ways of life. This was the opposite of the image of Japan as I wanted to show it and which accounted for its charm.”⁴¹ The traditional Japan that Fanck wanted to present was, however, the Japan that Itami repudiates in his ‘nonsense new-period dramas’

(*nansensu shin jidaieiga*) that ‘ridicule received images of the past, [and] are often seen as a “vestige of Taishō liberalism” that necessarily clashed with the burgeoning state ideology of imperialist militarism.’⁴² These fundamental differences between the two directors and the ways in which they wanted to present Japan to the outside world could hardly be reconciled in a single film.

In the 1930s, Japan struggled to preserve its own cultural and national identity while expanding its territory. *The Samurai’s Daughter* captures the tension between Japan’s westernization as a result of reforms during the Meiji period (1868–1912) and its effort to promote Japanese culture in the first decade of the Shōwa era (1926–1989). In this film, Japan is portrayed as both modern (in the few scenes set in Tokyo) and traditional (in the Tokyo scenes as well as in rural scenes set near Mount Fuji). The film makes note of Japan’s indebtedness to Germany in the field of industrialization. At the same time, it shows a Japan that vies for the assertion of its own cultural heritage. After the exposition, the film is divided into two main parts introduced by the intertitles ‘Westwind’ and ‘Ostwind’, followed by a coda in Manchuria, where Japan established its puppet state Manchukuo in 1932. *The Samurai’s Daughter* personifies this conflict between native tradition and outside influence through allegorical depictions of its characters, especially through the dilemma of its male protagonist Teruo.

Teruo had been adopted by the rich and powerful widower Yamato Iwao, played by the legendary Sessue Hayakawa. ‘Yamato’ is an ancient name for Japan, rendering the adoptive father an allegorical figure for the nation. On the one hand, he symbolizes Japan’s willingness to learn from the West by sending Teruo to Germany to study agriculture, provided that upon his return he marry Mitsuko, his only child, in order to maintain the family name and bloodline; Yamato himself also speaks German, and he has arranged for Mitsuko to be educated in both

eastern and western languages and arts; on the other hand, he is a descendent of an old samurai family and takes pride in that identity. Contrary to Mitsuko's German teacher, he prefers that Mitsuko wear a kimono to meet Teruo in Tokyo, but he is apparently willing to compromise since Mitsuko ends up going in a western dress while he himself wears a western-style overcoat with suit and tie beneath. However, Teruo returns to Japan accompanied by a blond German woman, Gerda Storm, and refuses to marry his adoptive sister now that he has been enculturated in western individualism. Gerda's family name participates in the meteorological symbolism of the film, which uses terms such as 'wind', 'storm', and 'typhoon' to describe clashes between West and East. The 'West Wind' segment portrays western influence on Japanese society in the form of beliefs in modernity, individualism, personal freedom, and anti-authoritarianism. Gerda's last name seems to indicate that she personifies the disruptive, 'stormy' intrusion of western values into a tranquil Japan.

However, the allegorical potential of Gerda Storm is not fulfilled. She soon rebukes Teruo for learning the false value of individual freedom from the West; instead, she admonishes him to abide by his obligation to family. Subordination of the individual to the collective or the country was part of the ethos of both National Socialist Germany and fascist Japan. Similar to the Shinto priest who later counsels Teruo, Gerda does not articulate the traditional western values of individualism. With ease, she leaves Teruo so that he can perform his filial obligation. The storm in Fanck's film comes rather from the Soviet Union. Standing at the tumultuous ocean, Yamato tells Gerda: 'There blows a dangerous storm over the earth, for you it comes from the east, for us it's blowing from the west. Report to your country that here in the far[th]est east a people keep guard on its rocky islands. At their walls this storm will break.' This echoes an earlier conversation on the ship, where Teruo tells Gerda that the dangerous storms for Japan

come from the interior of Asia, not from western Europe; and he flirts with Gerda by remarking that from western Europe come only winds, some of which are tempting and useful (5:30). The inconsistency in Gerda Storm's allegorical meaning supports what Haukamp observes, namely, that the film's endorsement of Nazism was not part of the original conception in 1935, but a feature added later, in sync with the geopolitical relationship between Nazi Germany and Japan. These conversations about the threat faced by Japan show that *The Samurai's Daughter* was geared to promote the Axis alliance between Nazi Germany and imperial Japan. Interestingly, Itami's version does not include the same reference to the Anti-Comintern Pact.⁴³ This is part of a consistent denazification effort that Itami undertakes in his version.

The 'East Wind' segment, on the other hand, conveys the pressure exerted by Japanese tradition on Teruo, who is expected to obediently fulfil his duty to family and country. In order to bring Teruo back to his roots, Teruo's sister, Hideko Kanda, exposes Teruo to Japanese culture to reawaken his love for his native culture and land; in this ethnographic sequence, viewers see traditional Japanese performances, such as sumo, kabuki, and noh theater. At the end Teruo remarks to his sister that although he does not understand the old songs, the blood of his ancestors seems to make him remember the past. Both his biological and adoptive families seek blessing and wisdom by turning to Buddhism. Teruo's biological father, Kosaku Kanda, prays to the Great Buddha in the Kōtoku-in Temple in Kamakura. Yamato writes to Teruo's teacher, the Buddhist priest Ikkan Oshō, asking him to bestow spiritual guidance on the young man. These efforts successfully divest Teruo of his western attachments; when he returns to his home village at the foot of Mt. Fuji, he is seen wearing a kimono for the first time in the film.

Fanck titled his version *The Samurai's Daughter*, a choice that Itami would never have agreed with. This title had an outdated ring to it even in the 1930s, and it played into the kitschy

stereotype that the faded samurai culture enjoyed in the West. The samurai class had lost its status decades earlier during the Meiji period. Fanck's version essentializes the samurai spirit as indelibly imprinted on the Japanese culture and people. In an extended sequence depicting Gerda as a guest at Yamato's residence, he sternly tells her that Teruo must abandon his personal wishes and obey the strict laws of the family. Yamato speaks while sitting at the tea table, but the accompanying images show tempestuous waves rushing against the boulders at the shore: 'The family is the foundation of our state, the rock on which we have built. The fullest concept, however, is "our sacred house" (*unser kaiserliches Haus*). Thousands of years of storms have broken before it. Our Japan is our sacred house. Our sacred house is Japan. It is what we live for and what we die for.' Then the image cuts back to the tea table, as Gerda replies, 'I hear an old samurai speaking.' Yamato adds, 'And a Japanese today.' This establishes the lineage of the samurai from the past to the Japanese of the present.

For Itami, to foreground 'samurai culture' as the essence of Japanese culture was anachronistic and Orientalizing; the samurai ethos also smacks of the intensifying militarism and expansionism in Japan, echoing parallel developments in Nazi Germany.⁴⁴ As Christian Spang points out, the Nazis wrongly interpreted the 'samurai spirit' (*bushidō*) as an innate characteristic of the Japanese mentality, and Nazi propaganda went as far as comparing *bushidō* with the SS ethos.⁴⁵ Therefore whereas Fanck includes a shot of two samurai swords in the beginning of the montage sequence showing the earthquake, there are no samurai swords in Itami's version; perhaps Itami did not want to suggest that the Japanese face natural disasters with dignified composure because they are descendants of the samurai, or perhaps he simply wanted to eliminate kitsch set-dressing from the domestic scene. In the montage sequence that shows Mitsuko's education and training, which includes both eastern and western as well as feminine

and masculine sports and arts, Itami leaves out instruction in the use of the *naginata* (a samurai weapon), which was actually becoming compulsory in girls' schools in 1936 in conjunction with 'wartime militarist education'. Such a deliberate omission attests to Itami's anti-militarist stance.⁴⁶ When Mitsuko is upset after being rejected by Teruo as a potential sexual partner, Yamato admonishes her to remember her heritage—'Mitsuko, aren't you a samurai's daughter?'—and this line is missing from Itami's version too.⁴⁷

Another major difference lies in the portrayal of Mitsuko in the two films. Christin Bohnke argues that Fanck used her as an ideal vehicle for Nationalist Socialist propaganda, while the more mature, modern, and independent Mitsuko depicted in Itami's version stands for Japan and is the result of the Japanese director's struggle for national agency in the disintegrating coproduction. Haukamp, in contrast, does not read much fascist ideology into the portrayal of Mitsuko, but finds more of Fanck's Orientalism: "In *New Earth*, she/[Hara] appears as the epitome of Japanese femininity. Fanck had conceptualized her role as Mitsuko as the archetypal Japanese woman ... a strong but "submissive Japanese woman."⁴⁸ One example is the scene where Mitsuko starts from her sleep and regrets that she has not practiced enough on the piano: 'The women abroad must all be very good at it!' In contrast, Itami has Yamato comfort her: 'Don't worry. You are a Japanese girl, and you know everything you need to know.'⁴⁹ In Fanck's film, when Gerda comes to Yamato's residence, Mitsuko subserviently provides their meal, because, as Yamato insists, 'It's part of the education of our daughters.' But in Itami's version the housekeeper serves the meal to all three of them.⁵⁰ Another example is the final rescue scene, where Mitsuko tends to Teruo's injured feet in Fanck's version, but not in Itami's. These are just a few examples that show how Fanck's Mitsuko embodies his Orientalist imagination of Asian femininity. Itami gives her greater dignity and by extension national self-

assertiveness. He also presents more intimacy between Teruo and Mitsuko, whereas it is nonexistent in Fanck's version, except probably at the very end.⁵¹

Perhaps the most striking difference between Itami's version and Fanck's film is that *New Earth*, as Bohnke writes, 'excludes all references to Nazi Germany.'⁵² Thus, according to Haukamp, in Itami's version Gerda Storm does not come from Germany, but from the United States: 'Gerda is "American" and the ship from America enters the frame from the right ('East').... [Itami] staged "America", signified by the Stars and Stripes, on the left and the Japanese flag on the right side of the frame.' Departing from Fanck's version of the same scene, Itami replaced the Hakenkreuz and Imperial Army flags with the Stars and Stripes and the Hinomaru.⁵³ And Mitsuko does not study German but English.⁵⁴ Before Haukamp, scholars emphasized that Fanck was an avid National Socialist. But Haukamp argues that Fanck's script was revised to accommodate the political development, and that the fascist agenda was not present at the outset. She also points out that Fanck did not join the NSDAP until 1 April 1940, possibly 'out of opportunism', and he 'never made another film' after *The Samurai's Daughter*.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, Fanck's finished picture is rife with evidence that the director was intent on making a pro-Nazi film. Indeed, Fanck himself wrote about his conscious decision to prioritize the ideological and political significance of the film over the aesthetic dimension 'according to the wish of my Führer and in the interest of his foreign policy by standing at this advance post.'⁵⁶ For Janine Hansen and Hans-Joachim Bieber, Fanck's basic idea was to use Japan as an analogy to illustrate the National Socialist claim that the Germans were a 'Volk ohne Raum' because there exist 'striking resemblances' ('verblüffende Ähnlichkeiten') 'between the Japanese and German—especially the *present-day* German—Weltanschauung.'⁵⁷ Sawamura Tsutomu dismisses Fanck's *The Samurai's Daughter* 'as no more than an attempt to form Nazi

propaganda out of Japanese raw materials.’⁵⁸ James King also writes that Fanck insisted on “a clear, pro-Fascist message.”⁵⁹ Valerie Weinstein points out that Fanck conflates Buddhist swastika-*manji* and Nazi swastikas in the sequence at the temple to show ‘a kind of cultural *Wahlverwandtschaft* between Japan and Nazi Germany.’⁶⁰ Very tellingly, as Christin Bohnke observes, ‘the shots of the *manji* in the scene with the Shinto priest are cut’ from Itami’s film.⁶¹

After the climactic rescue scene, Teruo and Mitsuko marry and move to the new colony of Manchuria in Northeast China, becoming two of the circa 10,000 to 20,000 young colonists who migrated from the archipelago to Manchuria.⁶² According to Haukamp, in August 1936, the Japanese government approved the plan ‘Millions to Manchuria’: ‘one million Japanese farming households were to be settled in Manchuria within twenty years, each household being provided with 20 hectares of farmland’.⁶³ Both Nazi Germany and imperial Japan shared the fascist ideology of securing more living space (*Lebensraum*). *The Samurai’s Daughter* justifies Japan’s need for more and better land by including numerous shots of the harsh and craggy landscape and of natural disasters (such as earthquakes, typhoons, and erupting volcanos) that, on the one hand, have molded the Japanese into a strong ‘Volk,’ but on the other hand point to Japan’s need for expansion and more arable land. In an early scene (32:05), Teruo shows Gerda the location of Manchuria on a globe and states, ‘This country, *Manchukuo* . . . is twice as large as your Germany or my Japan. There is still new earth in abundance that could feed many more people. But first order and peace must be established. And that is the mission of the Japanese people. We must do an immense amount of development in these countries.’⁶⁴ This speech, delivered via German voiceover, as is the case with any long speech made by a Japanese actor in the film, is typical of the rhetoric that *The Samurai’s Daughter* uses to justify colonialism. The film repeatedly emphasizes the affectionate connection between the Japanese and their land. In one

scene, Teruo lovingly holds up a clod of soil (55:35), and his father responds, ‘It is good earth, but it’s old.’ Toward the end of the film, the father makes a similar point, telling the newlyweds—through a German voiceover—that there are too many Japanese for too little land, justifying Japan’s need for territorial expansion. To that end, the love triangle between Teruo, Gerda, and Mitsuko could only be resolved by the departure of Gerda, which cleared the way for a happy ending—not only for the Japanese couple, but also for the Japanese nation, as the film ends triumphantly in Manchuria. Thus, while acknowledging western influence on Japan, *The Samurai’s Daughter* affirms the unity of the Japanese as a racially pure people and maintains that their solidarity is needed to surmount the challenges facing the nation. The failed interracial relationship could be seen as an allegory of the superficial alliance between Nazi Germany and Japan.

At the very end of Fanck’s film, Teruo places the couple’s newborn son on the soil and tells it to ‘become a child of the earth too,’ indicating that the next generation of Japanese in Manchukuo would be autochthonous and thus ‘rightful’ possessors of the land—yet another example of the film’s blatant justification of Japanese rule over Manchuria. Mitsuko trades smiles with the Japanese Kwantung Army soldier standing nearby before she and her family sit on the ground, and *The Samurai’s Daughter* ends with a disconcerting closeup of the soldier wielding his bayonet, seeming to promote the soldier as a new type of samurai. Itami, on the other hand, shows a faceless soldier in a long shot, minimizing the militant content of the scene.⁶⁵ According to Haukamp, Itami inserted the final shots of the Japanese soldier only unwillingly: ‘In various announcements of the plot, the film ends with Mitsuko laying the baby on the “soft soil. A ray of brilliant sunshine. The end.”’⁶⁶ Itami was politically liberal and an outspoken critic of the Japanese government. According to Haukamp, ‘In “My wish for the end

of the war”, [Itami] condemned all further war efforts as hopeless, cruel struggles, driven forward by a regime incapable of reacting to the true state of affairs.’⁶⁷ Not only Itami’s *New Earth* but also his numerous essays ‘were as critical of ideological and political currents as his trademark “iconoclastic” period films.’⁶⁸ These insights help explain the apparent contradiction between Itami’s liberal and anti-militarist positions and the final episode of Japanese colonization in Manchuria.

The Reception of the Films and Kawakita’s Post-*New Earth* Career

Itami completed *New Earth* in time for the Japanese premiere on 3 February 1937, which was held in Tokyo’s largest theater with nine princes and princesses and the diplomatic corps in attendance. However, the premiere was not a success: the applause was only ‘moderate’ and the reception mixed, which turned out to benefit Fanck. His version premiered in Tokyo one week later, also under the title *New Earth*, and then in the rest of Japan, including Japanese-occupied Manchuria, and achieved box office success. But Japanese reviewers were critical of both versions; for example, one critic complained that in Fanck’s film, ‘Great Buddhist statues were treated as if they wielded an absolute power,’ which could be taken as a native Japanese comment on how Fanck mistakenly treated Buddha as if he were a fascist authority.⁶⁹ Itami did not attend any of the premieres.⁷⁰ In Germany, Fanck’s film was first screened on 23 March 1937 in Berlin, under the title *Die Tochter des Samurai*.⁷¹ The audience included Goebbels, Himmler, other Nazi high-ranking officials, and the Japanese ambassador. The film ran for three weeks in Berlin and then in almost all German cities, selling out in the large ones.⁷² Per Goebbels’s instruction to praise the film as an ‘extraordinary achievement,’ the *Völkische Beobachter*, for example, touted the film as ‘groundbreaking in that it thoroughly breaks ties with the sweet

Butterfly-Romanticism and shows Japan as it really is'.⁷³ Here the Japanese and German perceptions of an authentic representation of Japan obviously diverged. Haukamp regards authenticity as a misleading goal to pursue, setting up false expectations and evaluation criteria.⁷⁴ Authentic to which Japan and what time period? The traditional, the modern, or both? Despite the fact that Fanck's version was criticized by Japanese reviewers, it was better received than Itami's version. The popular success of Fanck's 'inauthentic' and Orientalist version reveals that in the end it was not authenticity that mattered to Japanese spectators. Moreover, it is not known whether the Japanese audience was responding to the film's in/authenticity or to its political messages.

The Samurai's Daughter was intended to strengthen relations between Japan and Nazi Germany, but it alienated China. In early May 1937, the Chinese ambassador requested the German Foreign Ministry to stop screening the film, or at least to cut the final scenes in Manchuria. At the time, German exporters considered the Chinese market more lucrative than Japan, and the Reichswehr was interested in importing materials essential for armament manufacture from China and exporting German weapons in return; moreover, former high-ranking German officers were in China advising Chiang Kai-shek. In light of these circumstances, the German foreign office tried to maintain good relations with both China and Japan. As a compromise, the Propaganda Ministry ordered Terra, the German distributor, to cut the intertitle 'Manchuria' that appeared before the final section of the film, a tactic that fooled no one.⁷⁵ The Chinese premiere of an uncut version followed in June 1937 at the Japanese cinema in the Hongkou district in Shanghai, shortly before the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War on July 7. Although many invitations went out to Chinese guests, the audience was almost exclusively Japanese. The few Shanghainese viewers sat in their seats in silence after the film

ended and did not applaud. The film was overall ‘a humiliation for the Chinese people’ (according to the Chinese film journal *Dian Sheng*), and within days massive protests were mounted by over thirty organizations against the propagandistic film, which was viewed as colluding with Japanese expansionist policies. The Shanghai branch of Tōwa was the supplier of Japanese films on the Chinese market, and as its head, Kawakita was accused of being the mouthpiece of Japanese propaganda.⁷⁶

The pro-Manchukuo nature of *The Samurai's Daughter* raises a difficult question about Kawakita, namely, how to reconcile the contradiction between the cosmopolitan and sinophilic tendencies manifested in his résumé, on the one hand, and his active support for the colonization and conquest of China by the Japanese military, as evidenced by the political agenda of *The Samurai's Daughter*. According to Sierek, Kawakita's first coproduction proved that he had metamorphosed from an initially liberal-minded polyglot into a Japanese nationalist who shared the fascist ideology of expansionism, militarism, and ‘Volk ohne Raum’. But, Sierek suggests, Kawakita was a mild opportunist, not a fanatic.⁷⁷ With the colonial film *New Earth / The Samurai's Daughter*, however, Kawakita set an example for *kokusaku eiga* (films of national politics), a specifically Japanese genre of propaganda film that helped promote the Japanese war economy and disseminated images of Japanese imperialism and colonial endeavors in East and Southeast Asia.⁷⁸ According to Janine Hansen, not only was the ill-fated collaboration symptomatic of the German-Japanese diplomatic relationship, which despite all appearances was fraught with mutual distrust and misunderstanding, but the patriotic and militaristic orientation was also a forerunner of Japanese film policy as it was implemented in the subsequent war years.⁷⁹

Kawakita's second film project also supported a Japan-led Pan-Asian alliance after the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Commissioned by the Japanese government to make a documentary, he produced *The Road to Peace in the Orient* (1937), in which a young Chinese peasant couple learn to appreciate Japanese soldiers as helpers. This propaganda film called for cooperation with the conquerors. In 1939, Kawakita was charged by the Japanese military with working toward a 'filmic colonization of East Asia by the Japanese occupying powers'.⁸⁰ Sierek writes,

No one knew the situation of film politics and the film industry in the allied Nazi Germany so well as Kawakita. He became the key figure of the war propaganda machine, which should not be underestimated. In the process of adapting the legal framework of film production to that of Nazi Germany, Kawakita became director of the newly founded umbrella organization Dai Nippon Bunka Eiga Kokai [Culture of Greater Japan—author]. In this way, the cosmopolitan who had mutated into a henchman of the Axis Powers also ensured that Ufa's long arm left its mark on the global film scene in terms of film law and extended all the way to Tokyo.⁸¹

Already in 1937, Kawakita expressed his admiration for the German film industry's restructuring after 1933. Haukamp writes, "According to Kawakita, the Japanese film world aspired to a similar involvement of the state; in this sense Germany is seen as a model, just as *Samurai's Daughter* is a model and an initiator of further, fruitful ties with Germany and a positive

development for the Japanese industry through cooperation.”⁸² Both Sierek and Haukamp consider Kawakita an opportunist.⁸³

Whereas Kawakita was stationed in Shanghai, his counterpart in the North, Amakasu Masahiko, was the Japanese director of Man’ei Studio in Manchukuo, which he modeled on the fascist film industries in Europe. Like the protagonist Teruo in *The Samurai’s Daughter*, Amakasu and Kawakita were technocrats returning from Germany who later became Japanese occupiers in China. And like Kawakita, Amakasu knew the German film industry very well after a three-year stay in Europe, with visits to Babelsberg and Cinecittà in 1936.⁸⁴ These men restructured the Chinese film industry according to the Ufa model. Kawakita’s bureau of regulation and censorship, Zhonghua United Film Company, had economic, military, and political control over the Chinese film industry. His mission included conquering China as a Tōwa market and distributing Japanese films to Chinese viewers. He managed to persuade the head of Xinhua Studios, the Chinese media tycoon Zhang Shankun, to cooperate with him.

Different from Sierek’s portrayal of Kawakita, Poshek Fu offers a more positive view of Kawakita’s role in Japanese-occupied Shanghai. He points out that Kawakita was able to win over Zhang Shankun as a collaborator by ‘confiding to Zhang in fluent Chinese that he would most likely be the only Japanese to truly understand and genuinely sympathize with the Chinese cause’.⁸⁵ Fu argues that Kawakita adopted a laissez-faire policy toward Shanghai cinema by opting for cooperation over domination, and under his aegis, the movie company made mostly entertainment films without pro-Japanese statements. Sierek, on the contrary, argues that Kawakita commissioned Xinhua to produce films to entertain and politically indoctrinate Japanese occupation soldiers and Chinese viewers. Sierek showed that Kawakita was a Japanese at heart and pursued military and expansionist goals. In an interview Kawakita gave in February

1941, Sierek writes, ‘he openly advocated Japan’s invasion policy in China and supported the actions of the Japanese Imperial Army in Shanghai’, to the point of maintaining that ‘Zhonghua’s involvement in Shanghai should have started ten years earlier’.⁸⁶

When Ufa became Ufi in 1942, a similar process of conglomeration took place in China as Zhonghua was transformed into Zhonglian. Both with Man’ei in Manchukuo and Zhonglian in Shanghai, Amakasu and Kawakita took the Nazi film industry as a model for *Gleichschaltung* in the film sector, namely a ‘model subservient to the government and yet appearing independent from the outside’.⁸⁷ The film industry in China was also given ‘a strictly hierarchical and authoritarian structure, which offered sufficient opportunities for the state-military complex to intervene’.⁸⁸ Sierek writes, ‘So the long arm of Ufa extended to the eastern extremities of East Asia’.⁸⁹ Through key film personnel such as Kawakita and Amakasu, German fascism exerted an influence on East Asia via media and propaganda. Fu and Sierek present two different interpretations of Kawakita’s career. Whereas the producer’s collaboration with two fascist regimes led Sierek to take a more critical view of him, Fu avoids binary depictions of film moguls such as Kawakita as well as Zhang and points to the moral gray areas that arise in resistance and collaboration during war and occupation. Fu notes that ‘Zhang’s friends and defenders have heaped hagiographic praises on Kawakita’ for his ‘consistent support of Chinese cinema’.⁹⁰ When Zhang was later detained, it was Kawakita who intervened to get him released.⁹¹ Thus, to discuss Kawakita’s transnational career, one needs to take both Sierek’s and Fu’s research into consideration and recognize the complexities of film art and politics.

After Japan surrendered, Kawakita returned to Japan in April 1946. He was soon indicted by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) for Japanese war crimes for having made wartime films in China and for his involvement in *New Earth*. Kawakita was on the

list of thirty-one class B defendants accused of ‘inciting to war’, a step above the class C defendants charged with crimes against humanity. But unlike in Germany, Japanese war criminals got away with little punishment. Kawakita was only banned from working for three years before returning to the top of the Tōhō-Tōwa company.⁹²

Conclusion

This essay discussed the troubled Japanese-German filmic collaboration with an eye to the genesis of the project, Itami’s quiet rebellion against Fanck during the filming of his picture, and Kawakita Nagamasa’s career as cultural mediator and film functionary during Japan’s invasion of China. Hack and Fanck approached Kawakita about co-sponsorship at an opportune moment, when Kawakita was likewise seeking to form transnational collaborative enterprises. But the power axis between Nazi Germany and imperial Japan catapulted Kawakita to the height of national and international importance and intertwined his career with war efforts. The collaboration did not turn out as Kawakita had envisioned. Itami’s staunch ~~character and his own~~ political values and beliefs contributed to the duel with Fanck and the failure of the joint film. Kawakita, however, downplayed the conflict between his two directors and pursued further collaborations with Nazi Germany. The differences between Itami and Kawakita also indicate that *New Earth / The Samurai’s Daughter* is not an effective metaphor for the superficial alliance between the countries represented by the two directors. Due in large part to the near-inaccessibility of Itami’s *New Earth*, Fanck’s easily available *Samurai’s Daughter* has come to be seen as the most important coproduction of Nazi Germany and Japan. The film launched Kawakita’s career as a facilitator of Japan’s cinematic subjugation of China. The producer’s prior aspirations to mediate between cultures through film and Fanck’s ambition to represent a

real Japan, as well as Itami's liberal, anti-authoritarian struggles, became engulfed in the volcanic eruptions of the times.

¹ I have not been able to watch Itami's version, which is only available in archives in Japan. For simplicity's sake, the article will refer to the Itami version as *New Earth* and the Fanck version as *The Samurai's Daughter*. But the German title *Die Tochter des Samurai* was not adopted until the German premiere on 23 March 1937 in Berlin. When Fanck's film premiered in Tokyo in February 1937, it used the same title as Itami's version, *New Earth* (Atarashiki tsuchi, 1937). This coproduction has generated a lot of scholarship. It does not happen often that an entire book is devoted to a single film; this coproduction, however, has received this honor twice, from Janine Hansen and Iris Haukamp, in addition to a substantial treatment in Karl Sierek's monograph and discussions in a number of book chapters and articles. Janine Hansen, Christin Bohnke, Karl Sierek, and Iris Haukamp compared the two versions in their work. See Janine Hansen, *Arnold Fancks 'Die Tochter des Samurai': Nationalsozialistische Propaganda und japanische Filmpolitik* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1997); Christin Bohnke, 'The Perfect German Woman: Gender and Imperialism in Arnold Fanck's *Die Tochter des Samurai* and Itami Mansaku's *The New Earth*.' *Women in German Yearbook: Feminist Studies in German Literature & Culture* 33 (2017): 77–100; Karl Sierek, *Der lange Arm der Ufa: Filmische Bilderwanderung zwischen Deutschland, Japan und China 1923–1949* (Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer, 2018); Iris Haukamp, *A Foreigner's Cinematic Dream of Japan: Representational Politics and Shadows of War in the Japanese-German Coproduction 'New Earth' (1937)* (New

York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2021). For unknown reasons, Haukamp does not engage with Sierek's book except in footnote 4.

² Donald Richie, 'The Daughter of the Samurai: a German-Japanese coproduction,' Mori Art Museum. <https://www.mori.art.museum/english/contents/tokyo-berlin/about/img/Daughter.pdf>.

³ Quoted from James King, *Under Foreign Eyes: Western Cinematic Adaptations of Postwar Japan* (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2012) 21; see also Peter B. High, *The Imperial Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the Fifteen Years' War, 1931–1945* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003) 161; Haukamp 65 and 194–195.

⁴ King 21; Haukamp 65.

⁵ Haukamp 63–71.

⁶ Sierek 302.

⁷ Haukamp 64–65.

⁸ Haukamp 150.

⁹ Poshek Fu, 'The Ambiguity of Entertainment: Chinese Cinema in Japanese-Occupied Shanghai, 1941 to 1945', *Cinema Journal* 37, no. 1 (Autumn 1997): 66–84.

¹⁰ Michael Baskett argues that the failed coproduction, together with another failed coproduction between Nazi Germany and Italy shows the near impossibility of a real collaboration between the Axis powers, who were limited to a surface alliance or a 'hollow alliance'. (Michael Baskett, 'All Beautiful Fascists? Axis Film Culture in Imperial Japan', in *The Culture of Japanese Fascism*, ed. Alan Tansman (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009) 212–34, here 214). Following previous scholars, Haukamp also suggests that the failed collaboration serves as 'a

metaphor for Japanese-German wartime relations as a “hollow alliance” (Meskill 1966) between “reluctant allies” (Krug 2001)’ (Haukamp 101).

¹¹ Johanna Margarete Menzel Meskill, *Hitler & Japan: The Hollow Alliance* (New York: Atherton Press, 1966); Johanna Menzel Meskill, *Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan: The Hollow Diplomatic Alliance*, with a new introduction by Thomas Nowotny, Taylor & Francis, 2017.

¹² Haukamp 193–201.

¹³ Haukamp 201–212.

¹⁴ Fanck’s 1973 memoir is often unreliable and self-exonerating. Fanck’s claim that his departure from Marseille was delayed for four days because the Propaganda Ministry rejected his request of financial help for hotel expenses, whereas his Japanese contract partners promptly sent him a generous amount (Fanck 1873: 329–30), was made up (Haukamp 58). Haukamp writes, “In retrospect, Fanck inflated a real event in order to contrast Japanese and German support for his project, which would then prove his distance from the German regime” (211).

¹⁵ Sierek 31–55; Haukamp 31.

¹⁶ Sierek 57–92, 379–381.

¹⁷ Sierek 178.

¹⁸ Sierek 37.

¹⁹ Sierek 270. All translations of Sierek are mine.

²⁰ Haukamp 95–96.

²¹ Haukamp 48–9.

²² Haukamp 94–96.

²³ Hayashi had participated in one of the previous German-Japanese coproductions, *Kagami*, and had also helped translate *Girls in Uniform* (Mädchen in Uniform, Seifuku no shojo), which Kawakita Kashiko had liked and brought back to Japan in 1932 to critical acclaim (Haukamp 58). Hayashi would later participate in *New Earth* as a translator and supervisor for Fanck's version (Haukamp 42).

²⁴ Haukamp xvi and 94; Haukamp's timetable lists the date as March 20, 1934.

²⁵ Haukamp 51.

²⁶ Haukamp 53.

²⁷ Haukamp 56.

²⁸ Haukamp 93, n. 7.

²⁹ Haukamp 89–90.

³⁰ Haukamp 90.

³¹ Sierek 270–278, 294; Hans-Joachim Bieber, “‘Die Tochter des Samurai’: Deutsch-japanische Filmproduktionen in der NS-Zeit,” in *Kultur, Politik und Öffentlichkeit: Festschrift für Jens Flemming*, ed. Dagmar Bussiek and Simona Göbel, 355–77 (Kassel: Kassel University Press, 2009), here 358–361; Haukamp 58; 90; 95–96.

³² Haukamp 25–52.

³³ Haukamp 21.

³⁴ Haukamp 26.

³⁵ Haukamp 52; 163.

³⁶ Haukamp 27, 85–86.

³⁷ Haukamp 59; she put the 18 films in Appendix 1.

³⁸ Haukamp 18.

³⁹ Haukamp 8, 23, 89.

⁴⁰ Haukamp 31-42.

⁴¹ Fanck 1973: 342; cited from Haukamp 15.

⁴² Haukamp 87–88.

⁴³ Haukamp 179–181.

⁴⁴ Haukamp 160.

⁴⁵ Christian W. Spang and Rolf-Harald Wippich, ‘Introduction—from “German Measles” to “Honorary Aryans”’: An Overview of Japanese-German Relations until 1945’, in *Japanese-German Relations, 1895–1945: War, Diplomacy and Public Opinion*, ed. Christian W. Spang and Rolf-Harald Wippich, 1–18 (New York: Routledge, 2006): 11.

⁴⁶ Haukamp 179, 193–201.

⁴⁷ Haukamp 159.

⁴⁸ Haukamp 130. Haukamp does not list Bohnke’s essay in her bibliography.

⁴⁹ Haukamp 159.

⁵⁰ Haukamp 165.

⁵¹ Haukamp 167. Fanck’s film does not include two scenes that appear early in Itami’s version and depict Teruo and Mitsuko as a couple in love. Compared to the Japanese film, the German version presents Teruo’s marriage to Mitsuko as the fulfillment of a duty and not as an expression of romantic love. See Bohnke 91–92.

⁵² Bohnke 81; Haukamp 162.

⁵³ Haukamp 177–179. Bohnke notes that Gerda might be American or British: ‘In Itami’s version, the American and British flags are foregrounded in the ship scene between Gerda and Teruo.... In addition, Gerda speaks English instead of German, suggesting that she might be American or British’ (81).

⁵⁴ Haukamp 164, 181, and 196.

⁵⁵ Haukamp 209.

⁵⁶ “[A]uf den Wunsch meines Führers und im Interesse seiner Außenpolitik auf diesem vorgeschobenen Posten zu stehen” (Fanck, “*Die Tochter des Samurai*,” 10, qtd. in Hansen 40). My translation.

⁵⁷ Hansen 26; Bieber 360.

⁵⁸ King 22.

⁵⁹ King 21.

⁶⁰ Weinstein, Valerie. ‘Reflecting Chiral Modernities: The Function of Genre in Arnold Fanck’s Transnational *Bergfilm*, *The Samurai’s Daughter* (1936–1937)’, in *Beyond Alterity: German Encounters with Modern East Asia*, ed. Qinna Shen and Martin Rosenstock (New York: Berghahn Books, 2014), 34–51, here 44.

⁶¹ Bohnke 81

⁶² Sierek 370.

⁶³ Haukamp 4.

⁶⁴ Itami’s version uses English dubbing, which is uncharacteristic of Itami since he usually adheres to ‘acoustic authenticity’. Thus, Haukamp suggests that Itami himself did not shoot this scene (163).

⁶⁵ Sierek 358–367; Haukamp 183–191.

⁶⁶ Haukamp 161, 185, 189.

⁶⁷ Haukamp 88.

⁶⁸ Haukamp 216; 198–199.

⁶⁹ Baskett 227.

⁷⁰ Bohnke 95; Haukamp 78.

⁷¹ Sierek accuses Fanck of plagiarizing from a novel of the same name by Sugimoto Etsu Inagaki (298, 334). However, Hans-Joachim Bieber points out that the similarity goes no further than the title, and the publisher did not take any action because sales of the book benefited from the film's publicity (366).

⁷² Bieber 364–365; Hansen 62–86; Sierek 367–376; Haukamp 5, 71–79.

⁷³ High 163; Bieber 366.

⁷⁴ Haukamp 217.

⁷⁵ Bieber 367; Hansen 40, 44, 194; Sierek 374; Haukamp 91.

⁷⁶ Sierek 373–375; Haukamp 91–92.

⁷⁷ Sierek 275–277.

⁷⁸ Sierek 286.

⁷⁹ Hansen 2.

⁸⁰ Sierek 396; Fu 68.

⁸¹ Sierek 379.

⁸² Haukamp 79.

⁸³ Sierek 516. Haukamp 205.

⁸⁴ Sierok 402.

⁸⁵ Fu 69.

⁸⁶ Sierok 477.

⁸⁷ Sierok 402.

⁸⁸ Sierok 402.

⁸⁹ Sierok 403.

⁹⁰ Fu 73.

⁹¹ Fu 80.

⁹² Sierok 531–542; Haukamp 93.