Panel Title
The Tripartite Soul as Metaphor
Location
Kardinaal Mercierzaal, Institute of Philosophy, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, 3000 Leuven
Start Date
2-13-2014 2:30 PM
End Date
2-13-2014 3:15 PM
Abstract
As Plato might have said, but didn't, all soul is metaphor. This paper explores the implications of this in the tripartite model of the soul as deployed in the account of the deviant personality types in Republic 8 and 9. The levels of the hierarchy and the stages of degeneration from the ideal make frequent use of personification. Agency, however, is not attributed only to the εἴδη of the ψυχή, but also to the individual and to his desires. Interaction takes place between the individual and the εἴδη of his ψυχή, but also between the individual and his desires, as well as between desire and desire, and between the εἴδη of the ψυχή. There is interaction between one individual and another, but also between one individual and various personified elements of another’s personality. Since personification characterizes the model at all levels, it makes no sense to ask what the ἐπιθυμητικόν (for example) can ‘really’ do; it is only in so far as it is personified that it can ‘do’ anything. The tenor of the metaphor is not some non-metaphorical or less metaphorical version of the tripartite soul, but simply the person.
The Tripartite Soul as Metaphor
Kardinaal Mercierzaal, Institute of Philosophy, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, 3000 Leuven
As Plato might have said, but didn't, all soul is metaphor. This paper explores the implications of this in the tripartite model of the soul as deployed in the account of the deviant personality types in Republic 8 and 9. The levels of the hierarchy and the stages of degeneration from the ideal make frequent use of personification. Agency, however, is not attributed only to the εἴδη of the ψυχή, but also to the individual and to his desires. Interaction takes place between the individual and the εἴδη of his ψυχή, but also between the individual and his desires, as well as between desire and desire, and between the εἴδη of the ψυχή. There is interaction between one individual and another, but also between one individual and various personified elements of another’s personality. Since personification characterizes the model at all levels, it makes no sense to ask what the ἐπιθυμητικόν (for example) can ‘really’ do; it is only in so far as it is personified that it can ‘do’ anything. The tenor of the metaphor is not some non-metaphorical or less metaphorical version of the tripartite soul, but simply the person.