2015

Legacies of Place and Power: From Military Base to Freeport Zone

Victoria Reyes
Bryn Mawr College, vreyes@brynmawr.edu

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.brynmawr.edu/cities_pubs

Custom Citation

This paper is posted at Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr College. http://repository.brynmawr.edu/cities_pubs/32

For more information, please contact repository@brynmawr.edu.
Legacies of Place and Power: From Military Base to Freeport Zone

Victoria Reyes
Bryn Mawr College

Abstract
This article examines the place-making of global borderlands—semi-autonomous, foreign-controlled geographical locations geared toward international exchange. I use the case study of the Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ), Philippines as an example of a global borderland that resides within a space formerly occupied by a colonial power. I show how elite Filipinos adapted and transformed the spatial boundaries the U.S. military initially erected. The earlier boundaries differentiating Americans from Filipinos and military personnel from civilians, helped the native elite to perpetuate familiar patterns of inequality based on nationality, class, and skin color. This differentiation occurs through (1) the indirect and direct exclusion of the poor vis-à-vis the SBFZ’s socio-spatial organization, and (2) the maintenance of cultural practices (litter, traffic) and moral discourses (of what is “good” and “bad”) formerly associated with the base, so that the SBFZ remains distinct from the surrounding city of Olongapo. Places of power have legacies, structural and spatial residues that continue to influence cultural practices and discourses even after the original uses of a place are transformed.

Key words: place, history, military, Philippines, culture, spatial organization, Freeport zones, postcolonial

City & Community 14(1):1-26
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, sociologists have begun to recognize the importance of *place*—a geographic location filled with meaning that is both an independent variable and a mediator of social life (Gieryn, 2000; Paulsen, 2004). This article examines the place-making of global borderlands—semi-autonomous, foreign-controlled geographical locations geared toward international exchange (Reyes, in press). Global borderlands include sites such as overseas military bases, special economic zones, tourist resorts, embassies, headquarters of international organizations, and international branch campuses of universities. These locations are particularly important to examine because they are spaces where the first and third worlds meet, and where unequal interactions between people of different nationalities, classes, races/ethnicities, and genders are routinized. They are also found all over the world. For example, the United States had a total of 750 overseas bases in 45 countries and territories in 2010 (United States Department of Defense, 2010, p. 9); there are over 3,000 Special Economic Zones in 135 countries (FIAS, 2008); and tourism is the “world’s biggest business” (Goldstone, 2001, p. 2). Each of these institutions transforms local economies and involves unequal financial, cultural, and social exchange.

Studies of place and space tend to focus on spatial organization and/or social and cultural meanings. This article follows in the footsteps of urban cultural sociologists who emphasize how these two factors mutually reinforce one another (Paulsen, 2004; Borer, 2006). To examine global borderlands, I conduct a case study of the Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ), a postcolonial site in the Philippines. The U.S. took control of the islands in 1898, and from 1901 until 1992, the SBFZ was home to the former U.S. Subic Bay Naval
Base (SBNB). After the U.S. military’s withdrawal, local Filipinos occupied the space and transformed it into a Freeport. It is a strategic research site in which to study the varied forms of interaction that occur between groups precisely because of the combination of its colonial military history and its current focus of attracting international businesses and tourists. Additionally, because the SBFZ occupies the same physical space as the former SBNB, it allows one to investigate how colonial socio-spatial organization, cultural practices, and moral discourses still influence the modern era.

Given that local Filipinos took over the physical location of the SBNB and transformed it into a Freeport Zone, what happened to the leftover built environment and socio-spatial organization of the U.S. military? Do certain American practices continue, and if so, how and why? What meanings do local workers, local visitors, and foreign visitors give to this space? To answer these questions I combine what Borer (2006) identifies as the Urban Cultural perspective, which emphasizes that narratives and symbolism “play essential roles in the social life of cities” (p. 183), and the Urban Political Economy perspective, which stresses that culture depends on broader structural forces. I find that the boundaries initially erected by the US military, which served to differentiate Americans from Filipinos and military personnel from civilians, were adopted and transformed by elite Filipinos to perpetuate familiar patterns of inequality based on nationality, class, and skin color. From these patterns, I argue that places of power have legacies, structural and spatial residues that continue to influence interactions, practices, and discourses even after the transformation of a place’s original uses.

I first outline the influence of socio-spatial organization and history on cities, then describe how boundary-making cultural practices and moral discourses differentiate
places. Next, I briefly introduce the SBFZ setting and discuss my data and methodology. Finally, I present my findings: how the SBFZ’s socio-spatial organization directly and indirectly excludes the poor, and how cultural practices related to order and disorder and moral discourses of “good” and “bad”—both formerly associated with the military base—continue to differentiate the SBFZ from the surrounding city of Olongapo.

INEQUALITY AND POST-COLONIAL SOCIO-SPATIAL ORGANIZATION

Research on spatial organization examines relative locations, geographical patterns, and these patterns’ consequences (Logan, 2012). Social relations are spatially and hierarchically organized, and a large body of sociological research identifies these patterns and consequences (Massey, 2005; Gottdiener, 1985). Territoriality—the control of space—is a social process, and “stratification of places” creates advantages and disadvantages (Lyman and Scott, 1967; Logan, 1978). In this way, power and privilege are reproduced socially and spatially.

Much of the literature on cities, spaces, and inequality focuses on global cities—their internal spatial polarization and where they rank globally (Forrest, La Grange, and Yip, 2004; Sassen, 2001[1991]; Smith and Timberlake, 2001). The literature on colonial and postcolonial settings also shows how power and privilege are reproduced through space. For example, the physical patterns of colonial urbanization reflected socioeconomic classes and distinctions between groups (Yeoh, 2000; Shlay and Rosen, 2010; Myers, 1995). In colonial Vietnam, this is seen through the differences between residences in the French Quarter versus elsewhere, and who occupies which residences (Peycam, 2013).

In Southeast Asia, cities are also characterized by the elite’s increasing shift from public to private space (Yeoh, 2005; Connell, 1999). For example, Manila is an
increasingly privatized city, where public spaces are transforming into private ones. The result is a stark socio-spatial polarization between rich and poor. Similar to gated communities and fortified enclaves found around the world, the wealthy live in carefully planned and self-governed spaces that exclude the working poor and unhoused (Shatkin, 2005/2006; Shatkin, 2008; Berner and Korff, 1995; Porio, 2012).

However, these highly segregated places—whether upscale malls, exclusive residential communities, or tax-free economic zones—are often imposed on local spaces, displacing the poor. In contrast, when the American military took over Olongapo City, it was still a small fishing village that housed a small and unorganized Spanish artillery. Once the base was erected, its gated entrances served as barriers against unwanted Filipinos—non-workers and unescorted guests. These barriers were institutionalized over a period of almost one hundred years. However, once the U.S. military withdrew, local Filipinos physically took over the SBNB to keep it from being looted, and petitioned the national government to create the Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ). This area went from housing one type of global borderland for almost one century, to housing a different type, spurred by native efforts. This raises important questions. What happened to the leftover American military structures? Did locals strive to maintain, or erase and cover any connection with the American-built physical structures and spatial layout?

BOUNDARY-MAKING CULTURAL PRACTICES

The meanings that people use to define themselves and places directly and indirectly involve boundary making by differentiating between “us” and “them” or “ours” and “theirs.” Geographic boundaries carry symbolic meanings that enforce social boundaries (Lamont and Molnar, 2002). Chicago School and contemporary ethnographies show how
the spatial organization of where people work, live, avoid, and visit influence their lives (e.g. Drake and Cayton, 1993 [1945]; Duneier, 2000). Places’ imageries, characters, and cultures also have implications for policy, and symbolize “who belongs,” thus implying who does not belong (Molotch, Freudenburg, and Paulsen, 2000; Zukin, 1995).

The meanings that people assign to cultural objects are not static; rather, they are malleable and depend on context (Griswold, 1987; Milligan, 1998). For postcolonial spaces, these meanings and practices become particularly important and are continually negotiated, contested, and manipulated to promote certain ideologies and distinctions including those related to national and cultural identities, myths, and economic advancement (Clarke, 2007; Yeoh, 1996; Kusno, 1998). For example, Low (1993) demonstrates how postcolonial Mexico City is a symbolic site of tension because discourses over excavation rights and control over space include references to the past, while Yeoh (2000) details how Singapore’s government officials sought to reshape the nation’s historical and contemporary narratives by transforming ethnic communities into “Historic Districts.” Similarly, Manila’s segregation derives not only from the city’s socio-spatial organization, but also from people’s “sense of place,” where “certain types of places (enclaves or slums) or the people associated with those places elicit certain introspective states (mental states, including affect and motivation), which, in turn, predispose certain segregating practices” (Garrido, 2013a, p. 1344). These practices include varied consumption patterns, including housing (Connell, 1999).

The segregated spaces of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are global borderlands. They are tax-free areas within countries that are meant to attract foreign businesses and investment, and the dynamics that separate these enclosed spaces from their surrounding
communities are instances of the privatization and segregation of cities. Much of the research on SEZs focuses on structures and practices that have created, increased, and perpetuated the feminization of global labor and the gendered discourses and organization of work which often involves low-wage employment with minimal labor protections and job security (Mills, 2003; Nash and Fernandez-Kelly, 1983; Lee, 1995).

While some scholars have argued that SEZs represent “exceptional spaces of neoliberalism” (Ong, 2006), others contend that workers experience these zones as a continuation of the informal labor processes that occur outside them (Chen, 1995; Cross, 2010). A key focus is how these spaces are differentiated from others by specific practices. For example, Sklair (1991) and Bach (2010) show how the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone and its surrounding villages maintain distinct appearances through practices related to order and disorder, which are also associated with particular discourses. For example, these differences create a symbolic story—“if Shenzhen is a narrative about speed, progress and civilization, its villages serve as the narrative’s other” (Bach, 2010, p. 422). Similarly, in Philippine FZs, corporations can avoid “unwanted,” pro-union workers and cultivate a compliant workforce through the practice of requiring barangay (neighborhood) clearance passes (Kelly, 2001). As an American military base, the SBNB had particular practices that differentiated it from Olongapo City. Now that it is a Philippine Freeport Zone, are there particular cultural practices from the American military era that continue, or have local Filipinos erased these associations? If certain practices continue, what role do they play in the current place-making of the SBFZ?

MORALITY AND PLACE

Morality and moral discourses are another way to construct boundaries. Like
cultural boundaries, moral boundaries reflect structural conditions, geographic locations, and lifestyles, and are based on group characteristics (Lamont and Molnar, 2002). By moral discourses, I mean the socially and historically constructed “understandings of good and bad, right and wrong, worthy and unworthy that vary between persons and between social groups” (Hitlin and Vaisey, 2013, p. 55).

One type of moral ordering revolves around dirt and pollution. Mary Douglas (2008 [1966]) argues that categorizations of “dirty” and “clean” are products of systemic ordering and classification. Societies use different definitions of acceptability and prohibitions, and these reflect symbolic patterns that maintain status and social order by shaping social relations. For example, in the U.S., litter is perceived as a sign of disorder, something negative, unwanted, and avoided, and an indicator of a “bad” neighborhood (Sampson and Raudenbush, 2004; Wilson and Kelling, 1982). Littered neighborhoods, or people who live in them, are seen as “dirty” and “dangerous,” whereas other neighborhoods and people are seen as “clean” and “safe.” These distinctions reflect and maintain social stratification.

American colonialism in the Philippines also provides an example of how these boundaries are constructed, because it was rooted in efforts to “civilize” Filipinos through practices related to hygiene and the construction of “healthy” versus “diseased” (Anderson 2006). In modern Metro Manila, gated communities and other policed and exclusionary zones are similarly linked to notions of order as “good.” These communities provide a respite from the disorder of the rest of the city (Murphy and Hogan, 2012). Indeed, Garrido (2013b) specifies that the elites’ exclusive spaces—upscale shopping malls, residential communities, and business centers—are seen as “modern” and “rational,” a
“model” that serves as a direct contrast to the “disorder” of the rest of Manila. This differentiation of space by morality and order also extends to Manila’s public parks (Yotsumoto, 2013).

Another type of moral ordering revolves around overseas military bases, a particular type of global borderland. Many researchers have examined bases’ symbolic representations, linking them to disparities in class structure, material goods, national identity, and crimes in places such as Okinawa, Korea, Vietnam, and the Philippines (Inoue, 2004; Morris and Dunkelberger, 1998; Cooley and Marten, 2006; Ralston and Keeble, 2009). In particular, U.S. overseas military bases are often seen as an extension of America’s empire, and researchers focus on the immoralities associated with base life, including prostitution, sexism, racism, gender-based crimes, environmental hazards and the impact they have on the next generation, the extralegal status of soldiers, and the maintenance of political and economic domination (Go and Foster, 2003; Schirmer and Shalom, 1987; Lutz 2009).

In this article, I refer to hegemony—the historically and socially constructed ideals and values of a dominant actor that are imposed on others (Gramsci, 2010[1971])—and to the disparate power imbalances that exist between the U.S. and Philippines, where power is seen as the ability of an actor “to carry out his own will despite resistance” (Weber, 1978, p. 53). I focus on both parties and note how the non-hegemon, or the actor with less power (in this case, Philippine officials), still has agency and can manipulate the “rules of the game” to achieve its own aims.

I purposely do not use the term “neocolonialism,” because I believe referring to hegemony or power imbalances is a more accurate portrayal of U.S.–Philippine relations.
The differences in the global fields—a relational approach to studying the material and cultural dynamics within the international arena (Go, 2008)—during America’s colonial era and today are distinct, and should not be overlooked. In the colonial age, an imperial power could kill with impunity, and rule its colony, directly or indirectly, as ruthlessly or benevolently as it wished, with little concern for other world powers. Today, however, states have audiences—governmental, international, non-governmental, and other civil actors—that can hold them accountable (the varied impact of this accountability is an empirical question), and these actors can mobilize technology to broaden the impact of their messages and critique worldwide those who overstep their limits. These constraints influence how states act. Additionally, a focus on neocolonialism tends to downplay local actors’ agency in the shaping the foreign bases, while I focus precisely on the agency of various local actors.

Though the scholarship that focuses on overseas military bases tends to focus on the people who are most disenfranchised, the U.S. military cannot and/or would not maintain a presence where it is universally unwanted. Indeed, local political elites often desire a military presence. This allows the U.S. to maintain bases in foreign countries (Cooley, 2008; Thompson, 1975). This leads to important questions regarding the variability of discourses associated with the base and other types of global borderlands, and how these differ depending on whether people lived in the area, worked inside the particular global borderland in their community, or were excluded. I am particularly interested in locals who worked with and/or visited both the former U.S. military base and the current SBFZ—what are their understandings and thoughts regarding these exclusive spaces? How do they compare this space to the surrounding Olongapo City? Given that the SBFZ
occupies the same physical space as the former SBNB, do discourses associated with the American military continue to influence the moral ordering of the SBFZ and Olongapo City, and if so, how?

SUBIC BAY FREEPORT ZONE, PHILIPPINES

While under American colonial rule, Subic Bay came to house the United States’ largest overseas naval base. SBNB was home to the Navy’s Seventh Fleet; it was composed of 30,380 acres, five major facilities, and a refugee center on Grande Island (Bowen, 1986). These facilities were strategically significant for the U.S. and economically and politically important for the Philippines (United States, 1965; United States, 1985; United States, 1986; McLaurin III, 1990; Storey and Thayer, 2001). Under the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States, the U.S. did not pay rent for the bases; however, these bases were bundled with millions of dollars in economic and military aid, the levels of which were continually negotiated (United States, 1988).

Philippine politicians, particularly Ferdinand Marcos and Corazon Aquino, were adept at manipulating the bases’ symbolism and ideology to further political agendas (Suter, 1986). For example, Marcos was skilled at manipulating public platforms to make demands on the U.S. for his domestic constituents, while simultaneously negotiating with U.S. officials in private and ensuring them of his support (United States, 1991; Thompson, 1975; Cooley, 2008). Similarly, Aquino\(^1\) was able to unite a broad range of coalitions, including anti-American and anti-base movements, to form the People’s Power Movement that ousted Marcos from power (Cristobal and Gregor, 1987). However, Aquino’s anti-base rhetoric was not permanent. Before her election, she softened her stance and
proposed a popular referendum to decide the matter (United States, 1986). She did so not only because of the importance of American aid, but also because local public opinion polls suggested that a majority preferred the military to stay, and various ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) partners encouraged the retention of the bases (United States, 1985; United States, 1991; United States, 1992; United States, 1986; Chung, 2004). Negotiations to extend the agreement were in progress when Typhoon Yunya and the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo destroyed Clark Air Force Base (CAFB). This caused the U.S. to withdraw from Clark, and significantly changed the negotiations.  

Although U.S. and Philippine officials reached an agreement that included the SBNB, but not the CAFB, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed treaty that fell shy of the two-thirds majority required for ratification. Aquino initially pushed to put the issue to a public vote; however, she eventually supported the Senate’s decision (United States, 1991).  

Although the base was dismantled in 1992, this did not indicate the end of the U.S. military in Subic or in the Philippines. In addition to continuing to honor the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty that unites the Philippines and U.S. when either is attacked in the Pacific, in 1998, the two governments signed the Visiting Forces Agreement, which details the rights and responsibilities of each nation when U.S. military and civilian personnel visit the Philippines for military training and exercises. Some have always contested the U.S. military presence in the Philippines, and the symbolism of this relationship can be seen through the 2005–2009 Subic Rape Case. “Nicole,” a pseudonym given to the victim by the courts and media to protect her identity, was allegedly raped by Lance Corporal Daniel Smith in the SBFZ. He was initially found guilty of rape by the Philippine court system, but the decision was overturned on appeal. The media and some judges saw this case as
representing continued U.S. hegemony and Philippine dependence.

The unequal relationship between the two continues today. In 2012, the U.S. accounted for 10.22 percent ($7.55 billion) of imports, and 12.26 percent ($8.85 billion) of exports, while the Philippines received $129,434,000 in non-military aid and $27,000,000 in U.S. military aid. However, the economic role of Asian and Pacific countries is steadily increasing. For example, the Philippines received 12.64 percent ($9.34 billion) of its imports and sent 23.04 percent ($16.6 billion) of its exports to China and 11.35 percent ($8.39 billion) of its imports and 13.12 percent ($9.47 billion) of its exports to Japan.

The end of a permanent U.S. base marked the beginning of the SBFZ. In anticipation of the military pullout, the Philippine government created the SBFZ through Republic Act 7227 that laid out the goals of the SBFZ. The SBFZ is a “separate customs territory” aimed to be a “self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center that generate[s] employment opportunities in and around the zone and [that] attract[s] and promote[s] productive foreign investments.” Although businesses in the zone do not have to pay taxes, they do have to pay a flat rate—originally three percent of their gross income—allocated thus: “one percent (1%) each to the local government units affected by the declaration of the zone in proportion to their population area, and … a development fund of one percent (1%) … to be utilized for the development of municipalities outside the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, and other municipalities contiguous to base areas.” Adhering to environmental standards, including maintaining the forests inside the SBFZ, and establishing educational and medical institutions, are also part of this founding document.

In this text, the goal of the SBFZ was to create a self-sustaining, tax-free zone
geared toward foreign investment, while simultaneously generating profit to better its surrounding communities. However, the handbook designed to regulate and outline the specific rules of the SBFZ delineated particular rights, including, but not limited to tax-free incentives for Filipino and foreign SBFZ residents. Non-residents were limited to how much they could purchase and take out of the SBFZ each month, though consumption within the area was unlimited. SBFZ passes were also required to separate SBFZ residents, employers, and employees from those whom did not have any SBFZ affiliation.

The SBFZ functions very similar to a city, where the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), the governing body of the SBFZ, regulates everything inside its borders—from trash collection to security vis-à-vis its own police force. I examine the SBFZ Harbor Point mall, in particular, because its April 2012 opening brought with it an influx of locals who normally would not enter the area. It thus provides an opportunity to examine how racial/ethnic, class, and nationality distinctions interact with potentially changing cultural meanings and institutions associated with global borderlands (see Figure 1).

[Figure 1 about here]

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

This article is based on nine months of fieldwork, conducted over three time periods in a single year. In the spirit of classical ethnographic studies (e.g. Gans, 1962; Stack, 1974), I moved into an apartment in Olongapo City, outside the SBFZ, to conduct participant observation of daily life (e.g., shopping at local food markets, using local transportation, visiting local businesses, and volunteering with organizations). I focused on observing the differences between being inside or outside the SBFZ, to which I
traveled almost daily. My ethnographic data include observations of popular spaces of interactions and non-interactions with a particular focus on differences in gender, class, and nationality, and between facilities geared toward foreigners and locals. I also paid close attention to not only “what they say” but “what they do,” as well as “what is there” and “what is not there.”

To better understand the various meanings different types of people attach to this place, I also conducted 47 in-depth, semi-structured interviews of foreign visitors, local visitors, and local workers, as well as a survey of hotel managers inside the SBFZ. In-depth interviews help researchers learn meanings and collective understandings (Orbuch, 1997). Interviews with foreign visitors were conducted in English. I am also an intermediate speaker of Filipino (Tagalog), one of the Philippines’ national languages, and interviews with local workers and local visitors were conducted in Tagalog, except when interviewees requested English. I recruited interviewees by handing out flyers in Harbor Point mall, one of the SBFZ’s most intensively used spaces. Initial respondents then referred others, making this a snowball sample.

Five of the seventeen Harbor Point employees interviewed were male, twelve were female. Only two (one male, one female) were un-partnered—they had neither a boyfriend/girlfriend nor a spouse. Most contributed to their family’s income by giving money directly to their family on payday or by sending money to the province if they were renting a room in the area. Harbor Point mall employees were paid a range from 330 to 491 Philippine pesos (Php) per day, which translates to 5,520Php to 7,920Php a month, based on a six-day work week. Employees of other SBFZ businesses may differ in their salary. The local Filipino visitors I interviewed came from a broader spectrum of
socioeconomic statuses. For example, a Filipino contractor to the SBFZ’s government made 100,000 Php monthly, while the two schoolteachers I interviewed from a non-SBFZ neighborhood made 10,000 Php and 20,000 Php per month, respectively. Foreign visitors also came from varied socio-economic statuses. Missionaries raised money prior to their trip, while a Peace Corps Volunteer made 150 Php per day—less than Harbor Point employees. In contrast, an Australian businessman who recently started a SBFZ business estimates his yearly salary to be one million Philippine pesos per year, plus an additional 18,000 Australian dollars (AUD). At a 36 PhP to 1AUD exchange rate, this amounts to 1,648,000 Php per year or 137,333 Php per month—more than the government contractor previously mentioned. Similarly, a British businessman did not want to reveal a range of his yearly or monthly income because he made “quite a lot” of money. In sum, there are stark asymmetries in wages among and between these groups.

Finally, I collected documents that detail rules and regulations from the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), the governing body of the SBFZ, and I conducted more than a dozen informal, informational interviews with SBMA officials and other people I encountered during my daily routine. I also collected documents from the Digital National Security Archives and the National Archives and Records Administration’s Access to Archival Databases—which provided important information about SBNB—and 428 U.S. and Republic of the Philippines (R.P.) legal cases using Lexis-Nexis, Westlaw, lawphil.net, and ChanRobles’ Virtual Law Library.

Using a cultural and relational analytic approach to the data, which emphasizes the role of culture and relationships in economic activity (Zelizer 2005), I highlight the SBFZ’s socio-spatial organization, cultural practices, and moral discourses, and how these
compare to Olongapo City. By culture, I refer to the complex, rule-like structures that are shaped by individual and societal resources, and which people use strategically, but inconsistently (DiMaggio, 1997; Swidler, 1986). I also account for what Lamont (1992) calls proximate structures—the individual resources people use and encounter in their environment—and remote structures—the societal characteristics of the nations in which people live. This approach highlights how people’s discourses, practices, and understandings shape, and are shaped by, their own, their community’s, and their nation’s cultural, social, and economic backgrounds. By interviewing workers and visitors to SBFZ, I focus specifically on those included in this space. In doing so, I chose not to focus on those excluded from these sites, including prostitutes, activists, and the poor. However, these voices have been the focus of critical and feminist researchers, who use the bases and Freeport Zones as symbols of U.S. imperialism and Philippine dependence (Kirk, 1998; Enloe, 2000 [1990]; Go, 2011).

A note on reflexivity: I am a mixed Filipino American academic woman whose family continues to reside in the Subic barangay (neighborhood) of Olongapo City. In examining the experiences of middle- and upper-class Filipinos and foreigners in the Philippines, I am documenting a place and writing about lives that, while somewhat familiar, are also often relatively disadvantaged compared to my own. How might my social position affect my work? One major concern is that it might limit or change what my Filipino respondents say when discussing their perceptions of the U.S. However, in previous research in the Philippines, I interviewed activists, students, and academics who shared the aforementioned critical perspective. In another project, I spoke with mothers of Amerasian children, children whose fathers are American military men and whose
mothers are Filipinas. One of my interviewees discussed her frustration at being used by researchers and her distaste for the American military. In my experience, people in the Philippines tend to share their anti-U.S. and anti-military views easily; in some cases, people were even more eager to talk to me because they assumed that as a Filipino American, I shared this perspective.

STRATIFICATION OF SPACE

The Setting

The U.S. military built the “Main” or Magsaysay Gate, and it was the SBNB’s primary pedestrian entrance for U.S. and Philippine military personnel and civilians (see Figure 2). Around the gate are signs. Some are official, warning of a curfew for minors or that all employees and students must have their IDs visible. Others advertise events at SM mall—the mall just outside the SBFZ, as well as Harbor Point—the mall just inside the FZ, and other venues. There is a guard station at the gate, and the door is often wide open, with two or three guards sitting and/or standing around it. The guards, with guns and batons holstered on their hips, watch people as they walk through the gate’s queues. Daily, I observed students and workers checking their lanyards to make sure their IDs were easily seen.

[Figure 2 about here]

The Main Gate is one of many structures taken over by SBMA officials and Filipino volunteers when the military withdrew and left behind an estimated $8 billion in infrastructure (Bowen Jr, Leinbach, and Mabazza, 2002). The spatial layout of these facilities was originally planned to differentiate officers from enlisted men, and work areas from leisure areas. How did local Filipinos use the leftover built environment and socio-
spatial organization? I argue that elite Filipinos adapted the spatial legacies left behind by a former colonial and military power to reproduce inequalities in two ways, through the direct and indirect exclusion of the poor.

*Direct Exclusion of the Poor, Preference for Foreigners*

The Philippines is a class-based society with racial and ethnic disparities that were institutionalized during Spanish rule. These racial/ethnic and skin color boundaries are not a definitive color line (DuBois, 1903); rather, they rely on a more permeable color gradient. With the exception of indigenous groups such as the Aetas, who share a distinct phenotype and continue to be displaced and occupy the lowest rung of the socio-economic and educational ladders, Philippine race relations are similar to those found in Brazil, where race refers to skin color or physical appearance, and where national dialogues of race mixing (of the Spanish in particular) are romanticized (Telles, 2004). For example, high-status, light-skinned urban families of Spanish descent are at the top, followed by those of Filipino-Chinese descent, and indigenous, dark-skinned Filipinos are at the bottom of the hierarchy (Karnow, 1989; Francia, 2010). Additionally, when the U.S. military withdrew, it left behind an estimated 50,000 Amerasians, children with Filipina mothers and American military fathers (De Leon, 2012); these children, particularly those with African American fathers, are also routinely discriminated against (Gastardo-Conaco and Israel-Sobritchea, 1999).

Philippine class and racial/ethnic inequalities are evident in the direct and indirect exclusion of the poor, who are often dark-skinned, from the SBFZ. The direct exclusion occurs through the control over who enters. The first step in this process relies on the bridge leading to the gated entrance. Aside from the holiday season, vendors selling food,
gum, candy, and the like stay near the bridge’s entrance, with only rosary sellers and the
*mga pulubi* (beggars) operating further down the bridge, providing a setting of routinized
unequal interactions. The vendors and *pulubi* have a captive audience passing through: the
relatively more wealthy foreign and Filipino workers and visitors to the SBFZ.

The guarded entrance to the SBFZ serves as a barrier against these interactions,
keeping out *mga pulubi* and informal vendors. SBMA laws require all vendors in the
SBFZ to be registered, and require residents, employers, employees, and students to apply
and pay for SBMA IDs, which serve as gate passes. The exclusion is normalized, and it is
very rare for vendors and beggars to try to enter the prohibited area. In the nine months I
traveled daily to the SBFZ, I witnessed this happening twice, and the guards turned them
away. The IDs serve as an entrance pass, but daily shoppers and visitors are not required
to have them. Signs inform the public that guards have the authority to search any people,
bags, and items entering or leaving the area (Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, 1992).
Aside from gate pass requirements, no formal laws specify which categories of people are
allowed or denied entry. In an informal conversation, a Harbor Point worker said that
there are no formal laws, but that *mga pulubi* are kept out to maintain order. An SBMA
Law Enforcement official I interviewed clarified in a follow-up email:

*There are no specific rules as to who are “allowed” to enter the Subic Bay Freeport Zone ... as it says, Freeport ... so everyone is welcome, for as long as they obey the laws being implemented, i.e. traffic rules (with or without a SBMA police on the road, they have to follow the rules. na-observe mo naman un dba [you observed that, no] when u were here. It's like, un kasi ang 'na-impart ng mga [because want to impart the] US serviceman when the area was still a U.S. Naval Base. kaya [able to] strictly enforced ang traffic rules). Under Chapter X, Other Provisions, Section 97, Security: Function of SBMA Security Force. SBMA security force agents shall police and maintain law and order within the boundaries of the Subic Bay*
The guards’ authority to search serves as one way to legally enforce the informal norms of exclusion by stopping people based on their presentation of self. As my informants noted, this is because rich and poor Filipinos are easily identified via their clothing, shoes, and general appearance. These taken-for-granted differences are evident to workers and visitors alike. The policing of the gate and the marketing of the SBFZ ensures that this space is a segmented marketplace, replicating hierarchies based on class and nationality, from which the poor are kept out, and visitors who stay inside do not encounter the vast poverty that dots the landscape right outside the gates.

Denying entrance is just one way to enforce this norm of exclusion. The other is preferential treatment of foreigners. For example, in my daily trips to and from the SBFZ, I was never stopped by a guard nor did I ever see another foreigner stopped, whether they were military or civilian, and regardless of their race/ethnicity or skin color. Additionally, along with their dependents, any foreigner who is able to invest at least $250,000 in the SBFZ, or any foreign retirees who have a pension or who work less than 750 hours during the year but make at least $50,000, can be granted a permanent SBFZ resident visa, circumventing the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, 1992). All of this constitutes an institutionalized and very visible form of segregation and preferential treatment based on wealth and nationality. It is clear to locals that the SBFZ is for foreigners and middle- to upper-class Filipinos. That foreigners receive preferential treatment is not an obvious finding. At various times and in various places around the world, foreigners are often viewed with suspicion. Yet, in global
borderlands, foreigners of varied nationalities are actively cultivated.

*Indirect Exclusion*

Colonial inequalities also persist today in the form of indirect exclusion of the relatively poor via the SBFZ’s spatial layout. The Central Business District (CBD) is the main hub of daily activity. It has restaurants, universities, hotels, Harbor Point mall, SBMA offices, the boardwalk, docks, and a ferry to Grande Island. These service-based places may appear at first glance to be the Philippine equivalent of cosmopolitan canopies, places where civility and kindness are institutionalized, regardless of race, class, gender, or age (Anderson, 2011), but a closer look reveals that inequalities based on nationalities, race/ethnicity, gender, and class are interwoven into these very spaces and interactions. Foreigners and Filipinos travel to SBFZ precisely because of these inequalities.

Reflecting characteristics of American suburban sprawl rather than a more typical city in a less-developed country (Duany, Plater-Zyberk and Speck, 2010; Drakakis-Smith, 2000), the areas within the FZ are arranged into distinct clusters for technical, manufacturing, shipping, service, and retail businesses. Leaving the main hub of the CBD requires transportation. Popular Philippine modes of public transportation such as jeepneys (originally American WWII jeeps), trikes (motorcycles with side cars for passengers), and pedicabs (bicycles with side cabs for passengers or cargo) are not allowed in the FZ. Because two of the main duty-free stores, Royal Subic and PureGold Duty Free, are in Gateway Park, about a 5- to 7-minute drive away from the CBD, the companies provide free shuttles for shoppers. There are also small, white shuttles that serve the same functions as jeepneys, with fare-based transportation with specified routes. However, they are stripped of the personalized decorations that characterize jeepneys.
Three highways, Rizal, Argonaut, and Corregidor, link these various areas together, but aside from the free shuttles to the duty-free stores, employer-provided transportation, and the white shuttles, expensive taxis or private vehicles are the only means of travel. These are financially out of reach for the vast majority of Olongapo City residents. An average family of 4.5 living in Central Luzon made 139,000 Php (Philippine pesos), or $3,390, in 2009 (Philippines National Statistical Coordination Board, 2009). This translates to 386Php or $9 per day for the entire family. Taxi rides start at 50Php around the CBD. A one-way ride to Zoobic Safari costs 400Php, more than an entire family’s daily income. Taking into account the cost of transportation and not including the price of admission (500Php per person), a fun-filled day at the zoo is out of the question for most.

The SBFZ also has three gated residential communities. Living in these areas requires vehicular transportation. Domestic workers travel on the aforementioned shuttles, and although residents could also use these shuttles, in practice they do not. Transportation is another marker of distinction. The location of these communities serves two purposes: blocking residents who are unable to afford the more expensive SBFZ rent, and not allowing unwanted persons into the area. It prevents involuntary class/ethnic interaction. These communities and other SBFZ establishments that cater to foreigners and upper-class Filipinos also maintain standard American amenities such as an American toilet with a lid, toilet paper, running water, hot water, and air conditioning.

Despite being located within the SBFZ, the bathrooms in the SBMA office buildings do not have toilet seats, nor do they offer toilet paper. In contrast to the buildings catering to foreigners and upper-class Filipinos, these buildings maintain the
norms of bringing your own toilet paper and squatting over the toilet that are ubiquitous in Philippine places outside the SBFZ. Similarly, while the beach alongside the boardwalk in the CBD is free to use, there is at least one SBFZ hotel and beach that, similar to beach-front resorts and hotels located on the National Highway running from Olongapo City to surrounding barangays (neighborhoods), charges admission to use the beach and for toilet paper. In general, the SBFZ borders signify a place for rich Filipino and foreigners. However, within it there also are differences in basic amenities and services based on who is intended to use them—upper or middle class Filipino visitors, Filipino workers, or foreign visitors.

CULTURAL PRACTICES OF PLACES

Are there particular cultural practices or artifacts of the American military that continue today or have local Filipinos erased the memory of the former base? I argue that the institutional memory of the American bases continues to influence the cultural practices of the SBFZ, and that elite Filipinos purposefully institutionalized this memory to distinguish the SBFZ from Olongapo City. Three of the most visible examples that derive from the U.S. military concern the maintenance of order: (1) preservation and development of American and modern facilities, (2) cleanliness and litter and (3) traffic patterns.¹⁰

The SBMA governs the SBFZ and is accountable to the President of the Philippines, not the Olongapo City government. Past and present SBMA officials, rather than try to cover up any stigmas or associations with the U.S., strive to maintain and preserve the institutional memory of the American bases through rules regarding the construction of buildings. American symbolism is present in urban and semi-rural
locations in the Philippines, where various forms of media are in English, and American food, drink, and clothing brands are popular. For example, Coca-Cola is found in small *sari-sari* stores. Similarly, the SBFZ’s “aesthetics of politics” (Mosse, 1991) weave together American and Filipino myths and symbols that simultaneously refer to the base as a mythic institution rooted in Olongapo’s past and present, and to the economic, social, and cultural progress of Filipinos and their future.

The American military left behind more than 1,800 housing units that were converted into three long-term residential communities: Cubi, which houses mostly foreigners, and Binictican and Kalayaan, which both have Filipino and expatriate residents (interview with SBMA Law Enforcement Department staff member, September 14, 2012). Guidelines prohibit residents from changing the façades of their homes because SBMA wants “to preserve the architectural features,” which are military in nature (Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, 2011, p.14). Furthermore, the majority of SBFZ facilities use former American buildings without making substantial changes to their structure or appearance (see Figure 3). They do this not only to avoid costs and maintain architectural integrity and infrastructure for utilities, but also strategically and symbolically to link the SBFZ to the U.S. and distance it from Olongapo, which signals the availability of up-to-date facilities to potential business partners.

[Figure 3 about here]

These differences are visible to all from the SBFZ borders. For example, the Kalaklan Gate, at the far end of the CBD, borders the Olongapo City cemetery and is along a major roadway that connects Olongapo City to surrounding barangays (neighborhoods). From the bridge at Kalaklan Gate, I turn to view the SBFZ, and find that
buildings have large spaces in between them and are built with solid materials; there are clean roads with road signs and surface markings. Standing in the same spot, I turned around and looked into Olongapo City. The differences are immediately apparent—there are closely packed houses built with leftover materials (such as tin), and garbage alongside the street, residences, and river. These differences can also be seen alongside Rizal Highway within the SBFZ, which runs over one of Kalaklan River’s many drainage canals. During my fieldwork, I rode a shuttle over this river weekly. On the SBFZ side, there are boats and yachts docked at the Subic Bay Yacht Club’s pier. A glance to the other side shows houses made of tin. There is a stark contrast between the rich inside and the poor on the outside.

But these differences go beyond snapshots comparing the inside and outside of the SBFZ. Officials use strict enforcement of rules and regulations as another way to institutionalize the memory of the base within its old borders. This includes the absence of mga pulubi (beggars), street children, and stray animals, as well as the maintenance of sanitation standards for housing and businesses, the presence of armed SBMA police and security personnel, and the absence of public urination (Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, 2011; Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, 2009). Gloria, a white married American woman who makes approximately 30,000 USD per year and shuttles between the SBFZ and Taiwan for business, marks the boundaries between SBFZ and Olongapo by exclaiming that she cannot leave the SBFZ without seeing public urination and the abuse of animals.

One of the first differences between inside and outside the SBFZ that Filipino workers, Filipino visitors, and foreign visitors mention is its cleanliness. Just as the SBFZ
lacks *mga pulubi*, the poor, and street children, it also lacks litter. In the Philippines, although there are general environmental laws and programs that prohibit littering (Philippines, 1975; Philippines, 1997; Philippines, 2001), the norm is to throw trash on the ground as you walk. In American suburbs, littering is an invisible action (Murphy, 2012), but here I have witnessed people hold onto trash as they walk through the SBFZ, only to throw the litter on the ground as soon as they pass through the bridge and enter Olongapo City. Although a lack of institutional collection or trashcans contributes to the accumulation of litter (Murphy, 2012), it does not account for the presence of all litter. For example, the SM mall and other small stores right outside the SBFZ have trashcans outside their storefronts while they are open, and they employ workers to clean inside and outside the store. Yet litter remains, often right next to the trashcans. Additionally, a peek inside the SBMA trashcans shows that often they are not filled with garbage, but rather with leaves, sticks, and Styrofoam or plastic containers. The presence of trashcans does not automatically mean that litter is placed in these receptacles.

The SBFZ’s general absence of litter results from a combination of enforcement of environmental laws within the SBFZ, the hiring of workers to clean the area, and the institutional legacy of the military base. Filipino and foreign visitors and workers consider this a good thing. When the base was operational, American rules prohibited trash on the ground, and when the Americans withdrew, people continued this practice not only because of continuing laws—the first SBMA chairman strictly implemented the rules and regulations to preserve these behaviors—but also because it had become routinized. But such practices are more strictly enforced in some areas than in others. For example, near the gated entrances and within and around businesses, litter is absent. However, a walk
around various parts where there is not a lot of foot traffic and visitors shows that certain pockets of the SBFZ do accumulate litter. The institutional legacy of the military does not evenly influence the cultural practice of littering. The absence of peers who are committed to maintaining these practices, police who routinely enforce these rules, and foreigners, for whom at least some of the cleanliness is cultivated, lead to the disintegration of these legacies.

The differences in cultural practices of order and disorder extend not only to littering, but also to traffic. The contrast is noted by workers and visitors of different nationalities. Outside the SBFZ, jeepneys, trikes, pedicabs, cars, and vans zigzag across roads, crosswalks, and driving lanes, which serve only as loose guidelines. At important intersections, police help direct traffic, while traffic lights are obeyed depending on time of day, location, and degree of congestion. Inside the SBFZ, however, rules are more strictly enforced—drivers must come to a full stop at intersections with stop signs or red lights; yield to drivers who have the right of way; pull over for emergency vehicles; use proper lanes; obey speed limits; wear seat belts, and have a valid driver’s license, vehicle registration, and SBFZ vehicle decals.

Violating these rules incurs a warning on the first offense, and subsequent violations can receive up to a 5,000Php fine. Guards at major intersections and driving entrances maintain lists of violators so they can be informed of their offense via mail or upon their next entrance (Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, 1992; interview with SBMA Law Enforcement Department staff member, September 14th, 2012). However, as in the case of litter, these laws are less strictly enforced in unpopulated places.

MORALITY WITHIN PLACES
Order and disorder also carry moral connotations, so that the boundary is not just spatial but moral. As Douglas (2008 [1966]) shows, practices and moral discourses of pollution and cleanliness reinforce social relations and stratification. What meanings do SBFZ local workers, local visitors, and foreign visitors give to this space? Do they reinforce the stratification of the SBFZ and Olongapo vis-à-vis the aforementioned cultural practices? I argue that moral discourses of who and what are “good” and “bad” contribute to the maintenance of the social and physical boundaries that differentiate the SBFZ from Olongapo City and the type of people that visit and work in both places.

The legacies of the American military continue to influence these distinctions in two ways. First, the Filipinos I spoke with—both those who were SBFZ workers and visitors as well as those who had never visited the SBFZ—continue to refer to it as “the base,” maintaining its distinction from Philippine society and as a place for foreigners and elite Filipinos. Below, I describe how the base and U.S. comparisons continue to influence these discourses through perceptions of work. Second, the cultural practices of building maintenance, littering, and traffic correspond to constructions of the SBFZ as “good” while Olongapo City is disordered and “bad.” My interviewees, regardless of nationality, appreciated the order and cleanliness that differentiate the SBFZ. For example, Theo, a 22 year old Black South African single missionary whose church raised money for him to go on this mission, describes these differences:

*The difference between Freeport and Olongapo City is like the Egypt land and the Promise land, it’s much different. Freeport is much clean and much controlled because it was a navy place and also the nice mall that they built it, the Ayala Mall…but outside the Freeport, Olongapo is nice because of SM Mall, but it’s controlled, and compared [to] here, you have a lot of poverty in Olongapo when it's compared with Freeport...in
Olongapo, you see the real world. You see the people in the streets.

Two female SBFZ visitors, who are also former SBNB workers, explained the differences between working during the base’s era and working in the contemporary FZ. Aida, 61 years old, married, and with two children, and Marilyn, 51, single and with one child, are friends, and both agreed when Marilyn told me that the base was “mas maganda na ‘yon kasi alam mo, mataas ang labor. Kasi we were paid by hour” [it was better then because, you know, higher wages. Because we were paid by the hour]. This is an important distinction, since Philippine businesses pay employees by the day, not the hour. Additionally, they received, as Aida put it, “Actual training ‘yun. Mga actual training” from the military. Marilyn expands, “May certificate from the U.S. Department of Labor, because we were under the U.S. Navy … Kami, sa isang quarter, merong three weeks na schooling, merong exam, grade, English, Science, Mathematics and drawing” [We have a certificate from the U.S. Department of Labor because we were under the U.S. Navy…We, in one quarter, have three weeks of schooling, there were exams, grades, English, Science, Mathematics and drawing]. Furthermore, the military provided safety shoes and goggles and instituted five-day workweeks and eight-hour workdays.

However, Aida and Marilyn cannot understand Chinese and Korean businessmen, and note how these visitors ignore Filipino overtures of friendliness. Compared to their experiences with East Asians, they say “it was easier to communicate then [with Americans during the operation of the base], because most Filipinos speak both English and Tagalog. Now, very few [of us] could speak, let’s say, Korean or Chinese.” Aida and Marilyn cannot understand Koreans when they speak, who in turn, do not understand
Aida’s and Marilyn’s greetings when they pass each other on the street. In contrast, “the Americans … will greet you, ‘Hello!’ ‘Have a nice day!’ ‘Good morning!’”

Local workers at Harbor Point also described the differences between the SBFZ and Olongapo. They explained why they preferred to work inside versus outside of it—because it is “more organized,” “hospitable,” “strict,” “safer, better secured,” and “civilized”; they “control the people” and it is a “good place to work” with “work [that is] more stable.”

However, it is important to add caveats to these descriptions. These discourses are particular to the form of work—Harbor Point is based on interaction with Filipino and foreign customers. In contrast, I have witnessed SBFZ construction workers illegally wear flip-flops while working. Additionally, workers in the shipping and manufacturing industry are vulnerable to abuse. For example, the SBFZ company, Hanjin Shipping, is known for the abuse of workers’ rights, including physical abuse, mistreatment, inadequate breaks, and death. This was explained to me in my interviews, and is also seen in newspaper accounts and court cases (e.g. Philippines, 2011; Torres, 2012). Thus, the strict implementation of SBFZ rules that Harbor Point employees cite does not necessarily apply to all types of work. I argue that part of this discrepancy is due to the level of visibility for each type of work. Harbor Point workers, and how they are treated, are visible to rich customers; however, the conditions of shipping and manufacturing factories are not subject to the same daily scrutiny, making employees more vulnerable.

The rules that regulate the most visible parts of the SBFZ and make it a preferable place to work for Harbor Point employees, also apply to foreigners. David, an 18-year-old, single mixed-Native Hawaiian naval mechanic in port did not like the strictness and
commercialization of the SBFZ and preferred the neighboring Barrio Barretto. He illustrated the difference:

Me and my friend, we're in Olongapo. We were drinking. We walked by into the Freeport Zone. It was like 11:30 where I have to be back by midnight ... We started walking back and my friend starts throwing up. Fuck. Looking at it, he's just throwing them all over the place ...
Then he decided he wants us to go and take a pee. So he starts peeing in a park by a tree ...
and like this asshole coming by and saying, "I'm going to call the police." "Well, he's drunk. Just leave him alone ... I was like, "He can barely walk. He doesn't even know what a toilet is right now." He started calling the police. It's just my friend got drunk and he couldn't walk anymore. I was drunk as shit too. I was like—I put him over my shoulder and I started running with him on my shoulder. I don't know how I did it ... It was dumb because that guy ... he's going to call the cops he just started calling him. I got mad at that because he's like—out in Barrio Barretto ... I'm like, the locals would just be like, "I was just going here." "Just go in the bathroom here. It's all right." They understood ... and they're just trying to help us out.
That's what I like about Barrio Barretto, they help you out compared to this fuck—I hated it.

According to SBMA Law Enforcement Department (LED) statistics, there were 295 crime incidents in 2007, 195 in 2008, 116 in 2009, 128 in 2010 and 106 in 2011. In 2012, from January to June, there were 23 incidents, 48% (11 of 23) were related to theft. The LED does not keep track of the nationalities of perpetrators or victims. In comparison, the Olongapo City Police Department reported 2,195 crime incidents in 2011, which represents a crime rate of 898 incidents per 100,000 people, higher than the national figure; 80% (1,094 of the index crimes) were related to robbery and theft. The SBFZ covers more land—262 square miles compared to Olongapo City’s 71.5 square miles, and is less densely populated—it is home to 6,124 residents, whereas Olongapo City contains 247,842 residents. Although these figures suggest that the SBFZ has less crime
across more area than Olongapo City, they do not take into account the number of visitors to the SBFZ—an estimated 4 million in 2011—or unreported crimes.

Tracy, a white, 63 year old single Canadian who has worked in the SBFZ since its creation had a different perception of crime:

[SBMA police] don’t enforce [laws] anyway so it doesn’t matter. Sorry. I know I sound really negative but it’s just–where you get a bigger influx of people of course there’s more crime, if you will, mostly petty crime but copper theft is a huge problem here. Anything that’s got copper in it, street lights, sometimes two kilometers of street lights will not be working, we find out because they're stealing the wires constantly, which is a shame. Law enforcement officials here are civil servants and they don’t care, [there are] photo[s] of them sleeping, playing Angry Birds at work on the computers, and watching somebody burn the rubber off, then the cables, to get the wires. The perimeter fence that surrounds the Freeport it’s all been cut with bolt cutters and people just walk through ...

The newspaper and website Subicbaynews.net similarly report, with photographic evidence, how SBMA police will stand by while thieves steal cable wires.15

Local workers, local visitors, and foreign visitors also assign moral meanings in their discourse on the SBFZ’s institutionalized practices related to littering and traffic. For example, Boy, the aforementioned Filipino contractor with the SBMA, who is divorced with three children, said “the traffic rules is a good example, here everybody follows the traffic. The moment you step up in the gate. It’s good in FZ … I think there in FZ is much more order, as a practice to continue [the] orderly [nature of the] military base to the economic zones.” Harbor Point workers also note that another reason they prefer working within the SBFZ is that it is “spacious” and “clean.” Tom, a white single American tourist who said he was in Subic “for the beautiful women” described these differences from a
foreigner’s perspective:

*I like the mall here because it's clean and organized and there's no pollution ... of course, it's pretty obvious you're riding a bus and you see the Freeport. When you first come, you know exactly what it is ... It's a nice mall, it's a nice coffee shop, clean, and it's not a bad place to come hangout for a while ... I don't like driving around over in Olongapo because there are so many jeepneys and there [is] so much pollution in there.*

But, to local Filipino SBFZ visitors, the influx of more locals is threatening the cultural practices and moral discourses that maintain the distinction between the SBFZ and Olongapo City. Filipino and foreign visitors who were linked to the former base expressed frustration about the appearance of so many local Filipinos, because, in their view, the rules, regulations, and behavioral practices that have maintained the ordered status quo were disintegrating. During the holiday season, with the Night Market attracting shoppers who otherwise would not enter the SBFZ, garbage littered the nearby sidewalk and street. Roberto, a 30-year-old Filipino SBFZ visitor whose mother and father worked at the former base, related this anxiety:

*Maybe what I generally fear is having Harbor Point [mall], [there is] a lot more people who aren’t from here, you know? Because if you’re from Olongapo or Subic, you know. Everyone knows everyone basically if you’re from here. But now, there’s so many new faces. You don’t know right away, who they are. First, you just think, oh no, they’re not from here?! So what I fear is over population since there’s a lot of visitors that don’t know, in general, the rules and regulations here. I fear that the discipline inside here will vanish. Because of course, some other people throw their waste or garbage in random places. But us, generally, we're not like that. We don't spit on the floor. Normally we don’t do that.*

However, after the Nigh Market season ended and the vendors and their tents were
removed from this space, workers were once again hired to clean the area, suggesting that
the practices that make the SBFZ distinct will remain. The discipline, safety, and security
of the former base bleeds into the perception of the SBFZ, which celebrated its 20th
anniversary in 2012, and the increase in the number of Filipinos due to the opening of the
Harbor Point mall that same year is threatening to local residents who nostalgically
remember the base and perceive that lingering cultural practices and moral discourses are
disintegrating.

CONCLUSION

Place, as a geographical location filled with meaning, influences behavior and
culture (Gieryn, 2000; Paulsen, 2004). The spatial organization of places has distinct
consequences related to patterns of segregation, which are reinforced through cultural and
moral boundary-making practices and discourses (Massey and Denton, 1993; Lamont and
Molnar, 2002).

Global borderlands are a particular type of place—semi-autonomous, foreign-
controlled geographic locations geared toward international exchange (Reyes, in press). A
study of the place-making of global borderlands allows me to investigate how foreign
control influences place-making dynamics. The Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Philippines
provides a strategic case for understanding the significance of global borderlands because,
as home to two types of global borderlands, the former U.S. Subic Bay Naval Base and its
current form as a Freeport Zone, one sees how multiple forms of foreign-control influence
local dynamics.

Overseas military bases and Freeport Zones are often associated with negative
traits and consequences (Enloe, 2000 [1990]). However, they are not universally unwanted
(Cooley, 2008); indeed, local elites often cultivate varied types of global borderlands in their communities. Although much of the related research focuses on people and practices excluded from these sites, I am interested in those that are included—for example, SBNB and SBFZ local workers, local visitors, foreign visitors—and how they understand these spaces, their meanings, and the practices within them. Examining those that are included shifts the focus from exclusion, and whether global borderlands are “good” or “bad” for development, to one highlighting complexity and a nuanced understanding of these spaces.

Since the SBFZ occupies the same physical space as the former SBNB, I can also examine how colonial cultural practices, discourses, and socio-spatial organization influence contemporary life. Practices and discourses related to the SBFZ evoke images of Olongapo City as different and “bad” in comparison. Although Special Economic Zones around the world have practices that differentiate them from surrounding communities, what I have shown is how the SBFZ’s practices and discourses are also rooted in its physical and discursive history as a former U.S. military base. They are maintained not only because SBMA officials purposely institutionalized particular practices associated with the former base through the hiring of workers to clean and police the area, and the enforcement of related rules and regulation but also because these practices had become routinized and normalized for SBFZ workers and visitors, who also continue to maintain the discursive separation of the SBFZ from Olongapo City.

This continued distinction between the SBFZ and Olongapo City was not an obvious outcome. When the U.S. military withdrew, there was the possibility that the space would be more inclusive to Filipinos in the area. Local elite Filipinos took over the
SBNB and helped transform it into a FZ, and Philippine Republic Act 7227, which created the SBFZ, specifies that money from the SBFZ will be designated for improvements to the surrounding area. However, Filipino elites used its socio-spatial organization to continue to perpetuate longstanding inequalities. The recent agreements between the SBMA and the U.S. military regarding the U.S. military returning and taking over the currently unused SBFZ international airport may only increase and sharpen these divides, reviving the more stringent divisions from the base’s colonial era, though this is an empirical question.

Since the place-making of global borderlands continues to evolve, a primary focus of researchers should be the continued investigation of the influences of the past on places, rather than on a single snapshot in time. For example, research on Shenzhen Special Economic Zone shows the evolution of the Zone to a city-like space with internal stratification and regional connections (Sklair, 1991; Bach, 2010). Similarly, future research on varied types of global borderlands can highlight how people may evoke differing discourses and practices from the past, depending on the place’s current form and uses.

This analysis adds to the growing literature on place by demonstrating how the legacy of the past has lasting influence on interactions, practices, and discourses even after places are transformed from their original use. It shows how places of power have structural and spatial residues that reverberate in the present era, often in ways people take for granted. Places that change ownership can simultaneously be adapted for new uses while maintaining legacies from their original use. Understanding the legacies of place and power is complex, since they are the result of the original place’s socio-spatial
organization, use, and the meanings people attributed to it, as well as the relationship the surrounding community had with the original place.
References


Borer, Michael Ian. 2006. “The Location of Culture: The Urban Culturalist Perspective.” City & Community 5:173-197


http://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/03/world/asia/philippines-forgotten-children,

accessed February 14, 2013


Gastardo-Conaco, Cecilia and Carolyn Israel-Sobritchea. 1999. *Filipino-Amerasians: Living in the Margins*. Quezon City, Philippines: University Center for Women’s Studies Foundation


Inoue, Masamichi S. 2004. “‘We Are Okinawans But of a Different Kind’: New/Old Social Movements and the U.S. Military in Okinawa.” Current Anthropology 45:85-104


Murphy, Alexandra. 2012. “‘Litterers’: How Objects of Physical Disorder Are Used to Construct Subjects of Social Disorder in a Suburb.” *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 642:210-227


Philippines. 2011. *Subic Shipbuilder Corp and Redondo I-Tech Corp v National Labor Relations Commission (Fourth Division) [formerly 7th Division], Rogelio Bernal and Christine Baylon*, Supreme Court of Appeals. No. 121186

Appropriating Funds Therefore, and for Other Purposes, accessed:


http://www.chanrobles.com/administrativeorders/administrativeorderno341.html#

Philippines. 1975. Presidential Decree No. 825: Providing Penalty for Improper Disposal of Garbage and Other Forms of Uncleanliness and for Other Purposes, accessed:


Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. 2009. SBMA Legal Department lease template
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. 1992. “Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Provisions Relative to the Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone and the
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority Under Republic Act No. 7227, Otherwise
Known as the “Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992.”

131:43-48

Review 51:273–86

Telles, Edward. 2004. Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil.

Thompson, W Scott. 1975. Unequal Partners: Philippine and Thai Relations with the

Torres, Estrella. 2012. “DOLE, SBMA Sign Deal to Protect Subic Freeport Workers.”
BusinessMirror, accessed July 15, 2013,
sign-deal-to-protect-subic-freeport-workers

Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee
on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 102nd Congress. Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office

Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of


Digital National Security Archives


FOOTNOTES

1 Although billed by Marcos and herself as only a housewife, Aquino was part of the Conjuangcos dynasty.

2 Mt. Pinatubo changed negotiations. R.P. officials wanted the same compensation previously agreed upon. The U.S. refused and lowered its offer; R.P. officials accused them of exploiting their vulnerability (United States, 1991:22).

3 Aquino supported and attended the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security on August 27, 1991

4 Before the vote Aquino tried to demonstrate their importance via a people’s march and Senate lobbying


7 Aetas have been excluded since Spanish colonization. The SBFZ lies on ancestral lands and in 2009, the Ambala tribe was given legal authority over 10 acres of land.

8 However, unlike Brazil and the United States, the Philippines does not officially recognize racial or skin color differences through the census. Rather, the state tracks differences by regions and provinces, which highlight different ethno-linguistic groups; these have some relation to skin color differences.

9 Although the interaction between the different races/ethnicities of Americans and different ethnicities/skin colors of Filipinos is an important dynamic, it is not the focus of this paper.
10 Gender is an important component of dynamics within and outside the SBFZ. However, my focus is on particular cultural practices, not on intimate relationships (young Filipina women, older white or black American, white Australian, or Japanese men). I address these relationships in another paper.

11 All names are pseudonyms,


13 Land: http://invest.mysubicbay.com.ph/major-districts; residents:

14 Land: http://www.olongapocity.gov.ph/Geo.html; residents:

15 http://subicbaynews.net/?p=2940, accessed 1/30/13